Six Things That Citizens Around the World Urgently Need to Know About Climate Change In Light of Several Recent Scientific Reports

This article identifies and explains six things that most citizens around the world, although particularly those in developed countries, need to understand about climate change in light of the most recent climate change science. These six things are:

  1. The enormous magnitude of GHG emissions reductions needed to prevent catastrophic warming.
  2. The speed of GHG emissions reductions needed to prevent catastrophic warming.
  3. No nation may either legally or morally use national self-interest alone as justification for their failure to fully meet their obligation under the UNFCCC.
  4. No nation may either legally or morally use scientific uncertainty as justification for their failure to fully meet their obligations under the UNFCCC.
  5. Developed countries must legally, morally, and practically more aggressively reduce their GHG emissions than developing countries
  6. Developed countries must legally, morally, and practically help finance mitigation and adaptation programs in poor developing countries.

The need for broad understanding among civil society of these issues follows from several recent scientific reports on climate change. For instance, on October 8, 2018, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) issued a Special Report on limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees C above pre-industrial temperatures.  This landmark report, along with several additional recent scientific studies published in the last few months including a paper published by the Proceedings of the US National Academy of Sciences on July 21, 2018, Trajectories of  the Earth System in the Anthropocene by Steffen, and a paper published in mid-August of this year in Nature Communications by Anthony et. al., 21st-Century Modeled Permafrost Carbon Emissions Accelerated by Abrupt Thaw Beneath, lead to the conclusion that the international community is facing an urgent existential crisis that threatens life on Earth. Preventing this catastrophe requires the entire international community at all levels of government (national, state, regional, and local) to engage immediately in an unprecedented effort to rapidly reduce GHG emissions to net zero in the next few decades.

Although the October IPCC report on 1.5 degrees C warming received some significant notice in the US media, the recent US elections on November 6th in which climate change played only a very minor role at best, demonstrates a startling lack of understanding about the enormity and urgency of the climate threat facing the international community. Because of the immense ramp-up of programs and efforts needed to reduce the staggering threat of climate change depends on broad understanding of the scale of the problem facing the human race, and given the apparent ignorance of most citizens about the magnitude and urgency of the climate change crisis and other issues discussed in this paper, concerned citizens need to mount an aggressive educational program to inform civil society about aspects of the climate change threat that appear to be poorly understood. These issues include the following:

1. The Immense Magnitude of GHG Reductions Urgently Needed to Prevent Catastrophic Warming

The IPCC Special Report concludes that limiting global warming to 1.5°C would require rapid, far-reaching, and unprecedented changes in all aspects of society.  This is so because to limit warming to 1.5 C, CO2 emissions would need to fall by about 45 percent from 2010 levels by 2030, reaching ‘net zero’ around 2050 according to the IPCC Special Report. This means if global CO2 emissions have not fallen to net zero levels by 2050, any remaining emissions would need to balanced by removing CO2 from the air.

The Steffen et. al. paper also describes how the positive feedbacks depicted in the following graphic, once triggered could initiate other feedbacks creating a cascade of positive feedbacks, each of which could speed up the warming which is already causing great harm and suffering around the world. The paper claims this mechanism could make life on much of the Earth uninhabitable which could lead to social collapse on the global scale and ultimately to warming increases that human reductions of greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions alone would not prevent additional warming until the global system reached a new temperature equilibrium at much higher temperatures than the human race has ever experienced. In other words, cascading positive feedbacks in the climate system could result in humans losing control over reducing disastrous warming.

The Steffen paper also explains how human-induced warming of slightly over 1.0 degrees C is already rapidly approaching levels that may trigger positive climate feedbacks which could greatly accelerate the warming already plaguing the world by causing record floods, deadly heat waves, droughts, increasing tropical diseases, forest fires, more intense and damaging storms, sea level rise, coral bleaching, acidification of oceans, all of which are contributing to increasing the number of refugees which are destabilizing governments around the world.

The Anthony paper also explains that, contrary to common assumptions previously made by many in the international community that positive feedbacks in the climate system that could cause abrupt temperature increases would not likely be triggered if warming could be limited to below 2C above pre-industrial levels, positive feedbacks could be initiated between current temperatures which have risen slightly above 1.1C and 2C. Moreover, the additional warming caused by these feedbacks could initiate other feedbacks creating a cascade of positive feedbacks, each of which could speed up the warming which is already causing great harm and suffering around the world, phenomena which threaten life on earth.

For these reasons, citizens around the world need to understand the urgent need to reduce GHG emissions to net zero as soon as possible.

2The Speed of GHG Reductions Needed to Prevent Catastrophic Warming.

Every day that nations fail to reduce their GHG emissions to levels required of them to achieve a warming limit goal such as 2 degrees C makes the problem worse because the carbon budgets for the whole world that must constrain global emissions to achieve any warming limit goal shrink as emissions continue. Therefore, the speed that nations reduce their GHG emissions reductions is as important as the magnitude of the reductions identified by any national GHG reduction commitment. For this reason, any national commitment on climate change should not only identify the amount of GHG emissions that will be reduced by a certain date, but also the reduction pathway by which these reductions will be achieved.

The following illustration depicts two different GHG reduction pathways for reaching zero emissions by 2050. Although the curve on the top achieves zero GHG emissions at the same time as the curve on the bottom, total emissions during the period are much greater following the emissions reductions pathway under the top curve compared to total emissions under the bottom curve because the lower curve pathway more quickly reduces emissions. Citizens need to understand that waiting to reduce GHG emissions makes the problem worse because waiting consumes more of any shrinking carbon budget that must constrain global emissions to achieve any warming limit goal.

3. No Nation may either Legally or Morally use National Self-interest Alone as Justification for Their Failure to Fully Meet Their Obligations under the UNFCCC.

Because GHG emissions from every country mix rapidly in the atmosphere, all nations’ emissions are contributing to rising atmospheric GHG concentrations thus harming people and ecological systems on which life depends all over the world. The above illustration depicts that the atmosphere is analogous to a bathtub in that it has limited volume and that all nations emitting GHGs are raising atmospheric concentration of GHGs to its current concentration of approximately 407 ppm CO2 (the second line from the bottom in the above bathtub) which level is already causing enormous harm in many vulnerable countries while threatening the entire world if the atmospheric GHG concentration is raised to levels which trip positive feedbacks discussed above (represented by the upper line in the above bathtub). Thus high-emitting countries such as the US may not formulate their climate change policies on the basis of costs and benefits to itself alone. Particularly those nations that are emitting high levels of GHGs must acknowledge and respond to the devastating climate change harms they are already contributing to in other countries and particularly harms to poor people and nations that are most vulnerable to climate change impacts.  Thus in the United States, for instance, the Trump administration’s justification for withdrawing the United States from the Paris Agreement on the basis of “putting US interests first ” is ethically indefensible and tragic because of the damage the Trump climate change policy will cause outside the United States.

The following illustration depicts nations emitting high levels of GHG in red in the top half of the illustration while those countries most vulnerable to climate change impacts are indicated in red in the bottom half of the illustration.

For this reason, as a matter of law, given that nations under the UNFCCC agreed to stabilize GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. (UNFCCC, Art. 2), a nation may not fail to reduce its GHG emissions to its fair share of safe global emissions based on the cost to it because it has ethical and legal duties to other nations not to harm them.

4.  Scientific Uncertainty is Not a Legally or Morally Defensible Justification for Not Adopting Aggressive Climate Change Policy Responses.

Although opponents of climate change policies have justified their opposition on the basis of scientific uncertainty, and despite the fact that the most prestigious scientific organizations have expressly stated their conclusions about the enormous threat of climate change with increasingly higher levels of scientific probability for over 40 years, scientific uncertainty is not a justifiable response for any nation’s unwillingness to adopt climate change policies as a matter of law or morally.

Under international law, including the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC,  Art. 3.3) which states in relevant part “where there  are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty may not be used as a reason for postponing such measures,” and the “no harm principle”, a principle of customary international law recognized in the Preamble to the UNFCCC, nations may not legally use scientific uncertainty as an excuse for failing to take action to prevent dangerous climate change.

Also as we explained previously in 2008 in The Ethical Duty to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions in the Face of Scientific Uncertainty, nations also have had a strong moral responsibility to take action to reduce the threat of climate change once it was scientifically understood that GHG emissions could cause serious harms even if the harms had not been proven with high degrees of scientific certainty.

Given, that numerous reputable scientific organizations beginning in the late 1970s,  including the US National Academies of Sciences, (See Early Climate Change Consensus at the National Academy) and five reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change beginning in 1990 (See IPCC report timeline)  have concluded with increasing levels of certainty that human activities are dangerously threatening people and ecological systems on which life depends, nations have been on strong notice for over four decades that human activities responsible for GHG emissions are dangerous to the human community, thus nations have been on notice about the dangers of climate change for over 40 years and therefore may not legally or morally use scientific uncertainty as an excuse for failing to adopt climate change policies that will reduce their GHG emissions to levels required of them to prevent dangerous climate change.

5. High Emitting Developed Countries, Including the United States, Must Reduce GHG Emissions More Aggressively than Other Countries as a Matter of Law and Practically to Prevent Dangerous Climate Change.

Hiigh-emitting nations have a legal duty under the UNFCCC to reduce their GHG emissions faster than lower emitting nations because they agreed to:

[P]rotect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof. (UNFCCC, 1992, Art 3.1)

These principles were re-committed to in the Paris Agreement , Art 2.2 which  provides that:

This Agreement will be implemented to reflect equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.

Thus under law, hiigh emitting nations, such as the US, have a legal duty under the concept of “equity” to reduce its GHG emissions more rapidly than most other nations.  Although there is reasonable disagreement among nations about what “equity” requires of them,  formulate its ghg emissions reduction target on the basis of equity is not only required by its legal obligations under the UNFCCC, practically the US and other high emitting nations must reduce their GHG emissions by much greater amounts and faster than poor developing nations because if they don’t the poorer nations will have to reduce their GHG emissions almost immediately to near zero CO2 so that global emissions don’t exceed the carbon budget available to prevent a warming limit such as 2 degrees C from being exceeded,

  • There is a basic set of shared ethical principles and precedents that apply to the climate problem…[and] such principles… can put bounds on the plausible interpretation of equity in the burden sharing context…[and] are important in establishing what may be reasonably required of different actors.  (IPCC, 2014, AR5, WG III, Ch. 4, pg .317 )

The IPCC went on to say:

  •  these equity principles can be understood to comprise four key dimensions: responsibility, capacity, equality and the right to sustainable development (IPCC, , AR5, WG III, Ch 4, p. 318).

As a matter of law, therefore, high-emitting countries such as the United States must reduce its GHG emissions to safe levels based on equity at faster levels than other countries as any reasonable interpretation of equity would require the US to make much larger and more rapid GHG reductions than almost all other nations given that the United States (under the concept of responsibility) emitted 5,011,687 metric kilotons (kt) of CO2 equivalent emissions in 2016, second only to China’s 10,432,741 kt CO2. (Netherlands Environmental Agency), also under the concept of responsibility the United States has emitted a greater amount of cumulative CO2 emissions, that is 29.3% of global CO2 emissions between 1850 and 2002, while China emitted 7.6% during the same period, (WRI, Cumulative Emissions) making the US much more responsible for raising atmospheric concentrations of CO2 to the current level of approximately 406 ppm than any country.  Also, under the concept of equality given the US is responsible for 15.56 metric tons per capita CO2 emissions which is more than twice as much as China’s 7.45 metric tons per capita in 2016 (World Bank), as a matter of equity the US must reduce its GHG emissions much more rapidly and steeply than almost all countries.

The following illustration demonstrates why high-emitting nations must also practically reduce emissions more aggressively than other nations because it can be seen that if the high emitting nations such as China, the EU, and USA, depicted near the bottom of the illustration, don’t reduce GHG emissions muchfaster than the rest of the world, and if the international community is going to be restrained by the emissions reduction pathway needed to achieve a warming limit goal, such as the 2 degee C pathway depicted in the illustration, then there is quickly nothing left for the rest of the world. Therefore, high-emitting nations must more aggressively reduce their emissions than lower emitting nations not only as a matter of law but also to retain any hope for the international community to achieve warming limit goals agreed to in the Paris Agreement of as close as possible to 1.5 degrees C but no greater than 2 degrees C.

6. Developed Nations Have a Legal and Moral Duty to Provide Financial Resources to Assist Developing Nartions with both Mitigation and Adaptation Programs and this Financial Assistance is also Practically Indespensible to Prevent Climate-induced Harms in all Countries.

Under the UNFCCC, developed country Parties agreed to provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties in implementing the objectives of the Convention (UNFCCC, Article 4, §3). The Paris Agreement also provides that the developed countries shall provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation in continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention. (Paris Agreement, Art, 9.1)

Financial support of developing nation’s mitigation obligations under the UNFCCC  mitigations is not only legally required under the UNFCCC but also practically important because large-scale investments are required to significantly reduce emissions and dangerous climate change will not likely be avoided unless developing nations reduce their GHG emissions to their fair share of safe global emissions. Financial support for developing nations by developed nations is also both legally and ethically required to meet the adaptation needs of developing countries, as significant financial resources are needed by many vulnerable countries to adapt to the adverse climate change.

Climate impacts, such as sea-level rise and more frequent droughts and floods, are already having devastating effects on communities and individuals in developing countries. These impacts on developing countries are already affecting developed nations because, for instance, between 2008 and 2011, approximately 87 million people were displaced due to extreme weather events which is causing a mass migration of refugees which is destabilizing many developed nations, particularly in Europe.(Climate Change in Developing Countries, Government of Canada)  According to the World Health Organization, climate change is expected to contribute to approximately 250,000 additional deaths per year from malnutrition, malaria, diarrhea and heat stress.(World Health Organization, Climate and Health) .

Developing countries are the most impacted by climate change. This is due to many factors, including the economic importance of climate-sensitive sectors for these countries (e.g. agriculture) and the limited financial and human capacity to respond to the impacts of climate change. (Climate Change in Developing Countries, Government of Canada). The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations estimates that by 2030, up to 122 million more people could be forced into extreme poverty due to the effects of climate change—many of them women. (Conflicts Fueled by Climate Change, The Guardian.)

Because climate change is already destabilizing developed countries due to refugees who are fleeing vulnerable areas of poor developing nations that have become inhabitable due to climate change-induced droughts, floods, loss of drinking water, and rising seas, if developed nations do not help finance climate change adaptation programs in developing countries, they will experience growing conflict and stress caused by vulnerable people and refugees in developing countries who are both creating conflicts in their countries and in developed countries they have or are seeking to enter. . 

Image result for climate change refugees

The following illustration depicts the number of  refugees who are fleeing or who have fled climate change.

Image result for climate change refugees

Conflicts Fueled by Climate Change, The Guardian.

For this reason, developed country financing assistance for emissions reduction and adaptation programs in developing countries is not only legally required but practically necessary to reduce climate change-induced problems and conflicts in developed countries.


Donald A. Brown

Scholar in Residence and Professor

Widener University Commonwealth Law School


New Evidence That Climate Change Poses a Much Greater Threat to Humanity Than Recently Understood Because the IPCC has been Systematically Underestimating Climate Change Risks: An Ethical Analysis


Three papers have been recently published that lead to the conclusion that human-induced climate change poses a much more urgent and serious threat to life on Earth than many have thought who have been relying primarily on the conclusions of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). This paper first reviews these papers and then examines the ethical questions by the issues discussed in these papers.

I. The Three Papers

On July 31, 2018, a paper was published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences which should create a shiver of fear in all humans everywhere. The paper, Trajectories of  the Earth System in the Anthropocene by Steffen, explains how human-induced warming is rapidly approaching levels that may trigger positi climate feedbacks which could greatly accelerate the warming already plaguing the world by causing record floods, deadly heat waves and droughts, increasing tropical diseases, forest fires, more intense and damaging storms, sea level rise, coral bleaching, and acidification of oceans, all of which are contributing to increasing the number of refugees which are destabilizing governments around the world. This paper explains that, contrary to common assumptions made by many in the international community that positive feedbacks in the climate system that could cause abrupt temperature increases would not likely be triggered if warming could be limited to 20 C above pre-industrial levels, positive feedbacks could be initiated between current temperatures and 20 C. Moreover, once triggered the additional warming caused by these feedbacks could initiate other feedbacks creating a cascade of positive feedbacks, each of which could speed up the warming which is already causing great harm and suffering around the world. The paper claims this mechanism could make life on much of the Earth uninhabitable which could lead to social collapse on the global scale and ultimately to warming increases that human reductions of greenhouse gases (ghg) emissions alone would not prevent until the global system reached a new temperature equilibrium at much higher temperatures than the human race has ever experienced. In other words, cascading positive feedbacks in the climate system could result in humans losing control over preventing disastrous warming.

Another recent paper published in mid-August in Nature Communications by Anthony et. al., 21st-Century Modeled Permafrost Carbon Emissions Accelerated by Abrupt Thaw Beneath Lakes, concludes that models used to predict climate impacts have failed to incorporate abrupt carbon feedback from permafrost decay that recent evidence has revealed is now possible. In fact, the paper claims that early stages of processes that lead to permafrost degradation are already underway, a phenomenon which leads to release of dangerous amounts of methane and CO2. This paper further concludes that carbon emissions from melting permafrost could increase soil carbon emissions by 125–190% compared to gradual thaw alone.

This paper summarizes major conclusions from a third recent paper which analyzes IPCC’s consistent underestimation of climate change impacts. This paper, What Lies Beneath: On the Understatement of Existential Climate Risk, (hereinafter “WLB”), recently published by the Breakthrough Institute, claims both that the risks posed by climate change are far greater than is evident from the conclusions of IPCC and examines why IPCC has frequently underestimated threats from climate change.

The WLB report also further concludes that climate change is now an existential risk to humanity, that is an adverse outcome that could either annihilate intelligent life or permanently and dramatically curtail its potential. (WLB, p.13)

Although the WLB report acknowledges IPCC has done “critical, indispensable work of the highest standard in pulling together a periodic consensus of what must be the most exhaustive scientific investigation in world history” however, the IPCC process suffers from all of the dangers of consensus-building in such a wide-ranging and complex arena. (WLB, p. 5) The report also attributes the overly conservative conclusions of the IPCC to the consensus building nature that IPCC must follow to get governments to approve IPCC final reports and to IPCC’s following scientific norms that condemn speculation. (WLB. p. 5) As a result, the report concludes that much of the climate research on which IPCC has relied has tended to underplay climate risks and as a result, IPCC has exhibited preferences for conservative estimates of climate change impacts. (WLB, p. 5)  This practice the WLB reports labels as “scholarly reticence.” (WLB, p. 5)

This WLB report further claims that climate science has succumbed to the norm followed by most physical sciences to refrain from any speculation that cannot be grounded in empirically determined probability calculations. This epistemic norm, the report claims, is not well-suited to guide predictions about very scientifically complex matters such as earth system dynamics. The report calls this approach the Probability Obsession of science which is not well suited to predict future states of complex systems about matters for which there are no historical antecedents. (WLB, p. 2)

The WLB report also notes that a conservative approach to climate science began to dominate and as a result, the planetary future has become a hostage to national economic self-interest. Thus, the paper claims it became “alarmist” to claim the climate change is an existential threat to life on earth. (WLB, p.4)

The report further notes that although “a fast emergency-scale transition to a post-fossil fuel world is absolutely necessary to address climate change…. yet this is excluded from consideration by policymakers because it is considered to be too disruptive.” And so the paper claims “we have a policy failure of epic proportions.”  (WLB, p. 4)

The WLB report further notes that although it has widely been reported that if the ghg emissions reductions commitments or Nationally Determined Commitments (NDCs)  made by governments so far under the Paris Agreement are complied with, the Earth’s temperature is expected to rise to  3.40 C by 2100 without taking into account “long-term” carbon cycle feedbacks. (WLB, p.15) Yet if the positive feedbacks are fully considered, the temperature path defined by the NDCs could result in around 5° C of warming by 2100 according to a MIT study. (WLB, p.13) Yet, the report claims that even if warming reaches 3° C, most of Bangladesh and Florida would drown, while major coastal cities – Shanghai, Legos, Mumbai – would be swamped likely creating larger flows of climate refugees. Most regions of the world would see a significant drop in food production and an increasing number of extreme weather events, whether heat waves, floods or storms. (WLB, p.13)

The WLB report concludes warming of 4°C or more could reduce the global human population by 80% or 90%, and the World Bank reports “there is no certainty that adaptation to a 4°C temperature rise would be possible.” Quoting Professor Kevin Anderson, the report claims a 4°C future “is incompatible with an organized global community and is likely to be beyond adaptation by the majority of people.” (WLB, p. 14)

The WLB report also claims that the often-quoted prediction of likely temperature increases if current NDCs are complied with of approximately 3° C rise does not take into account the considerable risk that self-reinforcing feedback loops could be triggered when certain thresholds are reached leading to an ever-increasing rise in temperature. These potential thresholds include the melting of the Arctic permafrost releasing methane into the atmosphere, forest dieback releasing carbon currently stored in the Amazon and boreal forests, with the melting of polar ice caps that would no longer reflect the light and heat from the sun. (WLB, p. 14)

The report cites a recent study by the European Commission’s Joint Research Center found that if global temperature rose to 4° C that extreme heat waves with “apparent temperatures” peeking over 550 C (1310 F) will begin to regularly affect many densely populated parts of the world, forcing much activity in the modern industrial world to stop. (WLB, p.14)

The paper claims that one study found that even a 2° C warming “would double the land area subject to deadly heat and expose 48% of the population to deadly heat.” (WLB, p.14)

According to the WLB report, a 4° C warming by 2100 would subject 47% of the land area and almost 74% of the world population to deadly heat which could pose existential risks to humans and mammals alike unless massive adaptation measures are implemented. (WLB, p.14)

The WLB paper also explains how IPCC’s understatements of likely climate change impacts affect what is generally claimed among climate policy-makers about elements of climate science including climate models, climate tipping points, climate sensitivity, carbon budgets, permafrost and carbon cycles, arctic sea ice, polar ice-mass loss, and sea-level rise. The following summarizes some of the main paper’s conclusions on these matters, although we recommend that interested parties read the WLB’s full description of these issues. The full paper also should be consulted for footnote sources of the following conclusions.

Climate Models

Climate modeling is at the core of the work by IPCC, and in developing future emission and warming scenarios a 2007 report by the US Center for Strategic and International Studies Center for New American Security recognized the that: “Recent observations indicate the projections from climate models have been too conservative,” and  “the effects of climate change are unfolding faster and more dramatically than expected,” and, “multiple lines of evidence support the position that the 2007 IPCC reports’ projections of impacts are systematically biased low.” (WLB, p.18) For instance, the paper concludes:

The models used to project future warming either omit or do not account for uncertainty in potentially important positive feedbacks that could amplify warming (e.g., release of greenhouse gases from thawing permafrost, reduced ocean and terrestrial CO2 removal from the atmosphere, and there is some evidence that such feedbacks may already be occurring in response to the present warming trend. Hence, climate models may underestimate the degree of warming from a given amount of greenhouse gas emitted into the atmosphere by human activities alone. Additionally, recent observations of climate system responses to warming (e.g. changes in global ice cover, sea level rise, tropical storm activity) suggest that IPCC models underestimate the responsiveness of some aspects of the climate system to a given amount of warming. (WLB, p.18)

Climate models simply omit emissions from warming permafrost, but we know that is the wrong answer because this tacitly assumes that these emissions are zero and we know that’s not right. (WLB, p.18)

The WLB report characterizes IPCC reports as presenting “detailed, quantified (numerical) modeling results-such as feedbacks that the models account for in a descriptive non-quantified form. Sea-levels, polar ice sheets, and some carbon-cycle are three examples. Because policymakers and the media are often drawn to the headline numbers, this approach results in less attention being given to the most devastating, high-end, non-linear and difficult to quantify outcomes.” (WLB, p. 19).

The WLB report concludes about this tendency: “The emphasis on consensus in IPCC reports has put the spotlight on expected outcomes which then become anchored via numerical estimates in the minds of policymakers.” (WLB, p. 19)

The WLB report also notes that one of the problems with IPCC is the strong desire to rely on physical models. (WLB, p. 20)

Tipping Points

A tipping point may be understood as the passing of a critical threshold in the earth climate systems component – such as major ocean and atmospheric circulation patterns, the polar ice sheet, and the terrestrial and ocean carbon stores – which produces a steep change in the system. (WLB, p. 21) Progress toward a tipping point is often driven by positive feedbacks, in which a change in the component leads to further changes that eventually “feedback” onto the original component to amplify the effect. A classic case is global warming is the ice-albedo feedback, or decreases in the area of polar ice change surface reflexivity, trapping more heat, producing further sea ice loss. (WLB, p. 21)

In some cases, passing one threshold will trigger further threshold events, for example, where substantial greenhouse gas releases from polar permafrost carbon stores increase warming, releasing even more permafrost carbon in a positive feedback, but also pushing other systems, such as polar ice sheets past their threshold point. (WLB, p. 21)

In a period of rapid warming, most major tipping points, once crossed are irreversible in human time frames, principally due to the longevity of atmospheric CO2 (a thousand years). (WLB, p. 21)

Climate models are not yet good at dealing with tipping points. (WLB, p.21) This is partly due to the nature of tipping points, where particularly complex confluence of factors abruptly change the climate system characteristics and drive it into a different state. (WLB, p.21) To model this, all the contributing factors and their forces have to be well identified, as well as their particular interactions, plus the interactions between tipping points. (WLB,  p.21)  Some researchers say that “complex, nonlinear systems typically shift between alternative states in an abrupt, rather than the smooth, changes, a challenge that the climate models have not yet been able to adequately meet. (WLB, p. 21)

Risks associated with tipping points increase disproportionately as temperature increases from 1° C to 2° C and become high above 3° C. Yet political negotiations have consistently disregarded the high-end scenarios that could lead to abrupt or irreversible climate change. (WLB, p. 21)

IPCC has published few projections regarding tipping-point thresholds, nor emphasized the importance of building robust risk-management assessments of them in absence of adequate quantitative data. (WLB, p. 210)

The world is currently completely unprepared to envision and even less deal with the consequences of catastrophic climate change. (WLB, p. 21)

Climate Sensitivity

Climate sensitivity is the amount by which the global average temperature will rise due to a doubling of atmospheric greenhouse gas levels, at equilibrium. IPCC reports a focus on what is generally called equilibrium climate sensitivity (ECS). The 2007 IPCC report gave a best estimate of climate sensitivity of 3° C and said it is likely to be in the range 2° C to 4.5° C. (WLB, p. 22)

The 2014 IPCC report says that “no best estimate for equilibrium climate sensitivity can now be given, because of lack of agreement on values across lines of evidence and studies” and only gives a range of 1.5° C to 4.5° C. (WLB, p. 22)

The IPCC reports fail to mention that the ECS measure omits key “long-term” feedbacks that a rise in the planet’s temperature can trigger. (WLB, p. 22) These include the permafrost feedback, other changes in the terrestrial carbon cycle, a decrease in the ocean’s carbon-sink efficiency, and the melting of polar ice sheets creating a cold ocean-surface layer underneath that accelerates the melting of ice shelves and hastens the rate of ice-mass loss. (WLB, p. 22)

There is a wide range of literature that suggests that climate sensitivity which includes these feeedbacks-known as Earth System Sensitivity (ESS), is 4-6 0 C. (WLB, p. 22).

Long-term feedbacks have already begun to appear on short time frames, climate-carbon cycle coupling is expected to add carbon to the atmosphere as the climate warms, although the magnitude of feedback is uncertain. (WLB, p. 22)

Conclusions about climate sensitivity should take into account that:

  1. Biogeochemical feedbacks (such as less efficient land-ocean sinks, including permafrost loss) effectively increases carbon emissions to 2100 by about 20% and can enhance warming by up to 0.5°C, compared to the baseline scenario. (WLB, p. 23)
  2. Warming has been projected to increase methane emissions from wetlands by 0 – 100% compared with present-day wetland methane emissions. A 50% increase in wetland methane emissions by 2100 is expected in response to high-end warming of 4.1 – 5°C which could add at least another 0.5°C warming. (WLB, p. 23)
  3. It is important to use high-end climate sensitivity because some studies have suggested the climate models have underestimated three major positive climate feedbacks: positive ice albedo feedback from the retreat of Arctic sea ice; positive cloud albedo feedbacks from retreating storm track clouds in mid-latitudes, and positive albedo feedback by the next phase (water and ice) clouds. When these are taken into account the ECS is more than 40% higher than the IPCC mid-figure, at 4.5 to 4.7° C. (WLB, p. 23)

Some recent research concludes that climate sensitivity is higher in warmer, interglacial periods (such as present) and lower in colder glacial periods. Based on a study of glacial cycles and temperatures over the last 100, 000 years one study concludes that in warmer periods climate sensitivity is 4.88 0 C. (WLB, p. 23) The higher figure would mean that an atmospheric concentration 450 ppm CO2, a figure that current trends will reach in 5 years, would be around 30 C in rather than the 20 C number bandied about in policy making circles. (WLB, p. 23)

Carbon Budgets

A carbon budget is the estimate of the total future human-caused ghg emissions in tons of CO2 or CO2 equivalent, that would be consistent with limiting warming to a specific figure, such as

1.5 0 C or 20 C with a given risk of exceeding the target such as 50%, 33%, or a 10% chance. (WLB, p. 24)

Carbon budgets are usually based on mid-term climate sensitivity numbers of around 30 C. (WLB, p. 22)

Yet there are reasons to believe climate sensitivity is closer to 4C. In fact, as we have seen, climate sensitivity may be between 4-60 C. (WLB, p. 22)

Carbon budgets are routinely proposed that have a substantial and unacceptable risk of exceeding specified targets and hence entail large and unmanageable risks of failure., (WLB, p. 24)

Research in 2017 the compared role climate models used by IPCC with models that are “observationally informed” produce 15% more warming by 2100 than IPCC claims and therefore supports the conclusion that carbon budgets should be reduced by 15% for the 20C target. (WLB, p. 24)

The IPCC reports fail to say that once projected emissions from future food production and deforestation are taken into account there is no carbon budget for fossil-fuel emissions for a 20C target. (WLB, p. 24).

There are also problems with carbon budgets which incorporate “overshoot” scenarios, in which warming exceeds the target before being cooled by carbon drawdown. (WLB, p.24)  Pam Pearson, Dir. of International Cryo-sphere Climate Initiative, said that most cryo-sphere thresholds are determined by peak temperatures, and the length of time spent at the peak warning rather than “later decreasing temperatures after the peak are largely irrelevant, especially with higher temperatures and longer duration peaks.” Thus “overshoot scenarios” which are now becoming the norm in policymaking hold much greater risks. (WLB, p. 24)

Permafrost and the Carbon Cycle

The failure to adequately consider long-term feedbacks in IPCC models, and hence in projections of future warming, lies at the heart of the problem with the IPCC reporting process. (IPCC, p.25) Over century time-scales, amplifying feedbacks may ultimately contribute 28-68% of total warming, yet they comprise only 1-7% of current warming. (WLB, p. 25)

The land sink (storage capacity) for CO2 appears much smaller than is currently factored into some climate models. Thus future patterns of warming may be distinctly different from past patterns making it difficult to predict future warming by relying on past observations. (WLB, p. 25)

Soil Carbon. A 2016 study concluded that a soil carbon cycle feedback “has not been incorporated into computer models used to project future climate change, raising the possibility that such models are underestimating the amount of warming that is likely to occur. (WLB, p. 24) The projected loss of soil carbon from climate change is a potentially large but highly uncertain feedback to warming, however, there is likely to be strong carbon-climate feedbacks from colder northern soils. (WLB, p.24)

Forests. At the at the moment about one-third of human-caused CO2 emissions are absorbed by trees and other plants. But rapid climate warming and unusual rainfall patterns are jeopardizing many of the world’s trees, due to more frequent droughts, pest outbreaks, and fires. (WLB, p. 25) This is starting to have profound effects on the Earth’s carbon cycle. (WLB, p. 25)  In 2009 researchers found that 2° C of warming could cut in half the carbon sink of tropical rainforests. Some tropical forests – in the Congo and Southeast Asia – have already shifted to a net carbon source. The tropics are now a net carbon source with losses owing to deforestation and reductions in carbon density within standing forests being double that of gains resulting from forest growth. Other work has projected a long-term, self-reinforcing carbon feedback from mid-latitude forests to the climate system as the world warms. (WLB, p. 25)

There has been an observed decline in the Amazon carbon sink.  Negative synergies between deforestation, climate change, and widespread use of fire indicate a tipping point for the Amazon system to flip to non-forest ecosystems in eastern, southern, and central Amazonia at 20 – 25% deforestation. Researchers say that severe droughts of 2005, 2010 and 2015-16 could well represent the first flickers of this ecological tipping point and say the whole system is oscillating. (WLB, p.25)

Permafrost. The world’s permafrost holds 1.5 trillion tons of frozen carbon, more than twice the amount of carbon in the atmosphere. On land it covers an area of 15,000,000 km². The Arctic is warming faster than anywhere on earth, and some permafrost degradation is already occurring. Large-scale tundra wildfires in 2012 added to the concern, as have localized methane outbursts. (WLB, p. 25)

The 2007 IPCC assessment on permafrost did not venture beyond saying “changes in snow ice and frozen ground have with high confidence increase the number and size of glacial lakes, increased ground instability in mountain and other permafrost regions and led to changes in some Arctic and in Antarctic ecosystems. It reported with high confidence that methane emissions from tundra and permafrost have accelerated in the past two decades and are likely to accelerate further. It offered no projections regarding permafrost melts. (WLB, p.25).

The effect of the permafrost’s carbon feedback has not been included in the IPCC scenarios including the 2014 report. (WLB, p. 26). This is despite clear evidence that “the permafrost carbon feedback would change the Arctic from a carbon sink to a source after the mid-2020s and is strong enough to cancel 42 – 88% of the total global land sink. (WLB, p. 26)

In 2012, researchers found that, for the 2100 median forecasts, there would be a 0.23 – 0.27°C of extra warming due to permafrost feedbacks. Some researchers consider that 1.5°C appears to be something of a “tipping point” for extensive permafrost thaw. (WLB, p.26)

A 2014 study estimated that up to 205 billion tonnes equivalent of CO2 could be released due to melting permafrost, This would cause up to 0.5° C extra warming for the high mission scenario and up to 0.15° C of extra warming for the 2° C scenario. The authors say that; “climate projections in the IPCC Fifth Assessment report, and any emissions targets based on these projections, do not adequately account for emissions from thawing permafrost and the effect of the permafrost carbon feedback on global climate. (WLB, p.26)

Recently attention has turned to the question of the stability of large methane hydrate stores below the ocean floor on the shallow East Siberian Arctic shelf. (Methane hydrates are cage-like lattices of ice within which methane molecules are trapped). (WLB, p. 26)

These stores are protected from the warmer ocean temperatures above by a layer of frozen sub-sea permafrost. The concern is that warmer water could create taliks (areas of unfrozen permafrost) through which large-scale methane emissions from the hydrates could escape into the water column above and into the atmosphere. (WLB, p. 26)

A deceptively optimistic picture is painted when the potential impacts from the degradation of permafrost and methane hydrates are underplayed. (WLB, p. 26)

Arctic Sea-Ice

IPCC has consistently underestimated the rate of Arctic sea ice melt. (WLB, p.27)

Arctic sea ice is thinning faster than every IPCC climate projection, tipping points have been crossed for sea ice free summer conditions, and today scientists say an ice-free Arctic summer could be just years away, not many decades. (WLB, p. 27)

The loss of sea ice reduces the reflectivity of the planet and adds to warming but this feedback is not fully incorporated into models in circumstances where the rate of sea-ice loss is more rapid than expected in the models, as is occurring now. (WLB, p.27) To keep global temperature increase below 20 C, global CO2 emissions would need to reach zero 5-15 years earlier and the carbon budget would need to be reduced by 20-51% to offset this additional source of warming. (WLB, p. 27)

Because climate models are missing key real-world interactions and generally have been poor at dealing with the rate of Arctic sea ice retreat, expert elicitation’s play a role in considering whether the Arctic has passed a very significant and dangerous tipping point. But the IPCC has done none of this. (WLB, p.27)

Polar Ice-Mass Loss

2001 IPCC report said little change in Greenland and Antarctic ice sheet is expected over the next 50-100 years.  (WLB, p. 28)

Greenland Ice Sheet

The 2007 IPCC report said there were “uncertainties in the full effects of ice sheet flow” and a suggestion that “partial loss of ice sheet on polar land could imply meters of sea-level rise….Such changes are projected to occur over millennial time scales.” The reality is very different.” (WLB, p. 28)

IPCC said in 2007 that current models suggest virtually complete elimination of the Greenland ice sheet and a resulting contribution to sea-level rise of about 7 meters if global warming were sustained for millennia in excess of 1.9 to 4.60 C relative to pre-industrial values. (WLB, p. 28) This was despite that two 2006 studies found that the Greenland ice cap “may be melting three times faster than indicated by previous measurements, warning that we are close to being close to being committed to a collapse of the Greenland ice cap and reports that rising Arctic regional temperatures are already at “ the threshold beyond which glaciologists think the [Greenland] ice sheet may be doomed.” (WLB, p. 28)

In 2012 then NASA climate science chief James Hansen told Bloomberg that: “our greatest concern is that the loss of Arctic sea ice creates a great threat of passing over passing two other tipping points – the potential instability of the Greenland Ice Sheet and methane hydrates…These latter two tipping points would have consequences that are practically irreversible on time scales of relevance to humanity.’ On this very grave threat, IPCC is mute. (WLB, p. 29)

Antarctic Ice Sheet

The 2007 IPCC assessment proffered: “Current global model studies project that the Antarctic ice sheet will remain too cold for widespread surface melting and gain mass due to increased snowfall.” (WLB, p. 29) However, the net loss of ice mass could occur if dynamical ice discharge dominates the ice sheet mass balance. Reality and new research would soon undermine this one-sided reliance by IPCC on models with poor cryosphere performance. (WLB, p. 29)

By the 2014 IPCC assessment, the story was: “Based on current understanding from observations, physical understanding, and modeling, only the collapse of the marine-based sectors of the Antarctic ice sheet, if initiated could cause global mean sea level to be substantially above the likely range during the 21rst Century.” (WLB, p. 29) There is medium confidence that the additional contribution would not exceed several tenths of a meter of sea-level rise during the 21rst Century. And “abrupt and irreversible ice loss from the Antarctic is sheet is possible, but current evidence and understanding is insufficient to make a quantitative assessment.” This was another blunder. Observations of accelerating ice mass in West Antarctic were well established by this time. (WLB, p. 29) It is likely that the Amundsen Sea sector of the West Antarctic ice sheet has already been destabilized. (WLB, p. 29) Ice retreat is unstoppable for current conditions, and no acceleration in climate change is necessary to trigger the collapse of the rest of the Antarctic Ice Sheet, which comes with a 3-5 meter sea level rise. (WLB, p. 29), Such an event would displace millions of people worldwide. (WLB, p. 29)

In 2016, another significant study concluded that: “Antarctica has the potential to contribute more than a meter of sea-level rise by 2100 and more than 15 meters by 2500.” Compare this to the IPCC report, just a year earlier, that Antarctica’s contribution to sea levels “ would not exceed several tenths of a meter…during this century. ” (WLB, p. 29) As well, partial deglaciation of the East Antarctic ice sheet is likely for the current level of atmospheric CO2 contributing ten meters or more of sea-level rise in the longer run, and five meters in the first 200 years. (WLB, p. 29)

A 2018 study showed that ocean-driven melting has caused rates of ice-loss from West Antarctica to triple from 53 + or – 29 billion to 159 + or – 26 billion tons per year from 1992 to 2017. (WLB, p. 29) Forty percent of the total mass loss over that period has occurred in the last and five years, suggesting a recent and significant acceleration in the loss rate. (WLB, p. 29)

Over the same period, ice-shelf collapse had increased the rate of ice loss from the Antarctic Peninsula almost five-fold from 7 + or – 13 billion to 33 + or- 16 billion tonnes per year. (WLB, p. 29)

Sea Level Rise

In the 2001 assessment report, the IPCC projected a sea-level rise of 2 millimeters per year. By 2007, the researchers found that the range of the 2001 predictions were lower than the actual rise. Satellite data had shown that sea levels had risen by an average of 3.3 millimeters per year between 1993 and 2006. (WLB, p. 30) IPCC did not use this data to revise its projections. (WLB, p. 30) James Hansen warned of “scientific reticence” in regard to ice sheet stability and sea-level rise. (WLB, p. 30) In 2008, the US Geological Survey warned that sea-level rise could top 1.5 meters by the end of the century. And by the end of 2009, various studies offered drastically higher projections than IPCC. (WLB, p. 30) The Australian government identified research that estimated sea level rise range from 0.5 to 2.0 meters by 2100. (WLB, p. 30) Yet in 2014, IPCC reported a smaller figure (0.55 meters compared to 0.59 meters in 2007) despite mounting evidence of polar ice-mass loss. (WLB, p. 30) Noting inconsistent evidence, IPCC said that the probability of specific levels above the likely range cannot be evaluated. (WLB, p. 30)

An NOAA sea level report in August of 2017 recommends a revised worst-case sea level scenario of 2.5 meters by 2100, 5.5 meters by 2150 2150, and 9.7 meters by 2200. (WLB, p. 31)

Today the discussion among experts is for sea-level rise in this century of at least one meter, and perhaps in excess of two meters. (WLB, p. 31)

Goals Abandoned

The WLB report claims that the warming levels already reached at approximately 1.10 C are already “dangerous” and that future warming would need to be limited to 1.20 C to save the Great Barrier Reef. (WLB. p. 37) Therefore, the WLB report concludes that the UNFCCC process has already abandoned the goals of the UNFCCC of “preventing dangerous interference with the climate system.” The report also argues that other key goals of the UNFCCC including that “food production is not threatened’’ and “achieving reductions in a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change” have been abandoned for all practical purposes.”

Conclusion-Ethical Issues Raised by IPCC’s Consistent Underestimation of Climate Change Impacts.

A. Failure to Apply a Precautionary Science

As we have seen, the “What Lies Beneath” Report attributes IPCC’s consistent underestimation of climate change impacts to both the consensus process that IPCC follows in which governments must approve aspects of final IPCC reports and to IPCC’s following norms often followed by scientists which eschew making any claims that cannot be supported by empirically tested observations.

As we have claimed before in, there is a potential conflict between IPCC’s mission to synthesize the peer-reviewed climate change scientific literature, which normally requires adequate levels of scientific proof before drawing conclusions, and the precautionary principle stated in article 3 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which requires governments to act despite scientific uncertainties. A precautionary science would identify all scientifically plausible impacts, not only those impacts that can be identified with high levels of scientific certainty or impacts about which quantitative probability statements derived from empirical observations can be stated.  If the precautionary principle is to be taken seriously then decision-makers should be informed about all potentially dangerous impacts even if quantitative probability statements about these impacts can’t be derived from observations of how a physical system works.  Since the UNFCCC expressly adopted the precautionary principle, a strong case can be made that IPCC should identify all scientifically plausible impacts. If it were to do this, IPCC should, of course, be clear that some impacts are less certain than others.

Identifying all scientifically plausible climate impacts is also required as a matter of ethics once there is a reasonable basis for concluding that certain human behavior is dangerous to others.

Who should have the burden of proof and how much proof should be required to satisfy the burden of proof in the face of scientific uncertainty about dangerous behavior are fundamentally ethical questions, not ‘value-neutral’ scientific matters, yet scientists are rarely trained in ethical reasoning and very rarely spot the ethical issues raised by decisions about dangerous human behavior that must be made in the face of scientific uncertainty.  Given that the potential harms from climate change include an existential threat to life on Earth, as a matter of ethics, those who claim that scientific uncertainty is justification for not taking strong action to reduce the threat of climate change should have the burden of proof of demonstrating with very high levels of proof that ghg emissions levels are safe.

Ethics would require higher levels of proof of those who are engaged in dangerous behavior to prove their behavior is safe in proportion to how potentially dangerous the behavior is especially for harms to others who have not consented to be harmed and for behaviors that become more dangerous the longer one waits to reduce the uncertainty. Given that climate change actually threatens life on Earth including billions of people who have not consented to put at risk, and given that waiting to reduce ghg emissions makes the problem more threatening, ethics would shift the burden of proof to those who are most responsible for raising ghg emissions to prove with very high levels of proof that human emissions of ghg are safe even if there is some uncertainty about the amount of warming that different levels of ghg emissions will cause. For this reason, the problem created by IPCC’s underestimation of climate change impacts may not be exclusively the fault of IPCC.  The problem may also be the fault of policymakers who fail to respond to the enormous potential harms entailed by human-induced warming by demanding that opponents of climate change policies shoulder the burden of proof by demonstrating with high levels of proof that ghg emissions will not cause serious harms.

This website includes many articles which explain why policymakers and citizens have a strong duty to reduce ghg emissions in the face of some scientific uncertainty about climate change impacts. See, for example:

1. The Ethical Duty to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions the face of Scientific Uncertainty;

2. On Confusing Two Roles of Science and Their Relation to Ethics.

Policymakers have a vital need for scientists to explain all scientifically plausible harms that may result from human activities even if the magnitude and creation of potential harms are uncertain. In fulfilling these responsibilities, scientists may not ignore potential harms because they are unable to determine probabilities about the likelihood of their occurrence based on empirical observations. Yet because scientists often follow the epistemic norms of their science when engaged in scientific research which usually require adequate levels of proof before making causal claims, policymakers need to be clear when interacting with scientists that their policymaking responsibilities require that they, the policymakers, protect citizens from all plausible harms.  Therefore policymakers need scientists to identify all scientifically plausible harms. Because IPCC’s mission is to synthesize the existing peer-reviewed climate science, which very likely does not include scientific conclusions about plausible harms partly based on speculation, IPCC cannot fulfill the role of science that policymakers need when policymakers are seeking to protect citizens from all plausible harms, namely to inform humanity about all plausible climate change impacts. Thus, there is a basic conflict between IPCC’s mission of synthesizing peer-reviewed climate change science and providing policy-makers with information about all scientifically plausible climate change impacts.

This need of policy-makers to understand all plausible harms creates an enormous challenge for mainstream scientific institutions which usually rely on peer-review in which scientists normally review scientific claims by comparing claims to empirically tested observations which are the ground of the scientific enterprise. Yet, as Hans Jonas explained in The Imperative of Responsibility, In Search of an Ethics in a Technological Age, the power of modern technology to create catastrophic harms such as those harms now foreseeable from human-induced climate change, ethics requires that policy-makers approach these matters with a “heuristics of fear,” replacing the former “projections of hope” that traditionally guided policy (Jonas, 1984, p.x), Yet, mainstream science is often uncomfortable with conclusions not grounded in scientific observations. If this is so, ethics requires that IPCC’s mandate be amended to synthesize scientifically plausible conclusions about climate change outcomes.

B. The Ethical Bankruptcy of Arguments Which Demand High Levels of Certainty Before Taking Action to Reduce the Threat of Climate Change

The WLB report also claims that quoting a 2014 article in the Guardian increasing evidence ‘that policy summaries on climate impacts and mitigation by the IPCC were significantly “diluted under political pressure from some of the world’s biggest greenhouse gas emitters, including Saudi Arabia, China, Brazil, and the United States.” (WLB. p. 34)

The WLB report consistently argues that the remedy to IPCC’s tendency to underestimate climate impacts is to allow or require more speculation about uncertain but plausible climate impacts. However, those governments that seek to restrict discussion of all impacts to those that have been proven with relatively high levels of proof would likely argue that speculation could lead to an overstatement of climate impacts. Yet following a precautionary science that identifies all plausible climate change impacts including those that have been based on speculation can guard against overstating the seriousness of climate impacts by allowing those who claim that the plausible impacts have been overstated to provide reasons for their claims so that policymakers can judge whether some of the plausible but not fully proven impacts are arbitrary or without any plausible scientific support. This would place the burden of proving harm appropriately, as a matter of ethics, on the parties that seek to justify continuing dangerous behavior.

Nations which have demanded high levels of proof before reducing their contributions to climate change have failed to abide by their ethical and legal duties to not harm others and not abide by the ” precautionary principle” which they agreed to UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement.

C. Ethical Problems with Economics Arguments Against Climate Change Policies

The WLB report also claims that some governments have advocated policies that would not be sufficient to achieve the goals of the UNFCCC to prevent dangerous climate change because they thought policies that achieve safer levels of warming ‘were too economically disruptive.” (WLB, p. 39). This report claims that in so doing,” policymakers are complicit today in destroying the very conditions which make life possible.” (WLB, p. 39) Further, the WLB report claims “There is no greater crime against humanity.” (WLB, p. 39)

An ethical analysis of those nations that refuse to adopt policies that may be necessary to prevent catastrophic harm on the basis of their economic interest would also strongly condemn these nations as deeply morally bankrupt.


Anthony et. al., 2018, 21st-Century Modeled Permafrost Carbon Emissions Accelerated by Abrupt Thaw Beneath Lakes, Nature Communications ,

Breakthrough Institute, 2018, What Lies Beneath, On the Understatement of Existential Climate Risk,

Jonas, H, 1984, The Imperative of Responsibility; In Search of an Ethics for a Technological Age, University of Chicago Press

Steffen, 2018, Trajectories in the Earth System in the Anthropocene, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,



Donald A. Brown

Scholar in Residence and Professor

Widener University Commonwealth Law School

Harrisburg, Pa.


What Americans Urgently Need to Understand About Climate Change In Light of an Alarming New Report Published By US Academy of Sciences


On July 31, 2018, a paper was published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences which should create a shiver of fear in all humans everywhere. The paper, Trajectories in the Earth System in the Anthropocene by Steffen, explains how human-induced warming is rapidly approaching levels that may trigger positive climate feedbacks which could greatly accelerate the warming already plaguing the world by causing record floods, deadly heat waves and droughts, increasing tropical diseases, forest fires, more intense and damaging storms, sea level rise, coral bleaching, acidification of oceans, all of which are contributing to increasing the number of refugees which are destabilizing governments around the world.

The Steffen et. al. paper also describes how the positive feedbacks depicted in the following graphic, once triggered could initiate other feedbacks creating a cascade of positive feedbacks, each of which could speed up the warming which is already causing great harm and suffering around the world. The paper claims this mechanism could make life on much of the Earth uninhabitable which could lead to social collapse on the global scale and ultimately to warming increases that human reductions of greenhouse gases (ghg) emissions alone would not prevent until the global system reached a new temperature equilibrium at much higher temperatures than the human race has ever experienced. In other words, cascading positive feedbacks in the climate system could result in humans losing control over reducing disastrous warming.

Image result for global map of tipping cascades

Steffen et. al,, supra pg. 4.

If this is not scary enough, the Steffen et. al. paper concluded some of these feedbacks could be triggered between 1 degree C to 3 degrees C, suggesting that the “risk of tipping cascades could be significant at a 2 degree C rise (Steffen at al p.7), the upper warming limit goal of the Paris Agreement which President Trump has announced the United States will withdraw from.

Given that even if temperature increases already baked into the system don’t trigger positive feedbacks until global temperatures rise by 2 degrees C and given the enormous challenge facing the world to achieve the 2 degrees C warming limit goal agreed to by the international community in Paris in 2015 requires the international community to achieve net zero CO2 emissions by 2070 (UNEP, Emissions Gap, 2016), the international community needs to immediately join forces to achieve extraordinarily ambitious international cooperation almost immediately to achieve the 2 degree C warming limit goal. However, given that the 2 degree C warming limit goal agreed to in Paris was selected because it was believed that if warming increases could be limited to 2 degrees C, triggering dangerous climate system positive feedbacks was unlikely, the conclusions of the Steffen et al paper that positive feedbacks could be triggered below 2 degrees C additional warming must be interpreted as a justification for a call for an unprecedented urgent global cooperative effort to reduce carbon emissions and increase carbon sinks as rapidly as humanly possible.

Given that human-induced climate change is now widely understood to be an existential threat to life on Earth unless all nations rapidly reduce their greenhouse gas (GHG) to net zero as fast as possible, Americans urgently need to understand certain features of the problem which have been infrequently mentioned in the US national climate change conversation including the following: 

  • There is growing evidence that even if global ghg emissions could be reduced to near zero rapidly, there is enough carbon already in the atmosphere that limiting warming to the then 2 degrees C warming limit goal by the end of this Century has only a 5% chance (Mooney, 2017).
  • Every day that nations fail to reduce their GHG emissions to levels required of them to achieve a warming limit goal such as 2 degrees C makes the problem worse because budgets available for the whole world that must constrain global emissions to achieve any warming limit goal shrink as emissions continue. Therefore, the speed that nations reduce their GHG emissions reductions is as important as the magnitude of reductions identified by any national GHG reduction commitment. For this reason, any national commitment on climate change should not only identify the amount of ghg emissions that will be reduced by a certain date, but the reduction pathway by which these reductions will be achieved,
  • For reasons stated in the Seffen paper, climate change is an existential threat to life on Earth that requires the international community to rapidly take extraordinarily aggressive coordinated steps not only sufficient to prevent global temperatures from rising no than more than 2 degrees C, the upper warming limit agreed to by the international community in the 2015 Paris Agreement, but to minimize any additional warming as quickly as possible,
  • Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) which the US ratified in 1992, the US has a legal duty under the concept of “equity” to reduce its GHG emissions more rapidly than most other nations, and although there is reasonable disagreement among nations about what “equity” requires of them, any reasonable interpretation of equity would require the US to make much larger and more rapid GHG reductions than almost all other nations given that the United States emitted 5,011,687 metric kilo tons (kt) of CO2 equivalent emissions in 2016, second only to China’s 10,432,741 kt CO2. (Netherlands Environmental Agency). The US also has an equitable duty to more aggressively reduce its emissions than most other countries because it has emitted a greater amount of cumulative CO2 emissions, that is 29.3% of global CO2 emissions between 1850 and 2002, while China emitted 7.6% during the same period, (WRI, Cumulative Emissions) making the US much more responsible for raising atmospheric concentrations of CO2 to the current level of 406 ppm than any country.  Also given the US is responsible for 15.56 metric tons per capita CO2 emissions which is more than twice as much as China’s 7.45 metric tons per capita in 2016 (World Bank), as a matter of equity the US must reduce its GHG emissions much more rapidly and steeply than almost all countries,
  • The US duty to formulate its ghg emissions reduction target on the basis of equity is not only required by its legal obligations under the UNFCCC, practically the US and other high emitting nations must reduce their GHG emissions by much greater amounts and faster than poor developing nations because if they don’t the poorer nations will have to reduce their GHG emissions almost immediately to near zero CO2 so that global emissions don’t exceed the carbon budget available to prevent a warming limit such as 2 degrees C from being exceeded,
  • Any US policy response to climate change such as a carbon tax must be structured to reduce US ghg emissions to levels and speeds required of the US to achieve its responsibilities to the rest of the world to prevent dangerous climate change. Thus, if the US were to pass a carbon tax, the imposition of a tax must either reduce US GHG emissions to the level and the speed required of it by its obligations or be supplemented by other policy responses such as, for instance, mandatory conversions of electric power generation from fossil fuel combustion to renewable energy by a date certain or mandatory requirements for electric vehicles,
  • Because GHG emissions from every country mix rapidly in the atmosphere, all nations emissions are contributing to rising atmospheric GHG concentrations thus harming people and ecological systems on which life depends all over the world. Thus, the US may not formulate its climate change policies only on the basis of costs and benefits to itself alone, it must acknowledge and respond to the devastating climate change harms the United States is already contributing to that are being experienced around the world and particularly by poor people and nations that are most vulnerable to climate change impacts. For this reason, the Trump administration’s justification for withdrawing from the Paris Agreement on the basis of “putting US interests first” is deeply morally indefensible and tragic because of the damage it will likely cause to the world,
  • Because of the rapid speed required of the US to reduce its ghg emissions to net zero carbon emissions, the US urgently needs to put ghg emissions reductions on the equivalent of a wartime footing by not only adopting policy responses that can achieve ghg emission reduction goals required of it, but also by investing in research and development in new technologies that can facilitate and achieve the its ghg emission reduction obligations and increase carbon sinks that could reduce the rise in atmospheric ghg concentrations,
  • The United States needs to develop a strategy to achieve these objectives in the next two years and begin implementing the strategy immediately as quickly as possible.


Donald A. Brown

Scholar in Residence and Professor

Widener University Commonwealth Law School




New Paper: Step By Step Procedures that Nations Should Follow to Determine, Explain, and Evaluate their GHG Reduction Commitments Under the Paris Agreement


A.Urgent Need For Greater Understanding Among Nations and Civil Society of How Nations Should Formulate and ExplainTheir NDCs under the Paris Agreement.

Research conducted by Widener University Commonwealth Law School and the University of Auckland concluded not surprisingly that when 24 governments identified greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction targets they ignored their legal duties to set a national target on the basis of preventing dangerous anthropogenic climate change, equity, and common but differentiated responsibilities in light of national circumstances under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Paris Agreement. In all cases, this research concluded that nations inappropriately took national economic self-interest into account in establishing their GHG reduction target. ( while not clearly explaining how their GHG reduction targets were formulated on the basis of what was required of nations under law. This conclusion was not surprising to the researchers. But what was very surprising was that the vast majority of NGOs in these countries appeared not to understand how a nation should quantitatively formulate a target in light of its nondiscretionary and discretionary duties under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement. Without an understanding of how a nation should formulate and explain its GHG emissions reduction target, nations and civil society will not be able to effectively evaluate a nation’s NDC.

It is this writer’s view that the widespread ignorance around the world about how a nation should set a GHG target is attributable to the fact that although nations have been setting GHG targets for many years, only recently have they had to expressly respond to the Paris Agreement’s warming limit goals and to in so doing take the equity requirements of the Paris Agreement seriously while at the same time being clear and transparent in how they responded to there  obligations under the Paris Agreement. Up until recently, a nation could set a GHG target without considering how much of a shrinking carbon budget that remains to achieve a warming limit goal the nation was going to allocate to itself on the basis of equity. Very few nations, if any, have expressly formulated their national GHG reduction targets on the basis of a carbon budget that remained to achieve a warming limit goal.

Because the Paris Agreement’s success depends on nations being clear and transparent in explaining how they formulated their Nationally Determined Contributions  (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement, yet there is widespread ignorance around the world on how nations should formulate their NDCs to comply with their obligations under the Paris deal, there is an urgent need to help nations and civil society around the world understand how a nation should formulate its NDC to comply with their obligations under the Paris Agreement.

B. A New Paper Explains How Nations Should Formulate and Justify their NDCs under Paris Agreement

To meet this need, a new paper describes 4 steps in detail that all governments should follow to comply with their legal obligations under the Paris Agreement as well as the information that nations should  include with their NDCs about how they formulated their NDCs, which information is necessary to comply with the clarity and transparency  requirements of the Paris Agreement.

The paper is: A Four-Step Process for Formulating and Evaluating Legal Commitments Under the Paris Agreement. Donald A Brown, Hugh Breakey, Peter Burdon, Brendan Mackey, Prue Taylor, Carbon & Climate Law Review, Vol 12, (2018) Issue 2, Pags 98 – 108,

The four steps are:

(1) Select a global warming limit to be achieved by the GHG emissions reduction target. The description of this step also explains the need of nations to explain why it chose a warming limit goal greater than the 1.5 degree C goal but no less than 2.0 degree warming limit goal.

(2) Identify a global carbon budget consistent with achieving the global warming limit at an acceptable probability. The paper includes a description of how a nation should identify a carbon budget to achieve a warming limit goal and other considerations relevant to identifying a carbon budget on which the GHG reduction target will be based.

(3) Determine the national fair share of the global carbon budget based upon equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. This section of the paper does not resolve all controversies about how to interpret equity under the Paris Agreement, although it does identify principles identified by IPCC that nations should follow in applying equity to guide their GHG reduction target and information that nations should include with their NDC that explains how they applied discretion in determining what equity requires of the nation.

(4) Specify the annual rate of national GHG emissions Reductions on the pathway to net zero emissions.This section explains that because different amounts of shrinking carbon budgets will be consumed by how long it takes a nation to achieve a quantitative GHG emissions reduction amount, nations need to explain the nation’s reduction pathway over time to determine how much of a global budget available for the whole world the nation is allocating to itself.

The paper also explains why expressly following these steps is necessary to ensure that a nation’s NDC is sufficiently transparent to allow the Paris Agreement’s “stocktake” and “transparency mechanism” processes achieve their goal of increasing national ambition if necessary to achive the Paris Agreement’s warming limit goals.

In addition to describing the steps nations should follow in formulating their NDC, the paper includes a chart which summarizes information that should be supplied with their NDC when it transmits the NDC to UNFCCC, information necessary to make the Paris Agreement’s transparency requirementts work and information necessary to evaluate the adequacy of the NDC under the Paris Agreement.


Donald A. Brown

Scholar in Residence and Professor

Sustainability Ethics and Law

Widener University Commonwealth Law School

How to ask questions of opponents of climate change policies to expose ethical problems with cost and scientific uncertainty arguments


Most arguments against climate change laws and policies are based on claims of unacceptable costs or scientific uncertainty, arguments that hide or ignore ethical problems with these arguments, This video explains how to ask questions of those who oppose climate change policies on the basis of cost or scientific uncertainty which questions are designed to expose ethical problems with these arguments.

The list of questions referenced in the video follows:

Questions to be asked of those opposing government action on climate change on the basis of cost to the economy, cost to specific industries, or job destruction.

When you argue that governments should not adopt policies to reduce ghg emissions to their fair share of safe global emissions on the basis that climate policies will impose unacceptable costs on national economies, destroy specific industries, or kill jobs:

  1. Do you deny high-emitting nations not only have economic interests but also duties and obligations to nations and people most vulnerable to climate impacts to limit their ghg emissions to their fair share of safe global emissions?
  2. Do you deny that a high emitting nation needs to take responsibility for the harms to human health and ecological systems on which life depends which the nation is causing in other nations
  3. Do you deny the applicability of the well-established international norm that polluters should pay for consequences of their pollution?
  4. Do you agree that a nation’s climate change policy is implicitly a position on how high atmospheric concentrations of ghgs should be allowed to rise?
  5. Do you agree that a national ghg emissions target must be understood as implicitly a position on a global emissions reduction pathway necessary to stabilize atmospheric ghg concentrations at safe levels?
  6. Do you agree that no nation has a right kill other people or destroy the ecological systems on which life depends simply because reducing ghg emissions will impose costs on the high-emitting nation?
  7. Do you agree that nations which emit ghgs at levels beyond their fair share of safe global emissions have a duty to help pay for reasonable adaptation needs and unavoidable damages of low-emitting vulnerable countries and individuals who have done little to cause climate change?
  8. Do you agree that the costs of inaction on climate change must be considered by nations who refuse to reduce their ghg emissions to their fair share of safe global emissions on the basis of cost to them?\
  9.  Given that the United States has for over twenty-five years failed to adequately respond to climate change because of alleged unacceptable costs to it and that due to delay ghg emissions reductions now needed to avoid potentially catastrophic climate change are much steeper and costly than what would be required if the United States acted twenty-five years ago, is it just for the United States to now defend further inaction on climate change on the basis of cost

Questions to be asked of those opposing national action on climate change on the basis of scientific uncertainty.

  1. When you argue that nations such as the United States or states, regional, or local governments, businesses, organizations, or individuals that emit high levels of greenhouse gases (ghg) need not reduce their ghg emissions to their fair share of safe global emission because of scientific uncertainty about adverse climate change impacts:
  2. On what specific basis do you disregard the conclusions of the United States Academy of Sciences and over a hundred of the most prestigious scientific organizations whose membership includes those with expertise relevant to the science of climate change, including the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the American Geophysical Union, the American Institute of Physics, the American Meteorological Society, the Royal Meteorological Society, and the Royal Society of the UK and according to the American Academy of Sciences 97 percent of scientists who actually do peer-reviewed research on climate change which conclusions holds that the Earth is warming, that the warming is mostly human caused, and that harsh impacts from warming are already being experienced in parts of the world, and that the international community is running out of time to prevent catastrophic warming.
  3. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that there are some remaining scientific uncertainties about climate change impacts, are you arguing that no action of climate change should be taken until all scientific uncertainties are resolved given that waiting to resolve uncertainties before action is taken will virtually guarantee that it will too late to prevent catastrophic human-induced climate change harms to people and ecological systems around the world?
  4. Given that waiting until uncertainties are resolved will make climate change harms worse and the scale of reductions needed to prevent dangerous climate change much more daunting, do you deny that those who are most vulnerable to climate change’s harshest potential impacts have a right to participate in any decision about whether a nation should wait to act to reduce the threat of climate change because of scientific uncertainty?
  5. Should a nation like the United States which has much higher historical and per capita emissions than other nations be able to justify its refusal to reduce its ghg emissions to its fair share of safe global emissions on the basis of scientific uncertainty, given that if the mainstream science is correct, the world is rapidly running out of time to prevent warming above 2.Oo C, a temperature limit which if exceeded may cause rapid, non-linear climate change.
  6. If you claim that there is no evidence of human causation of climate change are you aware that there are multiple “fingerprint” studies and “attribution” studies which point to human causation of observed warming?
  7. When you claim that the United States or other nations emitting high levels of ghgs need not adopt climate change policies because adverse climate change impacts have not yet been proven, are you claiming that climate change skeptics have proven in peer reviewed scientific literature that human-induced climate change will not create harsh adverse impacts to the human health and the ecological systems of others on which their life often depends and if so what is that proof?
  8. If you concede that climate skeptics have not proven in peer-reviewed journals that human-induced warming is not a very serious threat to human health and ecological systems, given that human-induced warming could create catastrophic warming the longer the human community waits to respond to reduce the threat of climate change and the more difficult it will be to prevent dangerous warming, do you agree that those responsible for rising atmospheric ghg concentrations have a duty to demonstrate that their ghg emissions are safe?
  9. Given that in ratifying the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) the United States in 1992 agreed under Article 3 of that treaty to not use scientific uncertainty as an excuse for postponing climate change policies, do you believe the United States is now free to ignore this promise by refusing to take action on climate change on the basis of scientific uncertainty? Article 3 states:The Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures, taking into account that policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost. (UNFCCC, Art 3)
  10. Do agree if a government is warned by some of the most prestigious scientific institutions in the world that activities within its jurisdiction are causing great harm to and gravely threatening hundreds of millions of people outside their government’s jurisdiction, government officials who could take steps to assure that activities of their citizens do not harm or threaten others should not be able escape responsibility for preventing harm caused by simply declaring that they are not scientists?
  11. If a nation such as the United States which emits high-levels of ghgs refuses to  reduce its emissions to its fair share of safe global emissions on the basis that    is too much scientific uncertainty to warrant action, if it turns out that human-induced climate change actually seriously harms the health of tens of millions of others and ecological systems on which their life depends, should the nation be responsible for the harms that could have been avoided if preventative action had been taken earlier?


Comments are welcome.




Donald A. Brown

Scholar In Residence and Professor

Widener University Commonwealth Law School

Harrisburg Pa.




Ethical Issues with Relying on Pricing Carbon as a Policy Response to Climate Change.

I. Introduction.

This entry will examine ethical issues raised by relying on putting a price on carbon as a policy response to reduce the threat of climate change.

Establishing a price on carbon emissions as a response to reduce a government’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions has received strong support around the world. One observer of global climate change policy developments has concluded:

Not only is there a robust consensus among economists, but they have been remarkably successful in spreading the gospel to the wider world as well. Climate activists, wonks, funders, politicians, progressives, and even conservatives (the few who take climate seriously) all sing from the same hymnal. It has become conventional wisdom that a price on carbon is the sine qua non of serious climate policy. (Roberts, 2016)

This article will identify potential ethical problems with relying on carbon pricing to reduce the enormous threat of climate change despite the widespread popularity of pricing carbon regimes. As we shall see, although a few ethicists have ethical problems with any carbon pricing scheme, many others approve of carbon pricing schemes provided that the regime design adequately deals with certain ethical issues that carbon pricing regimes frequently raise.

Climate pricing regimes vary greatly from the government to government and among different types of carbon pricing regimes. However, there are two basic methods for using a price on carbon to reduce greenhouse (GHG) emissions.

The first is to distribute carbon caps, often referred to as carbon allowances, to GHG emitters usually followed by a tightening of the cap over time to achieve desired GHG  emissions reduction goals.  Those who have more allowances than they need may sell allowances to those who do not have enough.  Thus carbon allowances may be bought and sold, a scheme that is often justified by economists by claiming that this approach leads to GHG reductions at the lowest cost thereby finding an efficient solution to climate change while the amount`of GHG emissions achieved by the scheme may be determined by the total amount of allowances permitted. This method is usually referred to as “cap and trade”

Many cap and trade regimes allow those who need additional allowances to reduce GHG emissions to levels required by the cap to fund GHG emissions reduction projects often anywhere in the world including in places without a cap and get credit for the amount of GHG reductions achieved by the funded project, which credit then can be applied to determine whether the cap has been achieved. Different trading regimes have different rules specifying where and under what conditions emissions credits can be obtained by funding projects in other places.

The other common carbon pricing scheme is for government to charge a price for carbon emissions, a method usually referred to as carbon taxing. The carbon tax works also to lower GHG emissions because it makes technologies which produce less GHG per unit of energy more attractive thereby creating strong incentives for energy users to switch to energy technologies which produce less GHG emissions per unit of energy produced.  A price on carbon also creates incentives for all those responsible for GHG emissions to do what they can to emit less GHGs, including, for instance, reducing their carbon footprints by driving less, walking more, lowering thermostats in the winter, adding insulation to buildings, etc.

For these reasons, putting a price on carbon emissions as a policy response to human-induced climate change has strong global support particularly among economists.

This article will identify ethical issues created by (a) any carbon pricing scheme, (b) cap and trade regimes, and (c) carbon taxing regimes. This analysis will be followed by several conclusions.

II. Ethical Issues Raised By Any Carbon Pricing Scheme.

Although many ethicists who have identified ethical issues raised by policy responses to climate change that rely on putting a price on carbon acknowledge that pricing schemes have shown to be effective in reducing GHG emissions often at lower costs than other regulatory approaches, some ethicists nonetheless oppose carbon pricing schemes because of certain ethical problems with these schemes. Many other ethicists who acknowledge potential ethical problems with carbon pricing schemes believe these problems can be adequately dealt with by appropriate carbon pricing regime design. Yet even if ethical problems raised by carbon pricing regimes can be averted through carbon pricing regime design, policymakers and citizens need to understand these ethical problems so that they can be mitigated in the design of the carbon pricing scheme.

An ethical approach to climate change would limit GHG emissions by law at levels necessary to prevent human-induced climate change harms to people and ecological systems. For instance, many governments have established legal requirements on the percentage of renewable energy required of electricity providers, a policy response that does no rely on pricing carbon. An ethical approach to climate change is based on different justifications for reducing change harms than some economic approaches. As Vanderhelen said:

An ethical approach to climate policy is based on different assumptions than economic-based policy assumptions. The ethical approach says we should act on climate change now, not because the future costs of inaction exceed those of mitigation, but because the failure to do so harms others. It is our ethical duty to avoid this. (Vanderhelen, 2011)

And so an ethical approach to climate change requires those who are responsible for human-induced climate change harms to comply with their duty to not harm others without regard to the economic value of costs and benefits of climate change policy responses. All national governments in the world have duties to take actions that reduce GHG emissions from their jurisdiction to the nation’s fair share of safe global GHG emissions under the Paris Agreement and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
In addition, an ethical approach to climate change also identifies ethical issues raised by carbon pricing schemes including the following:

A.  Assuring the price will achieve GHG reductions at levels entailed by the government’s ethical obligations.

The amount and speed of GHG emissions reductions that government policies should achieve is fundamentally an ethical question that economic reasoning alone cannot determine. As the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change concluded in its 5th Assessment Report:

  • How should the burden of mitigating climate change be divided among countries? It raises difficult questions of fairness, and rights, all of which are in the sphere of ethics. (IPCC, 2014, WG III, Ch. 3, pg. 215).
  • The methods of economics are limited in what they can do. They are suited to measuring and aggregating the wellbeing of humans, but not in taking account of justice and rights (IPCC, 2014, AR5, WG III, Ch. 3, pg.224).
  • What ethical considerations can economics cover satisfactorily? Since the methods of economics are concerned with value, they do not take account of justice and rights in general. (IPCC, 2014,.AR5, WG III, Ch. 3, pg. 225).
  • Economics is not well suited to taking into account many other aspects of justice, including compensatory justice (IPCC,2014, AR5, WG III, Ch. 3,pg. 225).
  • [I]t is morally proper to allocate burdens associated with our common global climate challenge according to ethical principles. (IPCC, 2014, AR5, WG III, Ch. 4, pg. 317).

Thus, no carbon pricing scheme alone without consideration of ethical issues can determine what the magnitude and timing of a government’s GHG emissions reduction goals should be because a government’s GHG emissions reduction goals must be based on fairness, justice, and obligations to not harm others or the ecological systems on which life depends without the consent of those who will be harmed. These are essentially ethical matters that economic rationality alone cannot deal with. Proponents of carbon pricing schemes claim that pricing regimes allow those responsible for reducing GHG emissions to achieve reductions at the lowest cost, yet the amount of reductions that a nation is obligated to achieve is essentially an ethical matter.  So the goal of any pricing scheme should be designed to achieve ethically justified national GHG emissions reduction targets.

All nations in the world have agreed under the 2015 Paris Accord that they are duty bound to adopt policies that will enable the international community to limit warming to between 1.5 degrees C and 2.0 degrees C, the warming limit goal, on the basis of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities in light of national circumstances, the ‘equity’ requirement under the Paris Agreement.(UNFCCC, Paris Agreement, 2015, Art 2.) And so all nations have an ethical duty to determine their GHG emissions reduction goals which at a minimum would limit warming to as close as possible to 1.5 degrees C although no greater than 2.0 degrees C on the basis of what equity requires of it to achieve these warming limits. Equity is understood by philosophers as a synonym for distributive justice.

Although there are differences among ethicists about what equity requires,  “equity” may not be construed to mean anything that a nation claims it to mean, such as national economic self-interest. As IPCC said, despite ambiguity about what equity means:

there is a basic set of shared ethical premises and precedents that apply to the climate problem that can facilitate impartial reasoning that can help put bounds on the plausible interpretations of ‘equity’ in the burden sharing context. Even in the absence of a formal, globally agreed burden sharing framework, such principles are important in establishing expectations of what may be reasonably required of different actors. (IPCC, (IPCC, 2014, AR5, WG III, Ch. 4, pg. 317).

The IPCC went on to say that these equity principles can be understood to comprise four key dimensions: responsibility, capacity, equality and the right to sustainable development. (IPCC, 2014, AR5, WG III, Ch. 4,  pg 317)

As a result, because some pricing regimes will not reduce national GHG  emissions to levels required by their national obligations under the Paris Agreement even those nations that have adopted some kind of carbon pricing regime have had to enact other climate change policies to achieve the nation’s GHG reduction goals. For this reason and because some politicians have conditioned their support for a proposed carbon pricing scheme on acceptance of legal provisions that prohibit policy responses that are in addition to a carbon pricing scheme under consideration by a legislature, policymakers and citizens need to understand that any carbon pricing scheme must assure that a government’s emissions reduction policies will achieve the government’s ethically determined carbon emissions reduction obligations.  Thus they must oppose legislation that prohibits a government from supplementing carbon pricing schemes with other laws to reduce GHG emissions.

Thus the quantity of the price placed on carbon under a taxing scheme or the magnitude of allowances under a cap and trade regime should be established after express determination of the government’s ethically prescribed obligations to reduce GHG emissions to its fair share of adequately safe global emissions.

Every national GHG emissions reduction target is implicitly a position on two profound ethical questions among others. They are:

  • the amount of warming and associated harms the nation is willing to inflict on others including poor vulnerable people and nations, Since all nations have agreed under the Paris Agreement to limit warming to as close as possible to 1.5 degrees C and no greater than 2.0 degrees C, these warming limits should be the default assumptions of governments’ GHG reduction target formulation;
  • the nation’s fair share of total global GHG emissions that may not be exceeded to keep global warming from exceeding the Paris Agreement’s warming limit goals of 1.5 degrees C to 2.0 degrees C

Thus, to make sense of the acceptability of any carbon pricing scheme, government’s should; (a) identify its GHG reduction target, (b) how the target achieves its GHG emissions reduction obligations in regard to warming limits and fairness, (c) the date by which the target will be achieved, and (e) the reduction pathway that will achieve the GHG reduction goal.

The date by which the GHG reductions will be achieved is ethically relevant because any delay in achieving required reductions affects the remaining carbon budget that is available to assure that any warming limit goal is achieved. Carbon budgets that must constrain global GHG emissions to achieve any warming limit goal such as the 1.5 degrees C to  2.0 degrees C warming limit goals under the Paris Agreement continue to shrink until total GHG emissions are reduced to levels that will stabilize atmospheric GHG concentrations at levels that will not cause warming greater than the warming limit goal. Therefore both the magnitude of the government’s GHG emissions reduction goals and the time it takes to achieve the goal are relevant factors in regard to whether any government will achieve GHG reductions that represent its fair share of safe global emissions. In fact the reduction pathway by which the reduction goal will be achieved is also relevant to whether a government will reduce its GHG emissions to levels required of it by its obligations because pathways which produce rapid reductions early in any period will consume less of a shrinking carbon budget than pathways that achieve most of the reductions at later times in the relevant period.  This fact is depicted in this chart.

This chart demonstrates that different GHG reduction pathways may consume different amounts of any relevant carbon budget even if the percent amount of reductions, in this case, 100% reduction by 2050, is the same for the different pathways. The amount of the budget consumed by the two pathways is represented by the areas underneath the curves.

B. Intrinsic Ethical Problems With Any Carbon Pricing Scheme.

A few ethicists argue that relying on putting a price on carbon to achieve a government’s obligations is ethically problematic without regard to the details of the pricing scheme.

Ethicist Michael Sandel, for instance, in a 1967 OpEd in the New York Times entitled It’s Immoral to Buy the Right to Pollute identified the following ethical problems with pricing carbon after acknowledging that trading GHG emissions allowances could make compliance for the United States cheaper and less painful. (Sandel, 1967)

Turning pollution into a commodity to be bought and sold removes the moral stigma that is properly associated with it. If a company is fined by a government for spewing excessive pollutants into the air, the government conveys its judgment that the polluter has done something wrong. A fee, on the other hand, makes pollution just another cost of doing business, like wages, benefits, and rent. (Sandel, 1967)

The distinction between a fine and a fee for despoiling the environment is not one we should give up too easily. Suppose there was a $100 fine for throwing a beer can into the Grand Canyon, and a wealthy hiker decided to pay $100 for the convenience. Would there be nothing wrong with his treating the fine as if it were simply an expensive dumping charge?

Or consider the fine for parking in a place reserved for the disabled. If a busy contractor needs to park near his building site and is willing to pay the fine, is there nothing wrong with his treating that space as an expensive parking lot?

In effacing the distinction between a fine and a fee, emission trading is like a recent proposal to open carpool lanes on Los Angeles freeways to drivers without passengers who are willing to pay a fee. Such drivers are now fined for slipping into carpool lanes; under the market proposal, they would enjoy a quicker commute without opprobrium. (Sandel, 1967)

Some human behavior is so morally reprehensible that charging a price for the behavior to create a disincentive is widely seen as morally unacceptable. For instance, most societies would agree that a strategy to reduce child prostitution that relies on increasing the price of child prostitution or taxing a sexual transaction in which children are involved is morally unacceptable. Because some countries’ GHG emissions are far greater than any reasonable determination of their fair share of safe global emissions and these GHG emissions are already contributing to the killing or harming millions of people around the world while threatening tens of millions of others, allowing GHG emitters to continue to emit GHGs at unsafe levels if they are willing to pay the price required by a government rather then establishing a legally determined maximum emissions rate consistent with the emitter’s morally determined emissions limits can be argued to be as morally unacceptable as dealing with child prostitution by imposing a tax. Even though a tax might achieve the same amount of reductions as a legal limit implemented by an enforceable cap on GHG emissions amounts, applying a tax implicitly signals that it is morally permissible to continue emitting GHGs at current levels as long as the carbon tax is paid. Thus, the tax can diminish the moral stigma entailed by status quo levels of emissions.

Putting a price on carbon as a policy response to climate change is often justified by economists as a way to make sure that market transactions consider the value of harms caused by climate change that are unpriced in market transactions.  For instance, because the price of coal does not consider the value of the harms caused by the burning of coal that will be experienced by some people who are not participants in the sale of the coal, putting a price on carbon equivalent to the value of the harms caused by the burning of coal is a way of assuring that the value of the harms caused by the coal are considered in the market transaction. This addition to the price is referred to as a Pigovian tax or a tax on any market transaction that generates negative externalities, so that the value of the negative externalities is included in the market price.  Most economists recommend that the amount of the tax be based on the social cost of the negative externalities where the social costs are measured in dollars or other monetary units determined by the amount people would be willing to pay to prevent the harm. Once the cost the harms is determined and included in a tax, the market will be able to operate efficiently.

Economists thus justify a tax set in this way because it enables the market to maximize preferences. But ethics is interested not in maximizing preferences people have but in assuring that people’s preferences are those that people should have morally.  For ethicists, it is wrong to harm people without their consent, even if those causing the harm could pay victims money calculated by the market value of the harm. That is, according to most ethicists it is morally wrong to harm people or the ecological systems on which life depends even if those causing the harm are willing to compensate those harmed. Some ethicists therefore argue, putting a price on carbon as a policy response to climate change does not pass ethical scrutiny unless the price prevents all non-trivial harms to life, health, and ecological property that people have not consented to. Given that some human rights have already been demonstrated to be violated by climate change (UNHR, 2018), any price on carbon that allows human rights violations to continue does not pass ethical scrutiny.

And so putting a price on carbon does not pass ethical scrutiny as long as the price does not prevent the harms that people have right to object to without their consent.

Although the money from the carbon tax could be used to compensate people for harms caused by climate change, this potential use of the tax revenues does not ethically justify continuing the behavior which causes serious harms to others without the consent of those who are harmed. In addition, because those being harmed by GHG emissions are people all around the world, if the revenue from a tax is to be used to compensate those who will be harmed by the GHG emission, the revenues from a tax would have to be distributed worldwide.  At this time there is no such global revenue stream from national carbon pricing schemes.

Many citizens and institutions around the world including many colleges and universities have significantly reduced their carbon footprint because they believed they had a moral obligation to do so as long as their GHG emissions could contribute to harming people, animals, ecological systems on which life depends, or things of great value to people.  A sense of moral obligation, without doubt, motivates, at least some people and institutions, to do the right thing. Yet pricing carbon as a response to climate change does not create a legal prohibition to reduce GHG emissions but only an economic incentive to do so.  A government could always legally prohibit activities that create GHG emissions that create harms, an approach to changing behavior that was the dominant strategy in environmental law for many decades. Economists, however, have often objected to these “command and control’  approaches because they claim that market-based mechanisms can achieve needed reductions in a more efficient economic way, that is, at a price that includes consideration of the value of the harms created.

At least in the United States, many of the proponents of carbon pricing are failing to educate civil society about the moral obligations of all nations and people to reduce GHG emissions to their fair share of safe global emissions, a concern particularly in light of the very limited time left to limit warming to non-catastrophic levels. These proponents often passionately advocate for the adoption of a carbon pricing scheme because they are accurately convinced that a price on carbon will reduce GHG emissions, yet ignore discussing the non-discretionary moral duty to reduce GHG emissions thus inadvertently leaving the impression that provided that those who are willing to pay a price placed on carbon they have no moral obligation to cease activities which are responsible for carbon emissions. 

Economists often justify their market-based solutions as a method for maximizing the enjoyment of human preferences.  They thus calculate the value of harms avoided by climate policies by determining a market value of the harm and if there is no market value they often determine the value of the harms by determining what people are willing to pay to prevent the harm. This allows the economists to compare the cost of reducing GHG emissions against the value of harms prevented through pricing and in so doing allows a policymaker to select a policy option which maximizes human preferences. Yet, as we have seen ethics is concerned not solely with efficiently achieving the preferences people have but with establishing what preferences people should have in light of their moral obligations.

Under an ethical approach to climate change based on an injunction against harming others, because any additional GHG are raising GHG atmospheric levels which are already increasing harms people are suffering from droughts, floods, intense storms, tropical storms, and heat waves among other causes of  climate-induced harms, an ethical argument can be made that any carbon pricing scheme should seek to achieve the lowest feasible GHG emissions levels as quickly as possible. Ethics refuses to define what is ‘feasible’ in terms of the balance of costs and benefits. Ethics requires that harm to innocent victims must be avoided, even when the cost of reducing pollution exceeds the monetary value of harms to life and ecological systems on which life depends. Not all economists, of course, argue that government policies should be based on cost-benefit analysis but many do.

An ethical approach to climate change also requires that polluters should pay for the harms and damages they create as well as the costs to them of reducing the pollution.  Many carbon pricing schemes ignore the duty of GHG emitters to compensate those who have been harmed by their GHG emissions and base the amount of the tax on the amount of money needed to reduce GHG emissions while ignoring any obligations to compensate those who have been harmed by their emissions. This problem could be remedied by basing any price on the amount of money needed to compensate those who have experienced loses and damages or by providing separate funds to compensate those who are harmed by climate change but most carbon pricing schemes fail to take these matters into consideration.

Ethicists also acknowledge that climate-related harms are more likely to affect the poor, not just those who are now being asked to contribute toward its mitigation. For this reason, many ethicists prefer laws that prohibit certain immoral behaviors over laws that allow people to continue their immoral behavior if they are willing to pay higher prices entailed by the value of the harms caused by their behavior.

Economists often support pricing schemes if the pricing leads to the market incentivizing the use of alternative technologies that don’t create the harms of concern. In such cases, the morality of the pricing scheme likely depends on whether the technical transformation created by the pricing scheme will take place soon enough to prevent the harms of concern.

However, even in these cases, many ethicists believe that human activities that create morally unacceptable levels of GHG emissions should be responded to as moral obligations and only support pricing schemes so long as the scheme will enable reducing GHG emissions to morally acceptable levels as rapidly as possible. However, even so, some ethicists warn against erasing the moral stigma entailed by morally unacceptable levels of GHG emissions that could occur by allowing some to continue to exceed their moral obligations if they are willing to pay to do so.

Pope Francis in Laudato Si, the papal encyclical released in July 2015, questions whether market capitalism can effectively protect the poor, and in one passage specifically criticized “the strategy of buying and selling ‘carbon credits.’ More specifically Laudato Si argues that:

The strategy of buying and selling ‘carbon credits’ can lead to a new form of speculation which would not help reduce the emission of polluting gases worldwide. This system seems to provide a quick and easy solution under the guise of a certain commitment to the environment, but in no way does it allow for the radical change which present circumstances require. Rather, it may simply become a ploy which permits maintaining the excessive consumption of some countries and sectors. (Laudato Si 171).

The Pope’s objection appears to be based in part on the fact that a carbon pricing scheme will allow those who can afford to continue emitting GHGs after paying the pricing fee to do so while those that are unable to afford to pay the fee will need to reduce the activities that create GHG emissions. Yet this problem can be somewhat ameliorated by carbon pricing regime design decisions on how revenues are distributed or how allowances to emit are allocated.  However, these decisions raise questions of distributive justice, that is questions about how burdens or benefits of public policy should be allocated to comply with what fairness requires. For this reason, carbon pricing schemes often raise serious questions of distributive justice.

In addition if revenues from pricing schemes are to be used to help compensate those who are most harmed by climate change, given that those who are most harmed are often very poor people in poor nations that usually have done little to cause climate change, the revenues would need to transferred to poor nations and people around the world. Yet no national carbon pricing schemes have yet proposed such international financial transfers.

III. Ethical Issues Raised by Cap and Trade GHG Emissions Reduction Schemes

This paper next examines the following ethical issues raised by cap and trade regimes that are additional to those discussed in Section II.

A very detailed examination of some ethical issues raised by cap and trade regimes by Simone Carey and Cameron Hepburn is entitled Carbon Trading: Unethical, Unjust, and Ineffective? The Carey/Hepburn paper discusses in detail the following ethical issues raised by cap and trade regimes that are in addition to those discussed above. The following is a summary of issues discussed by the Carey/Hepburn paper.

A. Rights to use nature cannot be owned

Because GHG emitters that receive allowances or buy allowances from those that have excess allowances could under some trading mechanisms hold or bank these allowances, holders of allowances could be understood under some trading schemes to have a right pollute the atmosphere at levels entailed by the allowances they hold. However, most ethicists believe that no one should have a property right to pollute the atmosphere.  Because in absence of a rule that would prevent the owner of allowances to bank the allowances for use far into the future, the owners of the allowances could accumulate the right to pollute far into the future. As a result, some ethicists have argued that allowances should be limited to a specific time period and be understood to be revocable if the science changes and concludes that greater reductions are necessary then those that were understood to be necessary to prevent harm when the allowances were distributed.

B  Responsibilities to abate harms cannot be transferred to others

Some ethicists believe that some human responsibilities should not be allowed to be transferred to others. For instance, it is generally believed to be ethically unacceptable for those who are potentially subject to being drafted into the military to be able to buy their way out of this obligation by paying someone else to agree to take one’s place if he or she is drafted. For this reason, some ethicists claim that is ethically problematic for high GHG emitters to get a credit for reductions made by others while not requiring more of the high emitters to reduce their emissions.

C. Distributive justice issues with how allowances and revenues are allocated

Because those with the money to do so can buy scarce allowances, participants in a cap and trade regime can wind up with vastly unequal levels of allowances creating significant differences among participants in rights to emit GHGs. In addition, because rules determining who can get allowances and what is done with the money generated from allowance trading can create great imbalances, rules for allocating allowances and revenues from sales of allowances should be consistent with what distributive justice requires to assure fair burden and benefit sharing. Distributive justice requires that people should be treated equally unless there are morally relevant reasons for treating people differently. There is no reason in principle for allowance and revenue allocations to lead to a more unequal distribution of wealth. It will depend on how the cap and trade scheme is designed.

These issues are discussed in more detail by the Carey/Hepburn paper.

D. Ethical issues created by the fact that some cap and trade regimes allow high emitters of GHGs to count emissions reductions made by projects of others funded by the emitters in achieving the high emitters’ GHG reduction obligations.  

Some cap and trade regimes allow those with GHG emissions reduction obligations to count the reduction of GHG emissions made by others’ projects funded by the emitter as a credit in achieving the emitter’s cap obligations. Economists justify this feature of cap and trade because it allows emitters to achieve GHG reductions at a lower price, However, not all GHG reduction strategies will reduce GHG emissions with equal probabilities that GHG reductions made by the emitter would actually have achieved. For instance, an electricity supplier can commit to reducing its emissions to amounts that will be achieved with high levels of confidence by installing non-fossil energy but if the electricity supplier relies on funding a forestation project in a third world country to obtain a credit for its emissions reductions. the actual reductions to be achieved by the funded project are much more speculative because of problems in assuring that any forest project will keep GHG reductions achieved by photosynthesis of the forest out of the atmosphere forever. Thus funding a project to achieve GHG emissions credits raises issues about the reliability of achieving specific GHG emission reduction amounts that are more reliable if the person responsible for GHG emissions must assure that GHG emissions will actually be achieved.

Thus cap and trade regimes often also raise the following ethical problems which were discussed in more detail in a prior entry on this website. (Brown, Ethical Issues Raised By Carbon Trading, 2010).:

a. Permanence. Many proposed projects for carbon trading raise serious questions about whether the carbon reduced by a project will stay out of the atmosphere forever. Yet permanent storage of carbon is needed to assure equivalence between emissions reductions avoided if no credits were issued and atmospheric carbon reductions attributable to a project which creates carbon credits. This is so because emissions reductions should guarantee that some quantity of GHG will not wind up in the atmosphere, yet some projects which are used to substitute for emissions reductions at a source have difficulty in demonstrating that the quantities of carbon reductions projected will actually be achieved. For instance, carbon stored in forests, soils, or geological carbon sequestration projects could be released to the atmosphere under the certain conditions. For example, rapid temperature change could kill trees thus releasing back into the atmosphere carbon stored in the trees. This problem is usually referred to as the problem of “permanence” of carbon reduction projects. For this reason, only projects that assure permanent reduction of carbon in the atmosphere can be categorized as environmentally effective projects and should be used to offset activities which actually release carbon.

b. Leakage. Many proposed projects for carbon trading raise serious questions about whether carbon reduced by a project at one location will result in actual reductions in emissions because the activity which is the subject of the trade could be resumed at another location. For example, paying people to plant trees in location A is not environmentally effective if these same people that receive the money chop down trees at place B. This is the problem usually referred to as “leakage.” Forest and other kinds of bio-sequestration projects that sequester carbon in particular often create leakage challenges. Industrial projects can also create leakage problems if the industry gets credit for reducing carbon at one industrial plant while moving the carbon producing activities to another place. If leakage occurs, then the trade is not environmentally effective.

c.  Additionality. Getting a credit for a project which is used in a trade will also not be environmentally effective if the project would have happened anyway for other reasons. This is so because trading regimes usually assume that a GHG emitter should get credit because of their willingness to invest in projects that reduce carbon emissions that would not happen without the incentive to get credit for carbon reductions. If the project would happen without the investment of the emitter, then the investment in the project is not “additional” to business as usual. This is the problem usually referred to as the “additionality” problem.

d.  Enforcement of trading regimeA trading regime is environmentally ineffective if its conditions cannot be enforced. Although enforcement of trading regimes is sometimes practical when the project on which the trade is based is within the jurisdiction of the government issuing the allowances, enforcement is particularly challenging when the project is located outside of allowance issuing government. In such cases, enforcement must be “out-sourced” to other institutions or governments In addition, while many hundreds of millions of dollars are being invested in setting up emissions trading schemes all over the world, virtually no resources are being channeled into their enforcement or verification. Although most cap and trade regimes have built-in carbon reduction verification steps, verification remains extremely difficult for many types of carbon reduction projects for which credits are being issued because of the lack of enforcement or long-term verification potential. This enforcement challenge is exacerbated when projects for which credits are issued are in poor countries without the technical capability to enforce or verify that reductions have been made. Because of this, a strong case can be made that those who desire to rely on projects that have dubious enforcement and verification potential should have the burden of demonstrating enforcement and verification potential before they may obtain credits generated from these projects.

 e. Distributive justice and internal allocation of a government-wide cap. How a cap is allocated among entities within a government creates many potential distributive justice problems. Governments sometimes distribute a cap they have by giving away allowances, auctioning allowances, and other ad hoc considerations that often take into account political feasibility. Each of these methods of distributing a cap raises distributive justice issues that are often ignored for political reasons. For instance, both auctioning allowances and giving away allowances could be significantly regressive, making higher-income households better off while making lower-income households worse off. Auctioning could also be regressive if the most wealthy get the most permits forcing those without the financial resources into non-polluting options. Sometimes governments choose to allocate the cap by placing caps on “upstream” carbon users such as coal and petroleum companies and ignoring “downstream” carbon emitters such as coal-fired industrial users. A decision to place a cap upstream makes the climate change regime easier to administer but could have regressive effects on those least able to afford increased fuel costs. An upstream cap also can create little incentives for those who can afford to waste energy to change behavior. In contrast, downstream caps puts the responsibility on energy users. There is no ethically neutral way to decide these design questions.

f. Distributive justice and revenue from allowancesWhen allowances are auctioned or otherwise purchased, governments must make decisions about how to use allowance revenues. These decisions raise a host of distributive justice issues that are often ignored for political reasons. Some governments have chosen, for instance, to use allowance revenues to fund climate change technology research, to meet international obligations to fund climate change adaptation projects in developing countries, to fund programs to reduce deforestation projects in developing countries, to buy off politically powerful opponents to climate change legislation, to help those least able to cope with rising energy costs, or to subsidize nuclear power, geologic carbon sequestration, or renewable energy.  Thus, decisions about how to allocate revenues from distributing allowances raise distributive justice issue

IV. Ethical Issues With Carbon Taxes.

In addition to the ethical issues that apply to all carbon pricing regimes identified in section II of this entry, carbon taxing regimes can raise the following additional ethical issues.

a. Distributive Justice and a Carbon Tax.  Carbon taxing regimes must decide who must pay the tax and just as is the case for cap and trade regimes in the allocation of allowances, taxing schemes may choose to apply the tax either to upstream producers of carbon fuels such as petroleum or coal companies that distribute fossil fuels or further downstream to entities such as electricity generators who consume the fossil fuels. Upstream taxation creates fewer taxable entities who have a huge tax burden. Therefore the decision on who to tax creates different winners and losers, an outcome which has political significance particularly in places where fossil energy is mostly produced. If the tax is based on the amount of CO2 per unit of energy, then some fossil fuel industries such as coal production will pay a much higher tax per unit of energy, a fact which most greatly affects those places and communities that produce fuels with higher CO2 emissions levels per unit of energy.  This fact creates heavy burdens from the tax for those who are dependent on the sale of fuel with higher CO2 production levels. And so a decision about who must pay a tax has distributive justice implications.

How the tax revenues are used by the government also has enormous political and distributive justice implications. Policymakers are faced with many competing ways of using tax revenues generated by putting a price on carbon.  Many parts of the world that have established a carbon tax use it primarily to subsidize technologies that produce lower amounts of GHG per unit of energy such as wind and solar power. Other governments use the revenues to ease the burden on those who are most affected by the tax, including poor people. Thus how the revenues of a carbon tax are distributed raises deep questions of distributive justice which also create issues of political feasibility.

b. Amount of the tax. 

As we have seen all carbon pricing schemes raise ethical issues about whether the price is sufficient to achieve GHG emissions reductions consistent with the government’s ethically determined obligations to reduce GHG emissions. A pricing  regime that is based on taxing carbon emissions raises more challenging questions about whether the tax is ethically stringent enough than cap and trade regimes because governments are able more easily assure that the cap is stringent enough than a regime based on taxing carbon because the size of the cap may be set directly on the magnitude of GHG reductions required for the government to achieve its ethically determined GHG emissions reductions obligations while the sufficiency of a tax must rely on economic modelling to determine the magnitude of reductions that will be achieved by different levels of the tax. Determining the amount GHG reductions that will be achieved by different levels of the tax is always somewhat of a guessing game due to the inherent imprecision of economic modeling to predict how entities and people will respond to different price signals. For this reason, taxing schemes that seek to assure that the government will reduce GHG emissions reductions levels congruent with the government’s ethically determined reduction obligations should include accelerator provisions that would increase the amount of the tax once it is determined that actual GHG reductions are not consistent with reductions pathways required to achieve ethically determined reductions obligations. However, because experience with carbon taxing programs around the world has demonstrated that political backlash will likely arise that undermines government support for continuing a carbon tax that is judged to be too high, governments which seriously seek to reduce their GHG emissions through imposing a tax alone may need to consider back up strategies rather than rapidly accelerating taxes if the original tax does not achieve the GHG reductions required of it by its ethical obligations.

c. Considering responsibility for prior emissions, an issue relevant to distributive  justice. 

Distributive justice supports an allocation of burden sharing obligations on the basis of who is most responsible for causing the current problem. Carbon tax regimes are usually forward-looking; in that most schemes make everyone pay the same price for using the atmosphere’s capacity to absorb CO2.    Thus the scheme ignores responsibility determined by looking backward at questions such as:

  • Who caused the problem?
  • Who benefited from past emissions?
  • Who is in the best position to fix the problem?

To deal with these questions, a carbon tax may need to be supplemented by additional policies, for example by tax credits for poor people or sharing of tax revenues with those who must pay the tax but who have done little to cause the current problem so that the tax scheme can consider the distributive justice implications of looking backward at who is most responsible for the current problem

V. Conclusions.

As we have seen carbon pricing schemes designed to reduce GHG emissions raise a host of ethical issues and problems.

Although many of these ethical problems can be dealt with by the pricing carbon regime design, given the enormous threat to life and ecological systems created by human-induced climate change, perhaps the most important ethical issue raised by carbon pricing regime is whether the carbon pricing regime will be successful in reducing a government’s GHG emissions to its fair share of safe global emissions.

Because there is limited political support for enacting carbon pricing schemes with sufficient pricing levels to achieve the enormous reductions in GHG emissions now necessary to prevent very dangerous climate change, carbon pricing schemes will likely require policy responses in addition to carbon pricing alone.

Because of the need to judge whether any carbon pricing scheme will achieve a government’s ethically determined GHG emissions reduction obligations, all proposed carbon pricing schemes should be clear and transparent on how the pricing scheme will achieve the government’s ethically determined GHG reduction goals. A pricing scheme could contribute to achieving a nation’s GHG reduction obligations either by establishing a price that will sufficiently reduce a government’s GHG emissions to achieve the nation’s GHG reduction obligations by itself or in combination with other GHG reduction policies. However, to judge the adequacy of the pricing scheme, governments should explain the role of any carbon pricing scheme in achieving its ethically determined GHG reduction obligations.


Brown, D. (2010, Ethical Issues Raised By Carbon Trading;

Carey, S.& C.Hepburn, (2011) Carbon trading: unethical, unjust and ineffective?

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 1995, AR2, Working Group III, Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate Change,

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2014, Working Group III, Mitigation of Climate Change,

Pope Francis, (2015), Laudato Si

Roberts, D. (2016) Putting a price on carbon is a fine idea. It’s not the end-all be-all, Vox,

Sandel, M. (1967) It’s Immoral to Buy the Right to Pollute, http//

UNFCCC, Paris Agreement2 (2015),

UNHR, UN High Commissioner on Human Rights, (2018) Climate Change is a Human Rights Issue,


Donald A. Brown

Scholar in Residence, Professor

Widener University Commonwealth Law School



The following comments on this entry were made by Eric Haites, an economic consultant for Margaree Consultants Inc, in Toronto


Ethical Issues Entailed by Pricing Carbon as a Policy Response to Climate Change confuses benefit-cost analysis with carbon pricing and criticizes carbon pricing on grounds that also apply to non-price policies.

Carbon pricing policies – cap and trade systems (CTSs) and carbon taxes – are regulatory measures to limit greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) by specified sources within a jurisdiction. They may be implemented in conjunction with or as substitutes for non-price regulations such as subsidies for non-carbon energy, minimum gasoline efficiency standards for vehicles, funding for affordable public transportation, requirements/incentives to increase the supply of renewable energy and energy efficiency standards for buildings.

Benefit-cost analysis of climate change compares the estimated costs of different levels of global emissions reductions with the estimated value of reduced global climate change damages associated with those emission reductions. Benefit-cost analysis of climate change is extremely complex conceptually and in practice. Since the analysis must span a century or more due to the long atmospheric lives of greenhouse gases, the calculations are very sensitive to the discount rate and have large uncertainty ranges.

A CTS or carbon tax can be implemented by a jurisdiction to help achieve its GHG reduction goal regardless of how that goal is established. A country that has a nationally determined contribution under the Paris Agreement can use carbon pricing and/or non-price policies to meet its commitment.

It is true that many economics textbooks suggest that the carbon tax be set at the level determined by benefit-cost analysis, but that is not necessary and is based on the implicit assumption that an emissions reduction goal has not been established by other means, such as international negotiations.

Many of the criticisms of carbon pricing policies do not specify an alternative policy. If emissions are to be reduced, the alternative is a set of non-price regulations including efficiency standards and increased reliance on renewable energy. In practice, neither carbon pricing nor non-price regulations cover all GHG emissions, so there are regulated emissions and exempt emissions under every policy.

Consider then the claim that it is immoral to buy the right to pollute. Before a regulation is implemented, the right to pollute in unlimited quantities is free. Regulations impose costs and/or quantity limits on the right to pollute. In the case of a carbon tax, there is a cost for each ton of GHGs emitted by specified sources. In the case of a CTS, total emissions by specified sources are capped. In the case of non-price regulations there is a compliance cost, but any remaining emissions are free and unrestricted. The cost of an efficient automobile is higher, but its emissions are not priced or restricted.

One of the arguments by Simone Carey and Cameron Hepburn cited by the paper is that the rights to nature can not be owned. Many CTSs explicitly state that the allowances are not property rights. Almost all of the CTSs have cancelled or greatly devalued surplus allowances.

In the paper, the discussion of the distinction between a fine and a fee is misleading for a CTS. Every CTS has penalties for non-compliance, so the correct comparison is the fine for a CTS and that for a non-price policy. The non-compliance penalty for most CTSs is a reduction in emissions equal to the exceedance plus a penalty. To use the analogy in the paper, a CTS requires the offender to pick up the beer can and pay a penalty. In contrast, a non-price regulation only imposes a fine.

The paper raises the concern that “the tax can diminish the moral stigma entailed by status quo levels of emissions.” Why would the moral stigma associated with residual emissions differ? Are the residual emissions by a source subject to a carbon tax morally less acceptable than those by the owner of a more efficient automobile. Sources subject to carbon pricing policies have a financial incentive to make emission reductions that cost less than the tax/allowance price. Sources subject to non-price policies have no incentive to reduce their emissions.[1]

Issues of distributive justice arise for all regulations; which sources are regulated, how stringent is the regulation, how should groups that are adversely affected by compensated? The paper clearly identifies these issues for CTSs and carbon taxes. But they apply equally to non-price regulations. Who pays for the more efficient vehicles and buildings, the public transit and the additional renewable energy? Those costs will be borne by specific groups or the government. Carbon pricing policies have the advantage that they generate revenue that can be used to help address distributive justice.

The paper argues that past emissions should be considered when addressing distributive justice. Presumably, this consideration applies to any policy, not just carbon pricing. In practice the ability to do this is limited due to lack of data and the long atmospheric lives of GHGs. Non-price regulations often differentiate between existing and new sources and CTSs address this concern through their allowance allocations.

In summary, carbon pricing can be implemented by a government to help meet its GHG emissions reduction target regardless of how that target is established. A CTS or carbon tax can be implemented alone, jointly or in combination with non-price policies. In practice all jurisdictions with a pricing policy also implement non-price policies. Many of the ethical criticisms of pricing policies apply to non-price policies as well. Price policies have the advantage of raising revenue that can be used to address distributive justice.

[1] Indeed, they may have a financial incentive to increase emissions. A more efficient vehicle may have a lower operating cost per km so the owner may drive more.

Resonse to comments

I agree that levels of GHG reductions achieved by a pricing scheme need not be determined by Cost-Benefit Analysis although some economists recommend this. In such cases the ethical issues discussed in this paper apply

Mr, Haite is correct that the articles criticism of carbon pricing schemes may also apply to other responses to climate change, However, if the level of reductions that constitute a nation’s GHG reduction target are based on a nation;s ethical obligations, then the problem entailed by some carbon pricing scheme’s allowing emitters to continue emit as long as they pay  a tax is not possible.


Why Overcoming Instrumental Rationality In Climate Change Policy Controversies Is a First Order Problem Preventing Ethical Principles From Getting Traction to Guide Climate Change Policy Formation


I. The Failure of Ethical Principles to Get Traction in Climate Change Policy Formation.

This entry will explain why a type of rationality, referred to as instrumental rationality, both dominates policy formation on climate change around the world and is responsible for the failure of ethical principles to guide government responses to climate change.

As we have explained frequently on, climate change is a problem with features that particularly require that it be seen and responded to as an ethical problem even more than other environmental problems. These features include that: 

  • First, it is a problem that is being caused by some people in one part of the world who are putting others in other places who have often done little to cause the problem at great risk. 
  • Second, the harms to those at most risk are not mere inconveniences but potentially catastrophic harms to life and natural resources on which life depends.  In fact, unless humans adequately respond to climate change’s growing threats, most of life on Earth is threatened.
  • Finally climate change is a problem about which many of its greatest victims can do little to protect themselves by petitioning their governments for protection. The victims’ best hope is that the those high-emitting nations and people causing the problem will see that they have duties to climate change victims to avoid harming them.

The ethical dimensions of climate change are important to understand because unless those nations and individuals that are emitting high levels of greenhouse gases (GHGs) reduce their emissions in accordance with their ethical obligations, climate change will  eventually cause great harm to all but particularly to those who are most vulnerable to climate change impacts and who usually have done little to cause the great harm. 

There are many ethical principles that should, without controversy, guide national responses to climate change. These include, for instance:

  • Governments around the world have agreed under the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 1992) and agreements by parties under this treaty since then, including the Paris Agreement (Paris Agreement 2015), to adopt national climate change policies on the basis of several ethical principles including the duty to establish national policies in accordance with equity and common but differentiated responsibilities (UNFCCC, 1992, Art 3.1), to apply the precautionary principle that prohibits nations from using scientific uncertainty as an excuse for not taking action to prevent dangerous anthropocentric interference with the climate system (UNFCCC, 1992, Art 3.3), and the principle that developed countries have the obligation to take the lead on reducing the threat of climate change (UNFCCC,1992, Art 3.1), and to enact policies that limit warming to between 1.5 to 2.0 degrees C (United Nations, 2015 Art 2)
  • In addition there are numerous other non-controversial ethical norms that are understood to apply to nations as a matter of international law to global environmental problems such as climate change including the “no harm principle” which obligates nations to prevent people or entities within their jurisdiction from harming people and nations outside their borders (UNFCCC,1992, Preamble), and the “polluter pays principle” which requires those nations causing harm from pollution to pay for the damages they cause (Rio Declaration, 1992, Principle 16).

Yet most nations are completely ignoring these ethical obligations when they formulate policy responses to climate change (National Climate Justice. Lessons Learned).

A research project led by Widener University Commonwealth Law School and the University of Auckland found that despite express national promises under the Paris Agreement to base national climate commitments known as Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to reduce the threat of climate change to prevent warming as close as possible to 1.5°C but no more than 2°C, on the basis of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities, all 24 nations studied actually set their NDCs on economic self-interest. Yet this conclusion was not determinable from the documents that nations submitted to the UNFCCC Secretariat when the nations submitted their NDCs (National Climate Justice, Lessons Learned). The study also found that environmental NGOs in the country that supported national action on climate change did not seem to understand how to critique the failure of the nation to set its NDC on the basis of the nation’s ethical obligations including ethical obligations that the nation expressly agreed to.

Every national commitment to reduce greenhouse gas (GOHG) emissions, or NDC, is implicitly a position on two profound ethical questions among others. They are:

  • the amount of warming and associated harms the nation is willing to inflict on poor vulnerable people and nations, and
  • the nation’s fair share of global GHG emissions that may not be exceeded to keep global warming from exceeding a warming limit goal.

Yet nations around the world are setting their NDCs on economic self-interest and ignoring their ethical responsibilities on these issues.

Although reasonable people may disagree on what equity requires of nations to reduce their GHG emissions, national economic self-interest as a justification for their GHG reduction targets does not pass minimum ethical scrutiny. In this regard the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) said its fifth assessment report that despite ambiguity about what equity means:

There is a basic set of shared ethical premises and precedents that apply to the climate problem that can facilitate impartial reasoning that can help put bounds on the plausible interpretations of ‘equity’ in the burden sharing context. Even in the absence of a formal, globally agreed burden sharing framework, such principles are important in expectations of what may be reasonably required of different actors. (IPCC, 2014).

The IPCC went on to say that these equity principles can be understood to comprise four key dimensions: responsibility, capacity, equality and the right to sustainable development (IPCC, 2014).

And so ethical principles are failing to guide national climate change policy formation despite the uncontroversial applicability of several ethical principles that should guide national climate change policies.

The failure of ethical principles to get traction in guiding policy is a much broader problem than in regard to climate change policy formation alone.  Despite the emergence of the academic sub-discipline of environmental ethics in the late 1970s, ethical principles are failing to influence environmental policy-making for most environmental problems.

The claim that ethical principles are rarely guiding environmental policy formation is strongly supported by the comments of the founder of the journal Environmental Ethics, Eugene Hargrove, who in 2003 published an essay “What’s Wrong ? Who’s to Blame? (Hargrove, 2003). This essay invited reflection on why environmental ethics has not had an influence on environmental policy.  Just three years later, Robert Frodeman, in the  same journal in an article entitled “The Policy Turn in Environmental Ethics” also reflected on the huge failure of environmental ethics to achieve traction in environmental policy formation (Frodeman, 2006).

Since its inception in the late 1970s, academic environmental ethics has been mostly focused on theoretical issues while completely failing to help policy makers understand what is ethically wrong with specific arguments made by opponents of environmental policies who almost always use arguments derived from instrumental rationality which hide dubious unstated norms that are the justification for the arguments and which would often fail minimum ethical scrutiny if the norms were made express and critically reflected on.

One of the reasons why ethical principles have failed to affect environmental policymaking is the failure of the academic discipline of environmental ethics to pay attention to actual controversies that arise in environmental policymaking debates. Academic environmental ethics since its inception in the late 1970s has been almost exclusively focused on theoretical issues, such as how to ground a biocentric or ecocentric ethics, while completely failing to help policymakers understand what is ethically wrong with specific arguments made by opponents of environmental policies who almost always rely on arguments derived from instrumental rationality which hide or ignore dubious unstated norms on which the arguments are based. 

II. The Problem of Instrumental Rationality

This article now explains why a first order task that needs to be addressed before ethical principles can play their appropriate role in shaping environmental public policy is to open policymaking arguments on environmental issues including climate change to express ethical reflection. This is a first order task because throughout the world those responsible for environmental policymaking are following instrumental reason, a mode of reason which hides or ignores ethical questions, to determine the acceptability of environmental policies. It is a first order problem because before one can consider what ethical principles should guide policy formation, policymaking must be made open to ethical critique and reflection. If policymakers don’t see and respond to the ethical issues that are implicitly raised by arguments raised against proposed policies, they can’t apply the appropriate ethical rules.

Instrumental rationality is a mode of rationality that is exclusively concerned with the search for efficient means or scientific facts which, consequently, is not concerned with assessing the goals—or ends— that policies should pursue. This form of rationality has existed throughout history, but has become increasingly more dominant in post-Enlightenment liberal democratic capitalist societies (Cruickshank,2014).

Ethics rationality, on the other hand, is concerned about what the goals of society should be. Ethical reasoning seeks to determine what should be the goal of human behavior by examining what is right or wrong, what is permissible or impermissible, what actions are obligatory or non-obligatory, and how burdens of preventing harm should be justly distributed.

Instrumental rationality, because it focuses on means, usually ignores ethical questions about what the goals of policy should be despite the fact that every argument against a proposed environmental policy already contains an unstated norm.  For instance, a claim that a proposed climate change policy should not be adopted because it imposes unacceptable costs rests on the unstated norm that the government should not adopt policies that impose significant costs on the economy or specific industries.

Scientific and economic reasoning, which have increasingly dominated public policy-making from the beginning of the Enlightenment, almost always focuses on how to achieve goals, not on what goals or ends should be desired.

Economic rationality often focuses on how to maximize human preferences. Ethics asks a different question of economic activity, namely what preferences humans should have.

Scientific reasoning usually tests hypotheses to determine what “is.”  Moral philosophers believe that determining what “is,” which is the proper domain of science, cannot determine what “ought” to be, which is the domain of ethics.

Yet instrumental rationality that scientists and economists deploy in their search for scientific and economic facts has dominated public life and higher education for several centuries.

That instrumental rationality dominates environmental policy making is clear given that most government environmental agencies are staffed exclusively by engineers, scientists, economists, and lawyers but very infrequently by employees trained in ethics. This is huge problem because very few employees of environmental agencies or scientific organizations that make policy recommendations can spot problematic ethical issues that should be acknowledged in policy debates and particularly ethical issues that are ignored or hidden when instrumental rationality is deployed to make policy recommendations. Although employees of government agencies responsible for policy formation often understand they should apply policy rules entailed by relevant laws, many relevant laws do not contain clear rules on how to respond to economic and uncertainty arguments against proposed environmental policies.

Instrumental rationality dominates public policy formation for at least two reasons:

First, sociologists, including Max Weber, have predicted that instrumental rationality would over time crowd out ethical rationality in modern societies because increasingly complex human problems would be relegated to bureaucracies run by technical experts whose expertise depends on the use of instrumental rationality. Since the power of experts depends, in part, on maintaining the fiction that their expertise is the central key to solving modern problems, these experts are reluctant to acknowledge that their analytic tools for solving problems are often ethically inadequate and sometimes ethically inappropriate (Thomas, 2017). Moreover particularly in capitalist societies, wealthy interests are able to hire experts and frequently do so to fight government action which would reduce profits.

Second, opponents of proposed environmental policies usually frame opposition to these policies on the basis of excessive costs to governments or specific industries or lack of scientific certainty about harms the policy seeks to prevent. These arguments very frequently hide controversial normative assumptions implicitly embedded in the arguments. For instance, cost arguments made in opposition to environmental policies often rest on the very ethically dubious idea that any policy which creates significant cost to a nation, regional economy, or to a specific industry should not be adopted even when the problematic behavior causes serious harm to people or nations who have not consented to be harmed.  The public debate in response to these claims often narrowly focuses on the magnitude of the costs or whether the regulatory action will create jobs and in so doing ignores several serious ethical problems with these arguments.

In policy disputes about matters in which potential harms are acknowledged by opponents of proposed policies, the public debate about the acceptability of the harms is often limited to some form of “cost-benefit analysis”(CBA).

Yet CBAs frequently hide important ethical issues. If, for instance, a CBA concludes that government action to protect vulnerable people or ecological systems should not be taken because costs of taking action to reduce an environmental threat outweigh the economic value of harms avoided by the proposed regulation, controversial ethical assumptions may be hidden in factual assertions about the magnitude of the costs or value of benefits particularly if:

  • Potentially but not fully proven catastrophic harms were ignored in the CBA.
  • The costs of taking action would be imposed upon parties that are harming others, yet the victims of the harm have not consented to be harmed.
  • Things that were believed to be sacred by one culture are valued in the CBA as if they were commodities whose value can be measured adequately by “willingness-to-pay” monetary measures. CBAs usually commodify all human values and thus value is restricted to monetary value while ignoring other values including sacred value or beliefs that certain entities should not be for sale. Thus in CBAs, usually the value of things that could be harmed are measured by human preferences measured in monetary values. Yet ethics is concerned with what preferences people should hold, not simply what preferences people hold.
  • Human rights will be violated if regulatory action is not taken.
  • The proposed government action implements the ethical duty of people to not harm others on the basis of self-interest.
  • The CBA determined economic value of entities that might be harmed are determined without obtaining the consent of those who might be harmed.
  • The benefits of government action to protect the environment are discounted too greatly in calculations that seek to allow future benefits of action to be compared to current costs to those who must act to prevent harm (Brown, 2008).

Thus, if a decision to take no government action on a potential environmental problem is justified only as a matter of imbalance between costs and benefits, very dubious ethical assumptions are frequently hidden in the CBA calculations while ethical principles, including those that have been widely acknowledged as valid and applicable to government policy formation are often ignored.

In this writer’s experience, proponents of environmental policies also not only rarely identify the ethical problems with the use of CBAs or almost any cost-based argument made in opposition to proposed policies, they almost always respond to the cost-based arguments by making counter cost claims. And so public debate about proposed policies usually focuses on economic  “factual” claims while ignoring ethical principles.

Evidence of the utter dominance of instrumental rationality in the United State includes executive orders of several US presidents which require that any US proposed regulation must satisfy a CBA before it may be promulgated (Congressional Research Service, 2017).

This is so despite the fact that, as we have seen, a CBA used as a prescriptive guide to policymaking often hides many controversial ethical issues including, for instance, the duty of nations to not harm others on the basis of national economic self-interest.

Using cost to those causing harm to others as justification for failing to abate the harm also violates well-established principles of international environmental law including the “polluter pays principle” (Rio Declaration,1992, Principle 16 ) and the “no harm principle.” (UNFCCC,1992, Preamble)..

Yet the United States continues to very frequently base the acceptability of environmental regulations on the results of a CBA.

In 1997, while working as the Program Manager for United Nations Organizations in the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Office of International Affairs, this author closely observed the US debate about whether the US should agree to the Kyoto Protocol under the UNFCCC. This debate focused exclusively on two different CBAs, one completed by the US EPA and the other by the US Department of Energy which reached slightly different conclusions about the magnitude of negative impacts on US GDP if the US agreed to be bound by the Protocol. Amazingly both CBAs examined costs and benefits to the United States alone if the United States ratified the Kyoto Protocol while completely ignoring potentially harsh climate impacts on poor people around the world and the most vulnerable nations. Yet no one in the US government nor NGOs participating in the debate about whether the US should ratify the Kyoto Protocol raised any ethical problems with the US reliance on CBAs that examined costs and benefits to the US alone as a tool to determine the appropriateness of US action on climate change.

In most Western capitalist countries, corporations and their industry associations have huge political power to frame public policy questions and don’t hesitate to exercise their power to prevent any government action that could lower corporate profits.  And so the public debate on proposed policies often focuses on economic “facts,” not ethical duties, despite the almost universally accepted ethical norm agreed to by almost all religions and nations that people should not harm others on the basis of self-interest.

Opposition arguments against proposed environmental policies often rest on the unstated very dubious norm that regulatory action limiting commercial activities should not be taken unless the harms are proven by the government with high degrees of scientific certainty even in cases where achieving high levels of certainty is scientifically difficult or very prohibitively expensive.

For over 30  years, opponents of US action on climate change have frequently based their opposition on scientific uncertainty about human-caused climate change harms despite the fact that the United States agreed to the “precautionary principle” when it agreed to the UNFCCC in 1992. (UNFCCC. 1992, Art 3.3) This principle says that governments will no longer fail to take action on the basis of scientific uncertainty. Yet advocates of national action on climate change in response to opponents’ scientific uncertainty arguments almost always simply claim that the scientific “facts” of harm have been sufficiently scientifically demonstrated not on the ethical rule that precaution is required once it is scientifically established that significant harm might be created by certain human activities.

If a government decides not to act to reduce the threat of environmental harm on the basis of lack of proof of harm, such a decision can hide important ethical questions particularly if:

  • The government assumes that the proponents of government action to prevent environmental harm should shoulder the burden of proof of demonstrating harm particularly in matters where proof is very expensive, difficult to demonstrate, or cannot be fully demonstrated before potential harms are experienced..
  • There is credible but uncertain evidence that the current activity may be approaching thresholds that could trigger very serious consequences.
  • If the government waits until all uncertainties are resolved it will be too late to prevent serious harm.
  • Some very serious potential harm is judged to be low probability just because the mechanism for causing serious harm is not completely understood so that the probability of the serious harm cannot be confidently evaluated.
  • The victims of potential harm have not consented to put at risk.

All of these considerations are relevant to climate change yet, the United States has failed to decisively act on climate change since international climate change negotiations began 30 years ago because opponents of US climate change policies have claimed that there is insufficient proof of human-induced climate change caused harms.

Although the most prestigious scientific institutions in the world including most national academies of science and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change have concluded with high levels of confidence that humans are causing and threatening great harms from human-induced climate change, even conceding, for the sake of argument, that great harms from human induced climate change are not yet proven, ethical principles requires that action should be taken to reduce the threat of climate change. Yet the ethical basis for requiring action is almost never discussed in the US public debate about whether scientific uncertainty about human-induced climate change is an appropriate justification for US unwillingness to act on climate change.

Scientists employed by environmental agencies usually focus on understanding the environmental harms and risks of various human activities and whether proposed government action will acceptably reduce threats to human health and the environment. The goals of environmental regulatory action are usually given to them by law or regulation such as water pollution should be reduced to prevent unreasonable harm to humans or ecological systems. Yet, in the face of scientific uncertainty about whether human actions may cause harm, scientists cannot determine who should have the burden of proof or what quantity of proof should satisfy the burden of proof by scientific methods alone because these are fundamentally ethical questions.

An understanding the ethical problems with instrumental rationality leads to an understanding of why nations often ignore even well-established ethical principles in policy formation such as the ethical principle that no nation should harm others outside their jurisdiction on the basis of national economic interest.

For this reason, a first-order problem on the road to a world which formulates policies guided by ethical principles is to open policy formation controversies to express consideration of ethical issues. This goal requires that those engaged in policy formation spot and identify the ethical issues frequently hidden in economic and scientific arguments against proposed policies that currently dominate policy formation controversies on environmental issues around the world.

Unfortunately most professionals engaged in environmental policy formation have no training that would help them identify the hidden ethical issues embedded in arguments made against environmental and sustainable development policies. Nor do those NGOs who participate in  controversies about these issues have the training to spot ethical problems made by opponents of proposed policies that are derived from various forms of instrumental rationality.


Brown, D. (2008) Ethical Issues in the Use of Cost-Benefit Analysis of Climate Change Programs,, accessed 16 Dec. 2017

Congressional Research Service (2014) Cost-Benefit and Other Analysis Requirements in the Rulemaking Process’,, accessed 18 Dec.,2017

Cruickshank, J., (2014) Democracy versus the domination of instrumental rationality: Defending Dewey’s argument for democracy as an ethical way of life, Humanities 3, 19–41; doi:10.3390/h3010019,, accessed 20 Dec.2017

Frodeman, R. (2006) A Policy Turn in Environmental Ethics, Environmental Ethics, 26

Hargrove, E., ‘(2003)  What’s Wrong? Who Is to Blame?, Environmental Ethics, 25 (1):3-4, [2003] 3-4

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). (2014) 5th Assessment Report, Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Chapter 4. Sustainable Development and Equity. Sec 4.6. 2.1, p 4., assessed , Dec 23, 2017

National Climate Justice, Research Project On Ethics and Justice in Formulating National Climate Policies, Lessons Learned,, accessed 24 Dec, 2017

Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, (Rio Declaration, 1992), accessed 24 Dec 2017,

Thomas. W. (2017) Max Weber on Rationality in Social Action, in Sociological Analysis in Modern Life, Rational Action,, accessed 22 Dec. 2017

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 1992), FCC/INFORMAL/84/Rev.1 GE.14-20481 (E), Preamble.

United Nations (2015), Paris Agreement, FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1,, accessed 23 Dec. 2017


Donald A. Brown

Scholar In Residence and Professor

Sustainability Ethics and Law

Widener University Commonwealth Law School

An American at the Bonn Climate Change Negotiations.

To be an American at the Bonn 2017 climate negotiations felt very different than the 13 other times this writer has participated in the yearly efforts that almost every nation in the world has participated in with the hope of finding a global solution to climate change.

Shortly after entering the huge complex on the Rhine River at which every nation in the world was meeting to finalize the details of the 2015 Paris Accord, I ran into several acquaintances from other years who all remarked about the outrageousness of the US intention announced by President Trump of withdrawing from the global climate change deal.

The United States had a delegation at the Bonn talks that was telling other nations what they should do on an agreement about which the US president wants no part.  According to a representative from India, Dr. Vijeta Rattani, of the New Deli Center for Science and Environment, at the beginning of the Bonn talks the US was obstructing agreement on some issues that had wide support among most other nations.

The US’s main contribution was to host a panel which made a full-throated defense of coal while most of the rest of the world was trying to get an agreement that nations would phase out coal by 2030 because of the likely impossibility of keeping warming to non-catastrophic levels without phasing out of coal combustion.  According to a story in the New York Times before the Trump team could make its case on the benefits of fossil fuel, “the panel was disrupted for more than 10 minutes by scores of chanting and singing demonstrators. The protesters then walked out, leaving the room half empty. Throughout the remainder of the presentation, audience members shouted down and mocked White House officials who attempted to explain away President Trump’s stated view that global warming is a hoax.”

During the Bonn COP, 20 countries including  Angola, Austria, Belgium, Britain, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Marshall Islands, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Niue, Portugal and Switzerland agreed to phase out of coal combustion by 2030.

Throughout the Bonn talks, representatives of some of the most vulnerable nations to climate change pleaded with high-emitting nations to reduce their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in light of the current suffering of their citizens. Among others I talked to early during the Bonn talks was a representative from Seychelles, a nation of 115 islands about 900 miles East of the East African coast in the Indian Ocean, who was strongly disturbed by the US lack of response to climate change given that people on her island were already suffering from rising sea levels and drought which was making it more difficult for her island nation’s citizens to grow food.

I also talked to Africans working on climate issues who claimed that massive human suffering from drought is now visible in the sub-Sahara countries of Mali, Chad, and Niger, suffering which is responsible for the creation of waves of refugees who have been attempting to enter Europe often through Libya, many of whom have drown at sea while those of have made it to Europe are destabilizing European politics.

Throughout the Bonn negotiation complex, most nations mounted pavilions which included displays of climate change impacts already being experienced in their countries, adaptation responses which are underway, and mitigation efforts which they are undertaking.  Walking through the Bonn complex, participants could not escape the conclusion that adverse climate change impacts are not just a future menace but a troubling current reality in much of the world.  Although ten years ago, one could participate in the yearly climate negotiations and conclude that most nations thought that human-induced climate change was mostly a future threat, in November 2017 it is clear that most nations are already experiencing some adverse climate change impacts that they realize they and other nations need to respond to now.

In several Bonn events, representatives of the global scientific community created a mood of gloom and urgency by discussing the magnitude and speed of GHG reductions now necessary to prevent catastrophic climate change harms. One program put on by the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) described the enormous gap between the GHG emissions reductions pledged so far by nations under the Paris Agreement and those that are required to limit warming to the Paris Accord’s goals of 1.5  to 2.0 degrees C.  A report by UNEP concluded that if the international community fully complied with its GHG emissions reduction pledges made so far, the gap between the pledges and what is needed to achieve the warming limits is “alarmingly high.” The report goes on to say that even if national pledges are fully complied with, the remaining carbon budget that must constrain global GHG emissions to limit warming to 2.0 degrees C will be 80 % depleted by 2030 while by that year the remaining budget to achieve 1.5 degrees C warming limit goal will have been completely depleted. The report also says much more ambitious national pledges are now necessary by 2020, just over two years from now, to have any realistic hope of staying on a reduction pathway necessary to achieve the Paris Agreement’s warming limit goals.

Other scientists during the Bonn negotiations alarmingly warned of the more rapid loss of Arctic ice than what was expected, increasing yearly larger rises of atmospheric CO2 concentration levels perhaps because forest and ocean sinks are starting to decrease, and greater than expected sea level rise.

 Some of the great anger about the United States that I witnessed in Bonn was somewhat muted by the presence of 16 US States and numerous American cities and businesses who had been organized by California governor Jerry Brown and former New York City mayor Michael Bloomberg under the America’s Pledge Campaign. This group which accounted for almost half the US economy had a large presence in Bonn including a large pavilion which showcased what many US sub-national governments and private sector entities were doing to reduce US GHG emissions. One German participant said to me that he had hope that the United States would eventually do the right thing on climate change despite the Trump’s administration indefensible position because of the presence of the defiant US states and local governments. However, he said since these entities only represented about half of the US GHG emissions, the Trump administration’s unwillingness to cooperate with the rest of the world was a major global abomination.

During the last event I went to in Bonn, a UNEP representative discussed the fact that even if every nation fully achieved GHG reductions at levels they committed to, the world was headed toward over a 3 degree C warming in this Century, a level of warming that is extremely dangerous particularly for some parts of the world.  He then exhorted the audience to work tirelessly to get every national, state, regional, and local government to set ambitious GHG reduction targets. The situation is ominous he said, we need “all levels of government, that is nations, regions, and local governments,  to immediately work toward achieving zero carbon emissions.”


Donald A. Brown

Scholar in Residence and Professor

Sustainability Ethics and Law,

Widener University Commonwealth Law School



571 Strategies To Reduce GHG Emissions Adopted by 44 Cities

This site has previously focused primarily on the obligations of nations, organizations, and citizens around the world to respond to climate change at levels consistent with their ethical and moral obligations as well as with the ethical and moral problems with most arguments made by opponents of  climate change policies.  While national responses to climate change for the most part remain frighteningly inadequate, many local governments around the world have started to step up to reduce GHG emissions sometimes at surprisingly ambitious levels. The following paper identifies 571 strategies that 44 cities have adopted to achieve their emissions reduction commitments. Many cities are reducing GHG emissions while claiming they are saving money and often improving the  quality of life and sometimes creating jobs.

571 Examples of Strategies to Reduce GHG Emissions at the Local Governmental Level From 44 Cities Around the World

Donald A. Brown

Scholar in Residence and Professor

Widener University Commonwealth Law School

This paper relies on the research of Brett Flower, Jaclyn Kartley, Stacey Lindsay, Tyler Semler, Widener University Commonwealth Law School Students, and Analyn Avila, Jason Bailey, Colin Bloomfield, Priyanka Chakraborty, Victoria Edmonds, and Ina Holm Johansen, University of Auckland Law School Students

  1. Introduction

All around the world, local governments are beginning to step up to reduce the threat of climate change creating some hope that the world could begin to take action at the civilization challenging levels necessary to avoid catastrophic human-induced climate change impacts. The Secretariat for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change website identifies 2508 cities that have made specific commitments to reduce GHG emissions.[1]

This paper identifies greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction targets and strategies that have been adopted to achieve these targets by 44 cities around the world.

This paper’s identification of hundreds of strategies adopted by 44 cities demonstrates that local governments are innovating to find creative strategies to reduce the enormous threat of climate change and thereby implementing novel GHG reduction tactics, many of which cannot be taken by higher levels of government including state, regional, and national governments. Because local governments are working at a scale closer to most people and businesses that are responsible for GHG emissions, local governments are often in an optimal position to work closest with those most responsible for GHG emissions.

This paper includes the following sections:

(1) List of cities and targets,

(2) Identification of strategies adopted by these cities arranged in the following categories:

  1. 15 strategies for building green buildings,
  2. 55 strategies for reducing energy use in buildings,
  3. 19 other strategies for reducing energy use in general,
  4. 37 strategies for increasing renewable energy,
  5. 16 strategies to increase energy efficiency,
  6. 10 energy ordinance strategies,
  7. 143 strategies to reduce GHG emissions from transportation,
  8. 18 lighting transformation strategies,
  9. 32 strategies for managing waste disposal,
  10. 51 land use planning strategies,
  11. 19 miscellaneous tactics for reducing GHG emissions,
  12. 71 strategies for educating citizens,
  13. 38 strategies for incentivizing private sector GHG emissions reductions,
  14. 22 funding strategies to reduce GHG reduction emissions,
  15. 25 cooperative government climate strategies; and.

(3) Thirty Conclusions from this Analysis.

          I. Cities and reduction targets:

  1. Addis Ababa, reduce GHG output by 64% from business as usual projections by 2030.[2]
  2. 67% reduction of CO2 by 2035 in comparison to 2005[3]
  3. Amsterdam, by 2025, a 40 % reduction of CO2 compared to 1990 followed by 75% reduction by 2040.[4]
  4. Austin, net zero carbon by 2050,[5] 35% of its energy produced from renewables by 2020 and divest Austin of ownership in coal-generated facilities.[6]
  5. Berkeley, cut GHGs to 33% below 2000 levels by 2020, 80% reduction by [7]
  6. Berlin, reduce GHG emissions by 85% compared to 1990 levels by 2050, 40% compared to 1990 levels by 2020.[8]
  7. Bogotá, 62% GHG reductions by 2050.[9]
  8. Boston, 80% below 2005 CO2 levels by 2050, with an interim goal of 25% reduction by 2020.[10]
  9. Boulder, 80% reductions of CO2 below 2005 levels by 2050,[11]100% renewable electricity by 2030.[12] Finally, reduce organizational GHG emissions 80% below 2008 levels by 2030.[13]
  10. Brussels, 30% reduction of CO2 compared to 1990 levels by [14]
  11. Buenos Aires, 30% GHG reductions by 2030.[15]
  12. Calgary, 20% CO2below 2005 by 2020 and 50% below1990 by 2036.[16]
  13. Chicago, 80% reduction of CO2 below 1990 levels by 2050, with an interim goal of 25% below 2005 levels by 2020.[17]
  14. Copenhagen, achieving carbon neutrality by 2025.[18]
  15. Dublin, 13% reduction from 2005 CO2 levels by 2020.[19]
  16. Durban, 30% reduction of CO2 by 2020 from 1990 levels.[20]
  17. Edmonton, by 2035 35% GHG reductions below 2005 levels,[21]
  18. Hiroshima, 30% reduction of CO2by 2030 from 1990, by 2050 70% reduction from 1990.[22]
  19. London, reduce CO2 by 60% from 1990 by 2025, 80% by 2050.[23]
  20. Los Angeles, 45% reduction of CO2 by 2025, 60% by 2035, and 80% by 2050 from 1990 levels.[24]
  21. Melbourne, 100% CO2 reduction by 2020.[25]
  22. Minneapolis 15% CO2 reduction by 2015, 30% by 2025.[26]
  23. Nashville, 70 % CO2 reduction by 2050.[27]
  24. New York, 30% CO2 reduction below 2006 by 2017,[28] 80% by 2050, 40% by 2030. [29]
  25. Oslo, 50% CO2 reduction below 1991 levels by 2020; 95% below 1991 by 2030, 100% below 1991 by 2050.[30]
  26. Perth, 20% CO2 reduction by 2020 in comparison to 2011-2012, 32% by 2031.[31]
  27. Phoenix, carbon neutrality by 2020.[32]
  28. Philadelphia, 80% CO2 reduction from 1990 levels by 2050.[33]
  29. Pittsburgh, 20% CO2 reduction below 2003 levels by 2023.[34]
  30. Portland, 80% CO2 reduction from 1990 levels by 2050, interim goal of 40% reduction by 2030.[35]
  31. Quito, 30 % CO2 reduction CO2 by 2025. [36]
  32. Rio de Janeiro. 16 % CO2 reduction CO2 by 2016 and 20% by 2020 by considering 2005 as the baseline[37].
  33. Rotterdam, 50% reduction CO2 by 2050.[38]
  34. San Francisco requires individual departments in the city to develop annual climate action plans outlining steps to decrease GHG emissions.[39] The target for all departments is 25% reduction by 2017, 40% reduction by 2025, and an 80% reduction by 2050 all from 1990 levels.[40]
  35. Seattle, carbon neutrality by 2050.[41]
  36. Seoul, 25% reduction by 2020, 40% below 2005 by 2030.[42]
  37. Shenzen, 45% CO2 reduction in carbon intensity by 2020 to reach 0.81 tCO2 /CNY 1000.[43]
  38. Singapore, 36% GHG reductions by 2030 from 2005 levels,[44]
  39. Stockholm, net-zero by 2040 and fossil fuel free by 2050.[45]
  40. Sydney’s 70% CO2 reductions below 2006 levels by 2030.[46] The properties and operations owned by Sydney have been carbon neutral certified since 2011,[47] interim goals of 44% by 2030.[48] Sydney also plans to have the city use 100% renewable energy derived from solar, wind, and waste.[49]
  41. Vancouver, 5% CO2 reduction from 1990 levels by 2020.[50]
  42. Washington D.C., 80% CO2 reduction by 2050.[51]
  43. Wellington, 80% CO2 reduction from 2001 levels by 2050,[52] with interim targets of 10% by 2020; 40% by 2030; and, 65% by 2040.[53]
  44. Yokahama, 24% CO2 reduction by 2030, by 2050 80% from 2005 levels.[54]

      Section II. Strategies Deployed

The following identifies strategies that cities have adopted to achieve the reduction targets. Some of these strategies could be placed in several different categories

          A. Building green buildings

  1. Enacting a policy that new buildings must be designed with passive/low energy, (Oslo).
  2. Developing net zero apartment buildings, (Sydney).
  3. Implementing a Zero Emissions building plan:
    • Eliminating emissions from new buildings by 2020;
    • Increase building insulation requirements; and
    • Reduce energy use,(Vancouver).
  4. Specify future clean energy designs for new buildings, (Boulder).
  5. Encourage net zero buildings with the E+ program, (Boston).
  6. Public School 62 is the first “net-zero energy” school constructed in New York City. The school is designed to reduce energy use by roughly 50% as compared to a standard new NYC public school by using an ultra-tight high- performance building envelope, day-lit corridors, energy recovery, a geothermal well field, and demand-control ventilation. The building offsets the rest of the energy use with wrap-around solar PV panels placed on the entire roof area and the south façade, and solar thermal panels to provide domestic hot water and supplement the heating system, (New York).
  7. Establishing, implementing, and maintaining sustainable building practices for the buildings it owns, leases and funds over the course of their entire (Edmonton).
  8. Upgrade green building standards to include more protective standards for new buildings and certain public and private sector buildings, (Austin).
  9. Require owners of large buildings to incorporate integrated energy modelling early in design process, (Austin).
  10. Mandatory energy modelling and an energy assurance scheme for buildings larger than 5,000 sq m., (Calgary).
  11. Create show case and best practice energy buildings for public buildings, (Melbourne).
  12. Expand requirements for new buildings including implementing a New-Zero goal by 2030, requiring all new buildings to be solar capable, requiring that new city buildings meet LEED Gold standard, requiring new developments to encourage and accommodate low-carbon transportation choices, and require private construction to meet LEED Silver standard (Boston).
  13. Model good behavior to stimulate copycat behavior. A surprisingly successful approach that has seen significant upticks in “passive building” stock is the adoption of the Made In Green standards, a plan which focuses on making public buildings exemplars of ecological considerations, developing rigorous standards for new construction, encourages the incorporation of sustainable neighbor strategies in all new developments, develops green economic networks such as the Employment-Environment Alliance, and focuses on low-carbon mobility, (Brussels).
  14. Official and municipal buildings have all been made climate neutral and schools and public buildings will be transformed as well. Post-2015 only climate neutral buildings are being permitted for construction, (Amsterdam).
  15. Obtain LEED GOLD certification for all new construction and major renovation projects, (San Francisco, Airport).

       B. Reducing energy use in buildings

  1. Developing a district heating system using biomass energy resilience capacity building techniques, (Boulder).
  2. Encouraging eco-certification for municipal buildings, (Oslo).
  3. Adopting building efficiency standards and requirements, (Boulder).
  4. Achieving net zero energy at the new Airfield Security building, (San Francisco, Airport).
  5. Creating building energy monitoring requirements, (Philadelphia).
  6. Providing home repair and energy efficiency upgrades to low income residences, (Portland).
  7. Retrofit 40% of buildings to reduce energy consumption by 2020, (Chicago).
  8. Conserve energy through green roofs, 6,000 to be installed by 2020, (Chicago).
  9. Distribute weatherization materials and compact fluorescent lights (CFLs) to residents, (Chicago).
  10. Make municipal operations a model for minimizing environmental impacts from cleaning products to green roofs, (Boston) (Minneapolis).
  11. For existing municipal buildings incorporate LEED commercial interiors guidelines, (Boston).
  12. Encourage net zero buildings with the E+ program, a program that seeks to make existing buildings ultra efficient, (Boston).
  13. Encourage greening buildings with the Mayor’s Carbon Cup Award to recognize businesses that achieve deep GHG reduction goals, (Boston).
  14. Ensure that building decision-makers have access to building energy use information, (New York).
  15. Improve the energy performance of existing large buildings through the expansion of energy reporting, benchmarking, and disclosure practices, (Edmonton).
  16. Require all new occupied city owned, funded, or renovated buildings to exceed the highest sustainability rating standards, (Calgary).
  17. Create a survey of commercial buildings to determine barriers to energy retrofits, (Melbourne).
  18. In municipal buildings, both houses and offices, phase out the use of oil heating, (Oslo).
  19. Adopt passive house standards for all municipal buildings to minimize the amount of energy required for space heating and cooling, (0slo).
  20. Challenge all city buildings to achieve 10% energy reduction, (Wellington).
  21. Encourage builders and developers to site buildings for better solar orientation to maximize passive solar heating, (Calgary).
  22. Promote the use of visible energy meters in homes and workplaces, (Calgary).
  23. Increase quantity of green certified buildings by focusing on both new construction and remodeled stock using the Green Building Program as a Strategies include minimization of energy and water use (for instance, greywater reuse, rainwater harvesting, storm water reclamation, and regulation of local waterway use and pollution) and maximization of construction debris recycling and reuse, (Berkely).
  24. Enhance energy use standards for existing housing stock by encouraging energy efficiency (green building requirements) achieved via subsidized upgrades for insulation, rebates for energy upgrades, income-qualified weatherization services, making publicly available residential blocks energy efficiency data, state funded energy efficiency loans, and official endorsement of the Energy Star rating program, (Berkely).
  25. Increase public building renewables use and overall energy efficiency following a multi-headed approach that includes Energy Star compliance, the use of solar installations designed to off-set power use, upgrading all city lights (including traffic lights) to LEDs, a mandate that all public buildings under construction or renovation meet LEED silver certification or higher, the use of the Precautionary Principle in all city purchasing decisions, water conservation and recycling programs, and upgrade city vehicle fleet from conventionally powered vehicles to those using alternative, renewable energy, (Berkeley).
  26. Expand energy efficiency program by focusing on the residential experience of citizens and targeting low income, rental, and multi-unit housing, (Boston).
  27. Work with third party organizations to incentivize building owners to seize opportunities for energy efficiency projects both during construction and renovation, (Boston).
  28. Work with utilities to encourage replacement of inefficient outdated equipment before traditional end-of life points are reached, assist in bulk purchasing of replacement technologies and green tech. encourage load-shifting to enhance renewable energy usage, and encourage the deployment of thermal and battery storage, (Boston).
  29. Work with utilities to identify commercial tenant spaces that are abnormally energy demanding and reach out to these to encourage efficiency Similarly, target residential rental opportunities to reduce energy demand, (Boston).
  30. Lead by example, fully shifting public buildings to energy efficient practices by 2020 including the use of high efficiency street lighting, insulation of public buildings, and deployment of renewable energy infrastructure, (Boston).
  31. Conduct more pilot programs including construction of net-zero buildings, incentivize sustainable building practices by offering public land and financial considerations for industry interested in experimenting, leverage Boston’s research capabilities to develop and experiment with better building processes, explore green leasing and encourage vertical thinking that considers roof space as environmental space, including use of cool roofs and green roofs, (Boston).
  32. Reform existing codes to ensure rigorous coverage and retrain inspectors to ensure proper enforcement. Expand building codes to increase standards for renovation and building projects, (Boston).
  33. Work to interconnect existing energy data and reporting mechanisms, (Boston).
  34. Add energy efficiency measures to all current and past city building projects, (Boston).
  35. Adapt public housing to achieve passive standards and assist low income citizens in implementing energy saving alterations, (Brussels).
  36. Require that public buildings play an “exemplary role” by requiring them to exceed standards and demonstrate to the public the energy successes. Require that buildings achieve passive goals, the public fleet to be completely green, and environmental training for all employees be made standard, (Brussels).
  37. Launch the Green Condominium Program (aimed at improving energy efficiency in small, single family homes), the Green Landlord Program (aimed at encouraging landlords to upgrade their facilities), the Home Energy Efficiency Empowerment Program (aimed at educating homeowners on energy efficiency and providing technical know-how and funding assistance), and the Home Energy Technology Program (aimed at assisting in the widescale adoption of green tech, primarily through funding and tax breaks, (Vancover).
  38. Reduce local government building energy use by 75% before 2050 by increasing renewable energy, installing solar power and LED lighting, (Nashville).
  39. Convert public buildings to green buildings, (Hiroshima).
  40. Upgrade all city buildings and offices with energy proficient lights and insulation systems (Los Angeles).
  41. Install energy saving devices in all public buildings, (Ahmadabad).
  42. Determine energy resilience capacity, the ability of the energy system to withstand threats, (Boulder).
  43. Implement cost-effective upgrades in existing buildings to improve energy efficiency in the near term, (New York).
  44. Adopt Eco-Industrial park plans, (Addis Ababa).
  45. Retrofit 40% of buildings to reduce energy consumption by 2020, (Chicago).
  46. Distribute weatherization materials and CFLs to residents, (Chicago).
  47. Make municipal operations the model from cleaning products to green roofs, (Boston) (Minneapolis).
  48. For existing municipal buildings incorporate LEED commercial interiors guidelines, (Boston).
  49. Target inefficient buildings with a mandatory energy reporting ordinance, (Boston) (Minneapolis).
  50. Retrofit 40% of buildings to reduce energy consumption by 2020, (Chicago).
  51. Create EcoRoof incentives, (Portland).
  52. Conserve energy through green roofs, 6,000 to be installed by 2020, (Chicago).
  53. Implement Cool Roofs project, (Melbourne).
  54. Conserve energy through green roofs, 6,000 to be installed by 2020 (Chicago)
  55. For existing municipal buildings incorporate the LEED commercial interiors guidelines, (Boston).     

  C. Other energy reduction tactics.

  1.  Create procedures which allow roadway projects to use more locally-produced and recycled content materials thus saving on costs and energy, (Austin).
  2. Install lighter-colored pavement to reduce urban area temperatures, improve road strength, and lower energy bills of surrounding buildings, (Sydney).
  3. Implement a Neighborhood Energy Strategy:
  • Supply centralized heating, hot water, and cooling for several buildings;
  • Eliminate the need for boilers in each building;
  • Use low carbon renewable energy sources reducing fossil fuel use, (Vancouver).
  1. Assess various available energy reduction programs to determine which might be the best fit for Pittsburgh, (Pittsburgh).
  2. Seek out funding towards repurposing study, that is examine infrastructure and building uses to see if they can be used for more than one use, potentially saving money and energy, (Pittsburgh).
  3. Perform local electricity generation analysis, that is examine all the ways in which energy is generated in the city to see if cost savings and efficiency improvements are possible, (Boulder).
  4. Explore consumption-based accounting method to track and measure GHG emissions from products and packaging produced outside of Boulder but consumed locally, (Boulder).
  5. Launch an effort to reduce city wide water consumption, (New York).
  6. Enhancement of water conservation practice in new and existing buildings, (San Francisco, Airport).
  7. Implement Urban landscapes Climate Plan, (Melbourne).
  8. Scale up deep energy retrofits that holistically address heating systems, cooling systems, and building envelopes and transition buildings away from fossil fuels, (New York).
  9. Establish a Green Renovation Program, (Edmonton).
  10. Create a more responsible public procurement system that looks at purchases both for environmental impacts and lifecycle costs, (Berlin).
  11. Invest $14.8 million at rate of $1 million per year in reducing GHGs, (Melbourne)
  12. Build advanced heat and power systems to provide energy needs, (Berlin).
  13. Improve energy use behavior, wide spread adoption of energy efficient light bulbs, attic insulation projects in existing home stock, and require that new buildings meet the A standard on the BER scale, require major refurbishment of existing housing stock (including attic and wall insulation, boiler upgrades to high efficiency, window replacement, and use of renewable heat sources), implement the District Heating Plan (a new institutional construct that is modelled on Swedish successes in centralizing city heating). The Dublin City Development Plan has likewise been rewritten to mandate high energy performance as standard in all new buildings, (Dublin).
  14. Create a district heating system that covers insulation of new and old buildings. By 2040, almost 200,000 buildings will be administered heat by this system which successfully replaces the individual gas furnace, (Hiroshima).
  15. Invest four million Australian Dollars since 2007 in promoting innovation and technologies to reduce energy use, (Perth).
  16. Develop a coherent, city-wide, approach to neighborhood based energy systems which utilize the current, effective, District Energy Network initiative, (Vancouver)                                                                                                                                          Increase Renewable Energy
  1. Using a water distribution system to generate electricity, (Oslo).
  2. Commit two million dollars each year to install renewable energy on properties to generate clean energy locally, (Sydney).
  3. Install solar panels on properties, (Sydney).
  4. Install solar hot water and/or photovoltaic systems, (Sydney).
  5. Research and early adoption of smart grid technologies, (Austin).
  6. Powering city owned buildings through 100% of renewable energy resources, (Austin).
  7. Determine how many buildings have adequate solar energy capacity, (Pittsburgh)
  8. Develop an implementation plan to install solar energy on buildings, (Pittsburgh).
  9. Assess existing research on the benefits of passive solar design, especially in climates similar to Pittsburgh’s, (Pittsburgh).
  10. Determine which aspects of passive solar design are most appropriately suited to Pittsburgh, and whether the potential benefits are significant enough to justify a code change, (Pittsburgh).
  11. Implement a roof top solar program, (Boulder).
  12. Create a nanogrid and microgrid, (Boulder).
  13. Investigate producing and use of biofuels, (New York).
  14. Examine how city operations could increase solar use, diesel retrofit, and energy efficiency, (Melbourne).
  15. Build Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, (Addis Ababa).
  16. Develop Melbourne Renewable Energy Project, (Melbourne).
  17. Create Solar Atlas of potential solar applications for city by determining solar capability of various locations, (Berlin).
  18. Create a program Solar Capital Berlin, (Berlin).
  19. Create a program Solar Now!, (Portland).
  20. Create a Renewable Energy Master Plan, (Sydney).
  21. Develop a Renewable Energy Infrastructure Master Plan, (Rotterdam).
  22. Expand distributed solar energy and install 1,000 MW of solar capacity by 2030, (New York).
  23. Increase percentage of green power purchases, (Edmonton).
  24. Streamline the approval and permitting process for building-mounted solar panel systems, while providing clarity on building safety requirements, allowable impacts and allowable exemptions, (Edmonton).
  25. Convert the existing stream heat network to run off of renewable energy sources, (Dublin).
  26. Develop and implement a renewable energy strategy to reach the 100% renewables goal by 2050. Further fund the Climate Action Revenue Incentive Program which offsets carbon tax payment by industries who have pledged to be and are on course to become carbon (Vancouver).
  27. Create a smart grid network to utilize and control energy use that has been created which will help save and trade solar energy produced by the panels installed in their area, (Hiroshima).
  28. Install solar heating panels for all public swimming pools and restrooms, (Los Angeles).
  29. Install solar energy panels throughout the city with a target to increase the number of households with rooftop solar panels from 5,000 to 80,000 by 2020, (Amsterdam).
  30. Because of lack of adequate roofs for households, work with big industrial and commercial buildings to lease their roof for the solar panels to generate energy for residents, (Amsterdam).
  31. Expand wind power generation capacity from 67 MW to 85 MW, (Amsterdam
  32. Transform ports to become Green Ports by replacing old wind turbines with new and increased number of wind mills, (Amsterdam).
  33. Promote the use of solar panel by subsidizing the tax, controlling the use of solar energy by meters, and installing public solar panels for public use, (Los Angles).
  34. Provide economical solar power as an alternative to conventional power to the low-income groups, (Los Angeles).
  35. Install solar panels on almost every public building and for all public facilities, (Hiroshima).
  36. Enter into contracts with wind producers to meet city energy needs, (Austin).
  37. Require all producers of energy to meet renewable energy standard, (Austin).

            E. Increase Energy Efficiency

  1. Implement a rooftop Trigeneration System to heat and cool municipal buildings, (Sydney).
  2. Develop decentralized energy networks, (Sydney).
  3. Make energy efficiency and demand side management priorities of the Municipal utility, (Boulder).
  4. Expand energy services to the city, (Boulder).
  5. Replace natural gas and petroleum combustion throughout the city, (Boulder).
  6. Maximize water supply from existing facilities such as the groundwater system and the New Croton Aqueduct, (New York).
  7. Promote energy benchmarking, (Philadelphia).
  8. Distribute weatherization materials and CFLs to residents, (Chicago).
  9. Make municipal operations the model for sustainability from cleaning products to green roofs, (Boston), (Minneapolis).
  10. Create a tree canopy plan with a goal of a 35% increase in canopy cover, (Boston).
  11. Encourage net zero buildings with the E+ program which challenges builders, architects, and developers to build green buildings, (Boston).
  12. Encourage greening with the Mayor’s Carbon Cup award to recognize businesses achieving deep GHG reduction goals, (Boston).
  13. Implement the Efficiency Master Plan, (Sydney).
  14. Implement means by which energy use can be assessed, analyzed, and tracked by use of close public-private partnership,(Durban)/
  15. Deploy small scale municipality studies and incorporate successes into broader uses including the creation of Energy Efficiency Clubs, large scale use of LEDs in street lights, municipal building retrofit to incorporate solar panels and water heating, and educational outreach and training programs, (Durban).
  16. Create a Biogas Cogeneration Facility, (Philadelphia).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     F.  Energy Ordinances


  1. Charge a carbon tax, (Oslo).
  2. Create Conservation Audit and Disclosure Ordinance which requires energy audits for all homes in Austin electric service area, (Austin).
  3. Update energy codes to require that all homes be rated for energy use, (Austin).
  4. Determine whether a mandate, incentive, or combination of both is the most effective way to promote passive solar design, (Pittsburgh).
  5. Implement the universal zero waste ordinance, (Boulder),
  6. Strengthen the disposable bag fee ordinance to further reduce bag use, (Boulder).
  7. Adopt the Green Taxi Ordinance, specifying a reduction of average fleet GHG emissions by 20% below 1990 levels within four years (the standard amount of time it takes taxi companies to turn over fleet inventory), (San Francisco).
  8. Require energy use disclosure at point of sale for all buildings more than 10 years old, (Austin).
  9. Adopt Green Building Rezoning Policies which target GHG emissions specifically and mandate targets for all new buildings. Similarly, improve the energy efficiency standards for construction in the Vancouver Building code. Wider use of the Passive House development will become standard in law and policy. Broader implementation of the Green Building Policies and a specific inclusion of the emissions per square foot metric will be included. Update the British Columbia Building Code to include improvements for those in social housing and the general greening of public buildings,(Vancouver)
  10. Target inefficient buildings with mandatory energy reporting ordinance, (Boston) (Minneapolis).

              G. Transportation strategies


  1. Reconfigure traffic lights to synchronize with traffic through codes, (Austin).
  2. Provide extended transit service to suburbs, (Austin).
  3. Provide smart cars around the city for use by the public for a small fee, Car2go, (Austin).
  4. Create multi-use trails for non-motorized vehicles traveling across Austin, (Austin).
  5. Install enhanced bicycle signal detection technologies, (Austin).
  6. Install Pedestrian Hybrid Beacons, devices designed to signal to drivers that pedestrians are crossing streets thereby making walking safer, (Austin).
  7. Prioritize public transport users over other transportation options, (Oslo).
  8. Work in conjunction with local agencies to increase awareness of anti-idling requirements which reduce energy waste, (Austin).
  9. Require cars to be electric or fall below a really low emission standard, (Oslo).
  10. Develop a subscription system for bicycles for public use, (Oslo).
  11. Implement a high capacity transit corridor, (Seattle).
  12. Use electronic vehicles for the municipal fleet, (Seattle).
  13. Create motor vehicle excise tax which incentivizes low GHG emissions transportation, (Seattle).
  14. Incentivize increasing use of electric vehicles through free public parking, free access to toll roads, and use of lanes originally reserved for public transport, (Oslo).
  15. Create a fuel cell bus pilot program, (Oslo).
  16. Provide carbon neutral electricity for transport within the city, (Seattle).
  17. Replace entire municipal car fleet with electric cars, (Oslo).
  18. Ban cars from city center by 2019, (Oslo).
  19. Adjust speed limits accordingly to promote safety for all users of the roadway while saving on gas, (Austin).
  20. Expand transit, walking, and bicycling infrastructure and services, (Seattle).
  21. Add more volume-count monitoring stations to assist in making informed traffic system improvements, (Austin).
  22. Provide 200 charging stations in return for a $50/year subscription, (Austin).
  23. Expand the transportation system by offering a variety of options including extended hours for the MetroRail, (Austin).
  24. Add additional miles of new, safer, and enhanced bicycle lanes and trails, (Austin).
  25. Revise the purpose of a street to be considered as “a public space designed to move people, not just cars,” (Austin).
  26. Encourage proposals for high capacity transit, (Austin).
  27. Expand the electric trolley bus program, (Seattle).
  28. Use digital technology to maximize transportation efficiency, (Boulder).
  29. Create incentives to explore new mobility options, (Boulder).
  30. Support the adoption of electric vehicles and other non-fossil fuel mobility options for vehicles, (Boulder).
  31. Catalyze the development of non-fossil fuel transit systems, (Boulder).
  32. Develop parking management systems that stimulate adoption of high efficiency mobility options, (Boulder).
  33. Replace vehicle fleets with low emission vehicles, (San Francisco, Airport).
  34. Create an employee commute program, (San Francisco, Airport).
  35. Create a bus rapid transport system, (Addis Ababa).
  36. Develop a city-wide bicycle plan 2016-2020, (Melbourne).
  37. Implement 2017 City of Electric Vehicle Strategy, (Portland).
  38. Develop a plan for greater use of electric vehicles, Electric Vehicles: The Portland Way, (Portland).
  39. Increase light rail transit, (Addis Ababa).
  40. Examine the introduction of hybrid diesel buses, (Philadelphia).
  41. Implement Pedestrian and Bicycle Plan, (Philadelphia).
  42. Develop a plan for expanding trails for walking and bicycles, Philadelphia Trail Master Plan, (Philadelphia).
  43. Create a program that helps citizens reduce single-occupancy driving commutes through use of public transportation, bicycle, and walking, SmartTrips, (Portland).
  44. Create a traffic signal optimization program, (Portland).
  45. Create a program that increases the number of electric vehicles, Transportation Electrification Plan, (Portland).
  46. Incentivize public transit with pre-tax transit passes and cash payments by employers, (Chicago).
  47. Expand public transportation routes to boost ridership by 30%, (Chicago).
  48. Promote transit-oriented development, (Chicago).
  49. Add 150 hybrid buses to the current pilot fleet, (Chicago).
  50. Develop a strategy to increase car sharing and carpooling, (Chicago).
  51. Create a 500-mile bikeway network,(Chicago).
  52. Install 5,000 new bike racks, (Chicago).
  53. Power the municipal fleet with alternative fuels through an alternative fuel vehicle procurement policy, (Boston).
  54. Use biodiesel and ultra-low sulfur fuel in all diesel fleets, (Boston).
  55. Increase bike ridership through expanded bike lanes, sponsoring events, and Ride-Along Fridays program, (Boston).
  56. Design standards for multimodal streets that make all modes of transportation, vehicles, walking, bicycles compatible and safe, (Boston).
  57. Offer multiple public transportation options at one site, (Boston).
  58. Implement the Hubway Bikeshare program which provides 600 bicycles at 60 stations, (Boston).
  59. Map the comprehensive network of bicycle routes, (Boston).
  60. Enforce prohibition on idling trucks, (Boston).
  61. Parking freeze is maintained to encourage alternative transportation, (Boston) (Copenhagen).
  62. City of cyclists, add miles of bike paths, (Copenhagen) (Boston).
  63. Beautify the current bicycle routes through tree planting, (Copenhagen).
  64. Encourage bicycling through priority parking options at transport stations, (Copenhagen).
  65. Encourage bus ridership by investing in improved interiors, (Copenhagen).
  66. Convert municipal fleets to hydrogen and electric power,(Copenhagen).
  67. Encourage private citizens to convert to electric and hydrogen powered vehicles by providing refueling stations and free parking, (Copenhagen).
  68. Mandate bus companies reduce emissions by 25%, (Copenhagen).
  69. Create intelligent traffic systems, (Copenhagen).
  70. Develop comprehensive mobility planning, (Copenhagen).
  71. Identify and address gaps in the existing transit network and service, (Minneapolis).
  72. Develop car share program including priority parking, (Minneapolis).
  73. Implement the pedestrian and bicycle master plan, (Minneapolis).
  74. Reduce minimum parking requirements for buildings that are close to public transit, (Minneapolis).
  75. Encourage telecommuting and video conferencing, (Stockholm).
  76. Increase bicycle infrastructure, including bike sharing programs, (Stockholm).
  77. Install bicycle parking at all city workplaces, (Stockholm).
  78. Provide access cards for public transportation for business trips within the city, (Stockholm).
  79. Disseminate maps of bike paths and the network available to bicycle commuters, (Stockholm).
  80. Physically separate bicyclists and vehicle traffic, (Stockholm) (Minneapolis).
  81. Make bicycling safer at intersections with separate traffic signals and priority stop lines, (Stockholm).
  82. Enlarge bus lanes to promote reliability, (Stockholm).
  83. Make bus fleet 100% renewable by 2020, (Stockholm).
  84. Require that municipal fleet is fossil fuel free by 2030, (Stockholm).
  85. Create biofuel tax incentives to encourage the private sector to convert fossil fuel driven vehicles to biofuel, (Stockholm).
  86. Create low stress streets, i.e., streets dedicated to walking and biking, (Boston).
  87. Modernize, expand, and reduce crowding on the city’s transit system, (New York).
  88. Make walking and biking safer, more convenient options for all, (New York).
  89. Ensure that the City’s policies prioritize walking, biking, and public transit, (New York).
  90. Leverage technology and data to expand travel options and optimize the transportation network, (New York).
  91. Better manage and price parking to encourage efficient travel choices, (New York).
  92. Commit to add 2,000 electric vehicles (EVs) to its sedan fleet by 2025, (New York).
  93. Create an electric vehicle station charging program to advance the uptake of electric vehicles in the city, (Edmonton).
  94. Create 160 electric recharging stations at 70 locations, (Austin.)
  95. Encourage employers to offer transit passes to employees, (Calgary).
  96. Encourage ride and vehicle sharing in communities, (Calgary).
  97. Encourage workplaces to provide secure bike storage for employees, (Austin).
  98. Eliminate employee parking subsidies, (Austin).
  99. Work with large employers and academic institutions to implement and improve trip reduction programs and use of low or zero carbon transport alternatives, (Austin).
  100. Encourage teleworking to reduce commuter journeys, (Calgary).
  101. Increase walking and cycling journeys into downtown by 40%, (Calgary).
  102. Improve inclusion of pedestrians in transport planning decisions, (Melbourne).
  103. Create an attractive walking environment and connected walking networks, (Melbourne).
  104. Address pedestrian crowding issues at key transport modes, (Melbourne).
  105. Reduce pedestrian delays at controlled road crossings, (Melbourne).
  106. Support efforts to use zero carbon vehicles, (Melbourne).
  107. Create car ban for portions of center city, (Oslo).
  108. Transfer portions of car park space to bike space, (Oslo).
  109. Improve snow removal from cycle lanes in winter to encourage more cycling in the cold season, (Oslo).
  110. Develop and improve cycling infrastructure, currently painted road markings and intersection zones for bikes, and signage, (Wellington).
  111. Provide up to 100 carparks in the central city and suburbs for car share vehicles and EVs, with charging infrastructure provided by partners, (Wellington).
  112. Increase commuter cycling and walking via a four-pronged approach which includes a Pedestrian Plan, an increase in bike parking spaces, a Bike Plan that includes a focus on providing comprehensive bicycle education, (Berkeley).
  113. Expand car and ride sharing programs, specifically by improving access to sharing locations and vehicles, (Berkeley).
  114. Enhance public transit options, in cooperation with BART, AC Transit, and community organizations to reduce fares while improving frequency, reliability, range, comfort, and punctuality, (Berkeley).
  115. Increase low-carbon vehicle adoption, by removing regulations inhibiting mass adoption of alternate fuel vehicles and increasing bureaucratic support for green development (for instance, formalizing and codifying the requirements for deployment of electric charging stations in private, commercial, and public spaces), (Berkeley).
  116. Green the city fleet by replacing public vehicles with alternative fuel vehicles and encouraging government employee use of public transport options (via bus passes and tax benefits), (Berkeley).
  117. Implement parking management that promotes the use of public & alternative transport, primarily through limiting parking spaces, and dedicated use increases, (Berkeley).
  118. Implement parking management that promotes the use of public & alternative transport, primarily through limiting parking spaces, and use increases of green vehicles, (Berkeley).
  119. Revolutionize transportation options through a total reconsideration of the road network and transport options including a significant push towards increasing fuel economy, extolling the value of hybrids and electric vehicles, and promoting efficient freight trucks, and decreasing VMTs (vehicle miles traveled) by 5.5% below 2010 levels before 2020, (Boston).
  120. Focus on transforming Brussels from a car-based to an alternate-based transport regime, by adopting the IRIS 2 policies (a package of policies which aims to promote walking, biking, and use of public transport by diverting funds, encouraging investment, expanding reach, range, & reliability, and reducing costs and providing suitable infrastructural support while simultaneously disincentivizing single occupant trips), (Brussels).
  121. Create workplace and school travel plans to encourage commuters to use public transport on their daily travels, (Dublin).
  122. Implement eco-driving training for all professional drivers, (Dublin).
  123. Expand current transit options to include new routes, greater bus service coverage, and station upgrades, (Vancover).
  124. Use parking infrastructure to disincentivize private car use and support sustainable transport choices, (Vancover).
  125. Reduce membership fees for low income earners in bike share program, (Vancover).
  126. Introduce “smart traffic signals boost cycling” program, which involves the, Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) technology that helps government control traffic lights so bicycles and buses get around easier while reducing traffic lights’ energy use by 25%, (Copenhagen).
  127. Streamline transport to make it more carbon efficient with 700 km of bicycles trails and expanding public transport so everybody is within 10 minutes walking distance to a train station, (Singapore).
  128. Promote a cycle sharing system that presently has more than two hundred thousand active users, (Rio de Janeiro).
  129. Promote the concept of “peer economy” which runs on the principle of “own less and use more.” The present-day media and social platforms help people participate in this shared mobility plan where people share their vehicles when not in use or share their travel with others implementing the concept of car pool as well. (Rio de Janeiro).
  130. Convert public transport to use bio fuels and promote personal vehicles to make the switch as well, (Rio de Janeiro).
  131. Establish restricted environment zones, where old and inefficient vehicles are banned and assure that EVs entering the city are cheaper than others due to reduced parking rates, (Amsterdam).
  132. Set a goal of 4000 EV charging stations, (Amsterdam).
  133. Provide that by 2040 only electric boats will be allowed to travel on waterways, (Amsterdam).
  134. Use carbon free energy for vehicles and for airport infrastructure, (Los Angeles).
  135. Support electrification of rails to ensure zero emissions, (Los Angeles).
  136. Create electric charging stations as a part of every green building and throughout the city. Also, make the technology affordable for people to install in their homes, (Los Angeles).
  137. Create the Bus Rapid System (‘BRS’) which creates separate lanes for buses, taxis, other public transport assuring quicker transport during high congestion times. It betters the movement of public transport and encourages people to avail them reducing the number of personal vehicles and in turn lowering the carbon emission, (Ahmedabad).
  138. Create pricing in car parks that discourages the use of personal vehicles, (Perth).
  139. Create a car parks with solar charging panels for EVs (Perth).
  140. Build separate roads for ecological automobiles, (Hiroshima).
  141. Assist transit-oriented companies such as taxies in transitioning to carbon neutral vehicle and fuel options, (Seattle).
  142. Raise fuel economy requirements for all vehicles beyond federal requirements, (Boston).
  143. Convert all public transport and other city transport to using electricity or bio gas as fuel, (Los Angeles).

                                                                                                                                                     H.Transform Lighting


  1. Transform street lighting throughout the city to LEDs, (Philadelphia).
  2. Replace traffic lights with LEDs, (Chicago) (Copenhagen).
  3. Develop a public lighting strategy for city, (Melbourne).
  4. Traffic signal conversion to LEDs. (Portland).
  5. Retrofit street lights with LEDs in 71,000 lights by 2018 and 80,000 by 2019, (Calgary)
  6. Implement a ten-year lighting upgrade to LED in every public building from 2015, (Perth).
  7. Replace traffic lights with LEDs, (Chicago) (Copenhagen).
  8. Change streetlights to LEDs, (Minneapolis).
  9. Create city LED Lighting Project, (Sydney).
  10. Install LED lights throughout city, (Austin).
  11. Intelligent Street Lighting, (Oslo).
  12. Replace standard street lights with LED fixtures by installing 6448 LED light fixtures, (Sydney).
  13. In a joint venture with the electricity supply company in greater Oslo (Hafslund), install 10,000 intelligent high-pressure sodium streetlights, thereby reducing energy consumption by 70%. Each lamp can be dimmed individually when traffic and weather conditions allow. (Oslo),
  14. Replace all its street lights with LEDs to save energy. C(Ahmadabad)
  15. Convert traffic signals into solar operated traffic signals. (Los Angeles)
  16. Convert traffic signals into solar operated traffic signals. (Los Angeles).
  17. Replace traffic lights with LEDs, (Chicago) (Copenhagen).
  18. Create energy efficient lighting throughout the city, (Copenhagen).

            I. Manage Waste Disposal

  1. Produce biogas and bio-fertilizer from organic household waste at city’ anarobic treatment plant and use it for vehicle and agricultural purposes, (Oslo­).
  2. Zero waste plan, (San Francisco, Airport).
  3. Initially limit compositing to yard waste, but eventually explore the possibility of composting food waste, (Pittsburgh).
  4. Examine the use of BigBelly Trash Compactors to see if energy can be saved. (Philadelphia).
  5. Create a closed loop material management system to control material inputs and maximize recycling to reduce waste to landfills, (Berlin).
  6. Use waste water sludge to create biogas to replace diesel in buses, (Oslo).
  7. Increase renewable energy from landfills by improving methane collection efficiency, (Phoenix).
  8. Develop the existing landfill capture system to capitalize on the unused 29% of emissions and use the generated gas to fuel more projects (heating local buildings and greenhouses, and generating power), (Dublin).
  9. Implement the REPPIE Waste to Energy program which will process1400 tons of waste while producing 185,000,000 kwh of electricity to the Ethiopian grid every day, (Addis Ababa).
  10. Install a new main trash incinerator capturing carbon dioxide, (Oslo).
  11. Implementing measures to capture and destroy landfill gas at four landfills, (Austin).
  12. Increase home and business composting, (Austin).
  13. Develop more effective recycling practices at businesses and in public spaces, (Austin).
  14. Implement mechanisms to achieve a 90% diversion of solid waste materials, (Austin).
  15. Review and implement results of existing feasibility study of recycling and waste management, (Pittsburgh).
  16. Improve methane collection efficiency in landfills, (Phoenix).
  17. Create a digester gas to energy process at landfills, (Phoenix).
  18. Identify opportunities for digester gas capture and use, (New York).
  19. Create an improved municipal waste management plan, (Berlin).
  20. Create a Waste and Resource Recovery Plan, (Melbourne).
  21. Create a waste disposal master plan to generate gas for combustion from land fills, (Sydney).
  22. Apply anaerobic digestion technology to decompose the organic fraction of municipal solid waste to produce biogas (a mixture of methane, carbon monoxide, and other gases). (Edmonton}
  23. Explore the ability of city to meet energy needs with landfill gas, (Austin).
  24. Provide curbside pickup of organic material to reduce landfill gas, (Austin).
  25. Require landfill operators to refine landfill gas capture and combustion to destroy methane at landfills, (Austin).
  26. Implement zero waste strategies as defined by a waste reduction plan, including an emphasis on public education and outreach, (Vancouver).
  27. Install a waste to energy plant which produces methane for combustion, (Washington).
  28. Create a “waste-to-energy project (that) supplies national grid” by capturing landfill biogas and turning it in to electricity while donating “twenty-four per cent of the proceeds from the sale of carbon emission credits and four per cent of electricity sales […] to social investment in surrounding communities,” (Bogota).
  29. Progress towards zero waste by recycling all its waste materials in recycling plants which separate the organic waste from the rest and recycle them. Also develop an anaerobic digester and food waste pre-processing facility along with developing blue, green and black bin infrastructure for waste management, (Los Angeles).
  30. Convert ninety-nine % of 1.4 million tons of urban and business discard the city collects each year annually into ecological energy and fresh resources, (Amsterdam).
  31. Create power plants which burn waste to produce energy, (Hiroshima).
  32. Create a waste to energy plant to power the heating in 84,000 homes, (Oslo).

                J. Land Use Planning

  1. Create joint use parking facilities which facilitates compact urban design that reduce energy waste, (Austin).
  2. Generate and preserve affordable green housing, (Seattle).
  3. Implement a well-balanced strong inclusionary zoning policy which facilitates compact communities while reducing energy waste, (Seattle).
  4. Replace minimum parking requirements with maximum parking requirements to encourage public transit use, (Seattle).
  5. Use revenue from parking for sustainable neighborhood needs, (Seattle).
  6. Establish transit oriented development to include businesses, housing, and activity centers within walkable distance of each other, (Austin).
  7. Consider infill development that provides long-term affordability for residents and businesses, (Austin).
  8. Ensure that transit-oriented communities are within a 1/4 mile of transit options, (Austin).
  9. Revise zoning to prioritize mixed-use development, (Austin).
  10. Identify potential locations for composting operations, including the Forestry Division headquarters, vacant lots, and City and Housing Authority unused property, (Pittsburgh).
  11. Conduct infrastructure assessment to determine transition needs to reduce energy, (Boulder).
  12. Integrate transportation mobility enhancements to reduce energy use into land use planning, (Boulder).
  13. Continue maintenance and upgrade programs for infrastructure needed for a sustainable city, (New York).
  14. Review current and proposed construction and equipment replacement contracts to identify opportunities for energy efficiency improvements and switching to cleaner burning fuels, (New York).
  15. Adopt TreePhilly plan which requires each city neighborhood to have 30% tree canopy cover, (Philadelphia).
  16. Create a Tree Retention and Removal Policy, (Melbourne).
  17. Develop the city in accordance with the idea of 20 Minute Neighborhoods, or having anything you need to be within a 20-minute walk, (Portland).
  18. Create an urban forest strategy, (Melbourne), (Austin).
  19. Develop green zones within clusters of neighborhoods, (Minneapolis).
  20. Implement strategy to achieve the full Transit Orientated Development (TOD) potential of existing and future public transportation stations, (Edmonton).
  21. Transform 535 acres in the heart of Edmonton into one of the world’s largest sustainable communities, (Edmonton).
  22. Streamline zoning and permitting processes to encourage private building developers to connect to the district heating system, (Oslo).
  23. Create a land use plan that reflects climate policy in four areas: bio-climate in urban areas; open spaces and green areas; quality of water and torrential rain; climate protection, (Berlin).
  24. Increase canopy cover to 40% of city, (Melbourne).
  25. Create “eco districts” that seek to attract parties that are willing to pursue sustainable development. (Melbourne).
  26. Establish design standards that better provide comfortable connections between buildings and transit stops, (Calgary).
  27. Encourage higher density developments close to transit stops, (Calgary).
  28. Increase city green- and open-spaces via tree planting program (the urban forest approach), increased farmer’s market support buy local and encourage use of public parks and community gardens, (Berkeley).
  29. Adopt compact urban development design via regulation limiting development of new city construction to transport corridors and giving preference to development along, and within, transport nodes and corridors (e.g. see East Bay Green Corridor),(Berkeley).
  30. Prioritize the transformation of vacant lots and dilapidated areas into urban farms or community garden projects, (Boston).
  31. Expand Healthy Corner Store Initiative and emphasize the benefits of buying local. Complete study on city food use, waste, and coverage, (Boston).
  32. Create tree canopy, implement the Clarify the Tree Canopy Plan and reach target of 35% coverage by 2030, (Boston).
  33. Implement the 2015-2021 Open Space Plan which requires proper maintenance and enhancement of Boston’s existing green spaces, (Boston).
  34. Give preference for high density, integrated, residential properties which are highly connected to non-carbon intense transport networks and benefit from shared resource use, (Brussels).
  35. Greenify the city, creating a string of green spaces that include urban agriculture, increased tree coverage, improved and updated paving and cycle paths, the creation of green avenues in hitherto unused spaces (like railway tracks, along waterways, or on public pavements), (Brussels).
  36. Create large zones of special regulatory regions which are focused on intensive rehabilitation and restoration projects which must, in the future, comply with exacting standards for development, (Brussels).
  37. Focus on developing the urban core, increasing densification, reducing sprawl, increasing public transport by focusing on the Urban Development Line which marks the extent to which urban development is permitted in long term and identify areas in which only agricultural uses may occur, (Durban).
  38. Develop a long-term visionary planning project that is meant to energize public participation in planning and implantation. The Imagine Durban plan has been incorporated into a long-term plan and developed part from citizen suggestions that have been adapted for general use including a green roof project, a solid waste management program, polyethylene terephthalate plastic products project, and a city hall food garden project, (Durban).
  39. Focus on urban development only where services are already available and may be provided in a green friendly manner, (Durban).
  40. Convert underused rail space, via the Viva Vancouver Program, to greenspaces which encourage walking, (Vancouver).
  41. Vastly increase the tree coverage through re-greening of neighborhoods an develop plan for cataloguing and tracking urban trees, (Vancouver).
  42. Implement the urban farming policy, increasing the urban land used for farming, the number of framers and community markets, (Vancouver).
  43. Implement the Vancouver Food Strategy which emphasizes grow-local, eat-local and encourages that parks be repurposed to include food gardens, free fruit trees provided for the community, (Vancouver).
  44. Consider land use as an ultimate environmental question and focus on future development that prioritizes green transport, (Vancouver).
  45. Stop net tree-loss by 2020 and plant more than 500,000 trees before 2050 to sequestrate more carbon, (Nashville).
  46. Create green zones for plantation and mark areas along the shore to install renewable energy, (Amsterdam).
  47. Plant trees on steep hills not only to improve air quality and carbon sequestration but also to prevent landslides and create jobs, The city has planted 150 hectares of land by 2016 which has created employment, (Rio de Janeiro).
  48. Conserve energy through green roofs, 6,000 to be installed by 2020, (Chicago).
  49. Create a tree canopy plan with a goal of a 35% increase in canopy cover, (Boston).
  50. Plan for transit oriented development and exploitation of existing infrastructure. This would include a targeted residency rate of 45%, significantly decreasing commuting transport pollution by reducing sprawl, (Boston).
  51. Sequester carbon by planting over a million new trees, (Chicago) (Minneapolis).

                                                                                                                                                    K. Miscellaneous ways of reducing GHG emissions

  1. Institute a campaign to assist house-owners in replacing oil heating, (Oslo).
  2. Conduct a feasibility study for a more detailed GHG inventory, (New York).
  3. Complete a comprehensive baseline emissions inventory and develop a process for yearly updates, (New York).
  4. Develop department-wide GHG management plans with facility specific plans that are integrated with capital improvement programs, (New York).
  5. Support and encourage residential and commercial projects to reduce GHG emissions, (Phoenix).
  6. Improve electricity demand response and load management, (Philadelphia).
  7. Create a Last MiloMetre Freight Plan which increases freight delivery efficiency and reduces traffic congestion, (Melbourne).
  8. Create a Zero Net Emissions Strategy for the city, (Melbourne),
  9. Create a GHG reduction performance measurement system, (Boston).
  10. Conduct an emissions audit outreach program, (Boston).
  11. Plan to reduce fossil fuel use by replacing them with bio-fuels, (Rotterdam).
  12. Develop a city based standard for clean energy, (New York).
  13. Require energy producers in city to meet renewable energy target, (Oslo).
  14. Explore ways of assuring that city’s energy demands are not provided by brown coal or other high GHG emitting sources of energy, (Melbourne)
  15. Use smart grid technology to more efficiently manage electricity grid, (Austin).
  16. Call for basic behavioral changes (“good housekeeping” adaptations including lights off after work hours and powering down machinery when not in use) and the adaptation of low energy light bulbs, require upgrades to commercial and industrial building heating, ventilation, and climate control systems, comprehensive insulation of existing stock, and new commercial buildings reaching a BER A rating, (Dublin).
  17. Retire all the coal plants for energy production by 2035, (Los Angeles).
  18. Create district heating systems that use waste treatment plants to generate heat and power as forms of renewable energy, (Amsterdam).
  19. Create district heating systems that use waste treatment plants to generate heat and power as forms of renewable energy, (Amsterdam).

        L. Educating civil society about climate issues

  1. Arranging climate conferences for both public and private consumers, (Oslo).
  2. KRequiring environmental training for its employees, (Oslo).
  3. Training 5,000 young ambassadors for waste separation each year, (Oslo).
  4. Involving the community through workshops and events teaching skills and processes to reduce the carbon footprint, (Sydney).
  5. Encouraging public understanding of individual carbon footprint and empowering individuals to reduce this footprint by providing the public with a calculator to determine each individual’s carbon footprint, (Austin).
  6. Engaging college students in the process of achieving a climate friendly society, (Austin).
  7. Support individually tailored assessments of GHG footprint for complex organizations and entities, (Austin).
  8. Mayor and City leadership publicly announce climate goals, (Pittsburgh).
  9. Acquire funding for advertising climate program, (Pittsburgh).
  10. Launch web tools on climate change for residents, (Pittsburgh).
  11. Voluntary education, services and incentives for building owners, (Boulder).
  12. Deliver expanded multifamily housing assistance program to educate and increase recycling and composting, (Boulder).
  13. Create a set of sustainability goals for the city and an internet site, GreenWorks Dashboard, that identifies the goals and progress made in achieving the goals, (Philadelphia).
  14. Become a leader in climate education of children and youth through a virtual climate science center, (Copenhagen).
  15. Develop and test a model for realizations of energy savings to improve accountability and realistic feedback on progress, (Copenhagen).
  16. Create networks for knowledge sharing and provide energy counseling through the city, (Stockholm).
  17. Promote knowledge accumulation about climate issues and sharing throughout the city, (Copenhagen).
  18. Establish internet infrastructure on climate change issues for public sharing, (Copenhagen).
  19. Provide education to citizens through such organizations such as the Chicago Center for Green Technology on climate technology issues, (Chicago).
  20. Create information campaigns to support public transportation, (Stockholm).
  21. Find solutions for climate change by examining landlord-tenant disincentives, (Boston).
  22. Create a neighborhood climate action network, (Boston).
  23. Pilot neighborhood-level sustainability planning, (Boston).
  24. Create databases to connect citizens with information on relevant city processes on climate change issues and local sustainability matters, (Boston).
  25. Expand messaging and communications on climate issues and provide the information in multiple languages, (Boston).
  26. Publish and update a plan to achieve sustainability in the city such as the GreenWorks on the Ground, (Philadelphia).
  27. Educate citizens on how to obtain a solar viability assessment, The NYC Solar Partnership developed a pilot Solarize campaign in Brooklyn Community Board 6 (Solarize CB6) in 2015. The Partnership and community representatives selected two solar installers through a competitive process. Solarize CB6 held public educational workshops and participated in community events, ultimately reaching more than 660 residents and businesses. More than 350 people signed up for solar siting assessments, representing over 400 buildings, (New York).
  28. Establish a solar curriculum that is being incorporated into classroom learning in public schools to help bring the benefits of solar energy to life. The City’s Department of Education partnered with Solar One, a non-profit organization, to provide curriculum, classroom supplies, and professional development training to teachers whose schools received solar PV installations, (New York).
  29. Establish a long-term awareness and education campaign to inform citizens about the benefits of green buildings, (Edmonton).
  30. Establish programs to encourage uptake of solar PV technology, (Edmonton).
  31. Establish energy education program for City operations stakeholders who have responsibilities that affect or influence the energy consumption in City infrastructure and assets, (Edmonton).
  32. Establish an overarching marketing and communication strategy to engage/mobilize green energy use, (Edmonton).
  33. Establish an information and analytical tool to help citizens understand their personal energy use and the actions they can take to conserve energy and use it more efficiently, (Edmonton).
  34. Establish an evidence- based, action-oriented plan that will encourage a market-shift toward the purchase of battery electric and plug-in hybrid vehicles in Edmonton, (Edmonton).
  35. Create an education and awareness program that promotes energy efficient practices and productions, (Calgary).
  36. Create the Sustainable Austin blog: published by the City’s Department of Sustainability to keep citizens engaged with the net zero by 2050 goal, (Austin).
  37. Promote plastic free July 2017, including offering tours of the city’s landfill so that citizens can see the damage being done by plastic bags to the city’s environment, offering advice on the website, and raising awareness though the weekly newsletter for citizens, (Wellington).
  38. Offer free two-hour assessments to landlords, tenants, and homeowners about how to save energy in light of individual needs and budget, (Wellington).
  39. Encourage school and university students, and others, to visit the landfill – up to two tours each day during which advice is give on ways to minimize waste, (Wellington) .
  40. Create a Green Business Leaders program to encourage businesses to “protect the environment, save money, and make Austin a more livable city.” It currently has 214 members from 10 different categories of business, representing 39,000 employees and over 15m square feet of office space, (Austin).
  41. Organize a yearly forum to educate developers, tenants, and commercial interests of green technology developments, (Melbourne).
  42. Educate civil society about damages from low density housing, (Calgary).
  43. Enhance outreach and incentives to business (green business certification), an ongoing effort managed by the specially created Office of Economic Development and Green Businesses, (Berkeley).
  44. Invigorate community action, targeting cooperation between residents, businesses, community groups, and educational facilities to enhance, augment, compliment, and plan Berkeley’s environmental future, (Berkeley)
  45. Create a Neighborhood Climate Action Network: Boston aims to harness the power of residents and neighborhoods by creating community organizations and outreach mechanisms designed to educate citizens about, and encourage action on, climate change and mitigation opportunities, all-scale neighborhood projects designed to test climate change reduction strategies and allow direct input from communities who will be empowered to set goals, design and implement projects, and assess the impact on their neighborhoods, and increase local investment in environmental job training and spending, (Boston).
  46. Create an Environmental One-Stop Shop: Boston will centralize resources, guides, and city departments into a single, accessible bureaucracy which is readily accessible so as to reduce the difficulty in gathering dispersed sustainability resources, (Boston).
  47. Expand Messaging: The office of communications will harness the power of multiple channels for ecological messaging, including local newspaper networks, city sponsored events, worship networks, traditional advertising, and provide environmental messaging in multiple languages, (Boston).
  48. Create a publicly available measurement system that provides Bostonians with access to a comprehensive accountability platform on which sustainability performance is measured, tracked, and assessed. This transparency adds accountability and furthers research opportunities, (Boston).
  49. Expand Education on Sustainability, the city will integrate sustainability and climate change concepts throughout the curriculum and in youth organizations. Further, Green Teams will be created in schools. Transition school kitchens to use only locally grown products and replace heavily processing with on-site production. Similarly, utilise Public Health resources and programs to reach out, identify issues (such as public housing issues), and introduce changes, (Boston).
  50. Encourage homeowners and businesses to green their buildings – particularly by adding insulation, energy audits and modern, efficient, technologies (newer boilers, super-insulated glazing, ventilation, solar panels). These are supported by the creation of city funded facilitators who provide advice, technical assistance, and planning help. Particular assistance is offered to photoelectric device deployment, (Brussels).
  51. Support sustainable neighborhoods, promote green adaptations on the local level, primarily driven by community organizations and volunteer groups educated, financed, and guided by city Projects include ongoing dialogues about the importance of green behavior, calls for input on future projects, education on things that can be done in one’s own home, the creation of collective vegetable and recreational gardens, local exchange and recycling/reuse strategies, and so on, (Brussels).
  52. Create a broad social competition designed to gamify energy savings through the use of infrared thermography to pinpoint heat loss and highlight savings potentials and other technologies, (Brussels).
  53. Create a public campaign to understand and raise interest in solar and energy efficient measures and introduce transparency in the electrical bill and energy consumptions bills, (Nashville).
  54. Create an “environmental education targets low-income youth” program, entitled Green Schools program, which addresses four key sustainable themes: integrated waste management, environmental health, energy efficiency and renewable energy, and climate change, (Buenos Aires).
  55. Offer training on energy issues for the skilled workforce of architects, engineers, and builders on green construction and development, (Los Angeles).
  56. Along with giving two CFL bulbs to each household, provide an educational pamphlet on saving energy, (Los Angeles).
  57. Connect everyone in the city, the inhabitants, bureaucrats, researchers, and entrepreneurs, with information about which policies and strategies they can implement are fruitful and which are not and in so doing break down the communication barrier and help a society reach a common environmental goal by learning from each other’s experience and spreading awareness among the people. This tactic has been a huge success. (Amsterdam).
  58. Create a program that promotes public reflection, participation, and education on the city’s sustainability projects and allows citizens to give their opinion to public departments while engaging in public participation, educating the public and providing an opportunity to become involved in current activities, (Los Angeles).
  59. Engage the universities in enhancing practical knowledge about sustainability issues, (Los Angeles).
  60. Promote community involvement in understanding local environmental issues, (Rio de Janeiro).
  61. Create a public forum on sustainable development to encourage and accommodate opinion about possible and future public policies, innovations and strategies from private individuals, public departments and the private sector, (Rio de Janeiro).
  62. City funds research, educational courses, training, and awareness raising at local university, (Ahmadabad).
  63. Print public environmental policies in leading newspapers to increase awareness and attract participation, (Ahmadabad).
  64. Create a program to educate citizens about waste disposal management issues, (Ahmadabad).
  65. Create and fund a community awareness program on green energy, (Perth).
  66. Runs workshops on construction of green buildings, (Perth).
  67. City runs program to increase awareness of CO2 reduction strategies, (Hiroshima).
  68. City encourages environmental consulting firms to promote, educate, and train individuals and businesses on energy efficiency issues, (Hiroshima).
  69. City works with media and NGOs to promote environmental practices in day-to-day life. (Hiroshima).
  70. Install CO2 concentration monitoring stations in various city locations, (Hiroshima).
  71. Encourage universities to help with environmental education, (Hiroshima)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           M. Incentivizing Private Sector climate strategies


  1. Establish financial incentives to reduce auto travel and motivate the use of more sustainable means of transportation, (Seattle).
  2. Support residential charging stations in homes through on-bill repayment and time-of-day funding, (Seattle).
  3. Support and encourage retrofitting of commercial buildings in the 1200 Buildings project which provides financial incentives for this work, (Melbourne).
  4. Create an energy Building Monitoring program, (Philadelphia).
  5. Create an Energy Saving Partnership between government and private sector, (Berlin).
  6. Kilowatt Crackdown program which provides training and analysis of energy issues and potential cost savings for certain commercial buildings, (Portland).
  7. Sustainable Business Tax Credit which offers up to $4000 in a tax credit to businesses that demonstrate commitment to sustainability, (Philadelphia).
  8. Support loan program for industrial companies to increase efficiency, (Minneapolis).
  9. Streamline regulatory processes for building energy efficiency and clean energy applications, (New York).
  10. Assure building owners can finance energy efficiency projects, (New York).
  11. Determine the level and types of financial investment that are needed to achieve Edmonton’s energy transition goals and a lead role in finding solutions to advance initiatives that are economically justified, (Edmonton).
  12. Create community sustainability grants to support community-based energy transition projects, (Edmonton).
  13. Finance the evaluation of ways in which Edmonton’s industrial sector can improve individual and collective environmental performance (including reducing energy consumption and GHG emissions), (Edmonton).
  14. Create a public-private scheme operating since 1990 to retrofit large groups of public buildings to improve energy efficiency and return savings to the owners/operators over a period of at least 10 years. This program saved enough energy to power 7000 households, (Berlin).
  15. Sustainable Melbourne Fund which assists local government and property owners, (Melbourne).
  16. Supporting car share by providing three free car share parks in the central city with a commitment to increase that number in response to demand, (Wellington).
  17. Create public/private partnerships in which energy service providers invest in state of art technology in large buildings (public, commercial, or residential) and share the energy savings over at least 10 years with building owners (Berlin)
  18. Create a business to business event to examine strategies to reduce GHG emissions (Wellington).
  19. Use available grants to capitalize on small scale solar, hydroelectric, urban wind farms, and geothermal power facilities. Similarly, establish funding directed towards new waste water treatment works which capture and reuse the emissions from raw sewerage and use these to generate power and heat, (Dublin).
  20. Identify financial incentives and disincentives designed to encourage ecologically sound behavior, including the introduction of congestion charges, free parking for electric vehicles, creating institutional pathways that make it easier to identify, apply for, and use Irish and EU grants for environmentally conscious sustainable energy projects (such as those from the National Development Plan. Sustainable Energy Ireland, or the Executive Agency for Competitiveness and Innovation) while the Finance Department has created a sustainable office campaign which works to reduce the time between application and funding for projects, focuses on finding new investment opportunities in green appropriate ventures, and acts as a point of contact for industry looking for advice on green projects, (Dublin).
  21. Create tax incentives for green power production and the use of electric vehicles in city business, (Dublin).
  22. Implement a Green Roofs and Green Walls program that supports installing solar panels and creates better insulation in buildings to reduce heating and cooling needs. Municipality subsidies participants. (Amsterdam).
  23. Create a program called the “circular economy” where new buildings are constructed using materials from old buildings. The program seeks to reduce, reuse and recycle construction materials and concrete. The program is called the “Green Deal” where the construction materials extracted from the demolition of old buildings are used locally within that area, (Amsterdam).
  24. The Green LA project specifies building and construction requirements to be fulfilled for any construction in the city so that environmental goals are met, the program also seeks to provide incentives to projects which exceed environmental specifications, (Los Angeles).
  25. Stop the use of incandescent lamps in any of the public building or streets and encourages private individuals to do the same. The city is providing support to exchange for LED lighting and fixtures in public spaces of building and apartments, (Los Angeles).
  26. Invest the electricity tax from the Federal University to fund environmental friendly, urban mobility and sustainable development projects and innovations for ten years in a program called as “The Energy and Development Green Fund,”(Rio de Janeiro).
  27. Provide a subsidy for EVs providing €5,000-6,000 to a business buying an electric van, and up to €40,000 to a business buying a large, heavy electric truck, (Amsterdam).
  28. Create Home Grant Insulation incentives to private owners to insulate their houses in an eco-friendly manner that provides fifteen % concession which may cost up to five thousand pounds, (Amsterdam).
  29. Collective Solar Projects Grant subsidizes mounting solar panels on buildings. The grant ranges from five hundred to five thousand pounds, (Amsterdam).
  30. Resident’s Initiative is a grant given to residents who map a plan to create a sustainable society and volunteer and contribute towards it. The grant is up to five thousand pounds, (Amsterdam).
  31. Provide that particularly innovative projects which focus on significant energy savings and green energy use are eligible for a grant is up to ten thousand pounds, (Amsterdam).
  32. Generate more green jobs and support the economy with new environment-friendly positions for which the wages of these green jobs will be high and they will also have tax redemptions, (Los Angeles).
  33. Works to attract mature green business in the city by supporting them and creating green belts and proper infrastructure for promoting such green businesses, (Los Angeles).
  34. Reduce the tax on eco-friendly consumer items and insulation measures, (Los Angeles).
  35. If a city earns significant carbon credits, give them to corporations to attract and retain them, (Ahmadabad).
  36. Promote green offices by subsidizing costs entailed by making the office green, (Perth),
  37. Create sustainable business audits funded by city, (Perth).
  38. Subsidize building loans for environmentally innovative construction, (Perth).

      .                                                                                                                                              N Funding energy transformation

  1. Offer energy rebates for efficient vehicles, energy efficiency projects, efficient appliances, and residential solar, (Austin).
  2. Offer financial incentives to install smart thermostats which allow remote adjustments thermostats on the hottest days of year, (Austin).
  3. Offer rebates on energy bills for energy-efficient retrofitting, (Calgary).
  4. Finance insulation services to low income homes which led to 1400 retrofits, (Wellington).
  5. Expand funding for energy efficiency projects, particularly the LBI Energy Efficiency project and C-Pace program, (Boston).
  6. Increase use of renewables via the judicious application of economic incentives and disincentive packages, mainly subsidies, rebates, and regulatory requirements for the use of green friendly products and renewable energy sources, (Berkeley).
  7. Expand residential solar through the Solarize program and increasing funding and reducing regulatory barriers to further adoption of solar energy, (Boston).
  8. Enhance energy use standards for existing commercial stock via a variety of local programs including SmartLights (free, independent energy efficiency consultation services and rebate opportunities for green technology adoption), Smartsolar (free consultation services related to solar adaptation), Commercial Energy Conservation Ordinance (which requires commercial properties to undergo green upgrades before sale or renovation), and the Bay Area Green Business Program (a public-utility partnership organization specializing in technical assistance, consultation, and public recognition for energy upgrade projects), (Berkeley).
  9. Retrofit the existing housing stock to reduce energy use and update the building by-laws to reflect heightened standards, funded by the Building Energy Retrofit Fund. Moreover, require annual energy benchmarking and reporting, the results of which will be made publicly available. Implement a broader zero-emission building policy, (Vancover).
  10. Implement the Energy Works program which finances energy efficiency programs in the Philadelphia area, (Philadelphia).
  11. Provide financing to help with retrofitting which saves on utility bills, (Washington).
  12. Create a fund of €465,000 to help citizens purchase electric bikes and cargo bikes, (Oslo).
  13. Provide funding of one hundred and sixty-four thousand Australian Dollars for Environment Grants and Sponsorship program for constructing solar electric car charging stations, (Perth).
  14. Create green roof economic incentives for individuals, (Rotterdam).
  15. Provide assistance in procuring green bonds to finance energy projects, the Green Bonds program, (Portland).
  16. Set a goal of retrofitting a million homes by adopting the “pay-as-you-save” model which aids Londoners to save money off their energy bills, (London).
  17. Offer rebates for home charging station installation for electric vehicles, (Austin)..
  18. Support new financing and ownership models for developing solar installation, (Minneapolis)
  19. Target funds to use in energy efficiency retrofitting, (Copenhagen)
  20. Provide Grants for high energy efficiency performance, (Minneapolis).
  21. Provide financial assistance to the private sector to accelerate adoption of energy efficiency and clean energy, (New York).
  22. Finance building upgrades by requiring building owners to pay back loans through energy savings, (Melbourne).

                                                                                                                                                       O . Cooperative government climate change strategies

  1. Involvement with the Vision Network’s Focus Cities program in which 10 cities cooperate on climate issues, (Austin).
  2. Office of sustainability creates Renewable Energy Task Force to oversee progress towards goal (Pittsburgh, PA) and works with other city departments and nonprofits to develop education tools and reduce barriers to renewable energy installation and generation, (Pittsburgh).
  3. Office of Sustainability develops tools to recognize the need for and promote installation of projects that save energy, (Pittsburgh).
  4. Work with Pennsylvania Resources Council, a non-profit organization that studies waste reduction practices, to update feasibility study of upgrading recycling and waste management, (Pittsburgh).
  5. Work with Municipalization organization to determine the feasibility of creating municipal energy systems, (Boulder),
  6. Assemble a comprehensive suite of regional climate projections, (New York).
  7. Apply a regional climate model to the NYC watershed region, (New York).
  8. Identify additional data and monitoring stations needed to track climate changes, (New York).
  9. Track improvements in climate change science, climate models, and estimates of changes in the severity, duration and frequency of weather events, (New York).
  10. Develop estimates of changes in rainfall intensities under climate change scenarios based on state of current science, (New York).
  11. Create a methodology for the City Environmental Quality Review process so that potential climate change impacts are assessed before decisions are made, (New York).
  12. Create the CitySwitch program which cooperates with other cities including Sydney on energy issues, (Melbourne).
  13. Systematic energy consumption mapping to enhance energy management, (Copenhagen).
  14. Require that municipal buildings must meet energy conservation criteria, including rented spaces, (Copenhagen).
  15. Establish an energy fund with the savings from climate upgrades to finance upcoming projects, (Copenhagen).
  16. Train all city employees on climate friendly conduct, (Copenhagen).
  17. Strive, where possible, to achieve Edmonton’s energy transition goals in partnership with other municipalities and the Province of Alberta, (Edmonton).
  18. Work collaboratively with Federal/Provincial governments to address Federal/Provincial legislation and policies that are barriers to Edmonton’s energy sustainability goals and encourage Federal/Provincial legislation and policies that support Edmonton’s energy sustainability goals, (Edmonton).
  19. Explore Federal financing mechanisms to enable private sector building retrofits, including the Department of Energy’s Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) and the Warehouse for Energy Efficiency Loans (WHEEL) through the National Association of State Energy Officials, (Austin).
  20. Work with higher levels of government to require companies, utilities, and housing industry associations to enter into agreements on climate change, (Berlin).
  21. Create an energy partnership with another city including cities in other countries to explore innovative concepts to improve energy performance, (Berlin).
  22. Work with other governments to improve sustainable procurement, resource recovery, and energy efficiency practices, (Melbourne).
  23. Create a Green City Index: A centralized database index comprised of data evaluating both Brussels’ policies and those of 30 peer European city-partners (considering 30 indicators divided into 8 broad themes related to environmental policies, , land and waste governance, transportation solutions, energy efficiency standards and consumption rates, water management, quality of building stock, emissions, and air quality) which allows the city to track its own successes and take inspiration from the successes of others, where applicable, (Brussels).
  24. Establish regional bio fuel factories which will run with the locally derived waste, (Ahmadabad).
  25. Undertaken a plan called the Green Office Plan which incentivizes offices to turn green, (Perth).

Section III. Thirty-one Conclusions from the Study.

The following are conclusions from the above analysis:

  1. Local governments can take many actions to reduce GHG emissions from their jurisdiction that do not require the government to spend significant funds including the following:
    1. Create a cooperative network among businesses, organizations, and citizens in the city or town to make voluntary GHG reductions and use this network to develop GHG reduction strategies for the local government.
    2. Make citizens aware of national, state, or regional and private sector programs that support actions to reduce GHG emissions at the local level.
    3. Encourage citizens to reduce their carbon footprint by making carbon calculators available and providing educational support in using the calculator.
    4. Provide information on how to think about the benefits and opportunities for installing solar energy.
    5. Create parking incentives for EVs and low emissions vehicles.
    6. Determine what financing support is available to increase energy efficiency of buildings.
    7. Encourage use of public transportation, bicycling, and walking,
    8. Provide education to citizens on how to reduce energy use while saving energy costs through insulation, more efficient electric devices, and prudent thermostat use.
    9. Create a climate change blog or publication that updates citizens on opportunities for reducing GHG emissions.
    10. Make citizens aware of electric utility programs that incentivize GHG emission reductions through rebates on insulation or efficient.
    11. Educate citizens about the climate benefits of tree canopy.
  2. Many cities obtain support for climate change policies by focusing on economic benefits of climate policies.
  3. Many cities have reported that implementing their GHG reduction strategies has saved money while often improving the quality of life and creating jobs.
  4. Because implementing GHG reduction strategies often saves money, a barrier to implementing GHG strategies is often not the will to take action but the capital needed to fund reduction steps. For this reason, many local governments have worked to find attractive financing to support business and citizen actions to reduce GHG emissions.
  5. Most local governments have worked cooperatively with local private sector organizations to reduce GHG emissions from within the jurisdiction of the local government.
  6. What local governments are able to commit to is sometimes a function of the willingness of higher levels of government to support local government efforts.
  7. Increasing the use and quality of public transportation is an important strategy for most cities.
  8. Many cities have encouraged citizens to reduce their carbon footprint by encouraging and educating citizens about how to calculate their carbon footprint. Some cities have encouraged citizens to reduce their carbon footprint by a certain amount such as one ton per year or by 10%.
  9. Several cities including New York report that working with citizens on climate strategies is a key to developing a robust GHG reduction strategy.
  10. The range of strategies in this paper reflect differences in distinct cultural, political, and social context, differences in population size, growth rates, control over energy supply, and relationship to higher levels of regional or national government. Some small local governments have little control over matters that larger local governments have and thus are more subservient to higher levels of government. The city of Austin, for instance, controls the electricity supplied to the city and has 448,000 electricity accounts in the greater Austin area and thus has potential better control over GHG emissions from electricity than other cities. On the other hand, cities in which electric utilities have been privatized have less control. Austin has been able to sign contracts with wind providers from different parts of Texas that can provide wind power throughout the day thus diminishing the need to supplement electricity from fossil fuel sources. Austin is in a stronger position than many cities in managing electricity use by managing a smart grid and thermostat use.
  11. Many cities are beginning to incentivize a transformation of vehicles from fossil fuel to electricity. Austin, for instance, has installed over 100 EV charging stations at parking stations reserved for EVs.
  12. Most cities are working to make it easier to use bicycles for transportation, In Austin, for instance, in four years of operation the city’s bicycle sharing scheme, 400,000 trips have been made.
  13. Those cities that create partnerships with the private sector are in a better position to reduce GHG emissions. A standout program offered by Austin in this category is the Green Business Leaders Progam. Currently it has 214 members from 10 different business sectors, representing almost 40,000 employees and incorporating over 15.5m square feet of office space.
  14. An important strategy for all local governments is education for citizens and the private sector about climate change issues. Austin, as an example. has developed a public communication program, about climate change issues and the city’s mitigation strategies. Its website includes impressive detail about all of its strategies, and its governance around sustainability.
  15. More and more cities are committing to and planning to achieve zero carbon by 2050 at least in the electricity sector.
  16. Many European cities including Berlin and Copenhangen have transformed transportation options to make public transportation, cycling, and walking attractive.
  17. Many cities rely on private-public partnerships to reduce GHG emissions as well as collaboration with higher levels of government.
  18. Many local governments have little control over the electricity supplier for the government For instance, the only impact Calgary can have on the electricity supply is through lobbying the provincial government to take steps to increase the proportion of renewables in Alberta and in encouraging generation powered by renewables within its jurisdiction, These governments must collaborate with higher levels of government to achieve greater use of renewables by electricity providers.
  19. Almost all local governments can reduce energy use through improved lighting strategies while saving money. Calgary is retrofitting its street lighting with LEDs and will complete 80,000 of its 90,000 lamps by the end of 2018. It is projected to reduce the City of Calgary’s energy consumption by 10%, saving the city some $5million per annum.
  20. Almost all local governments can save money by improving building energy efficiency.
  21. Many cities are aggressively creating incentives for the use of EVs. Norway has the highest number of EVs in the world, with more than 400,000. In 2016 nearly 40% of newly registered cars were EVs and the government plans to phase out all fossil-fueled cars by 2025. EVs in Norway are particularly effective because they are charged solely from renewable sources. In Oslo there are about 30,000, up from 4,000 in 2012. Oslo has an extensive free charging infrastructure with over 1,000 charging stations in both the city center and neighborhoods
  22. Like Calgary and Melbourne, Oslo has also converted its street lamps to LEDs. However it has gone further by creating a new lighting control system that dims lamps to a minimal level until they are activated by the approach of a vehicle or pedestrian.
  23. A particularly innovative strategy has been the construction of a district heating networks, using bio-gas produced by city waste.
  24. Many cities have developed tools for citizens to help them calculate their carbon footprint and increase knowledge of energy use. Wellington has developed an energy calculator, available online. Many resources are available on the web to help citizens reduce their footprint. See, for example
  25. Many cities have created communities of citizens and businesses that work together to reduce GHG emissions. By creating a community whose stated goal is emissions reductions, cities harnesses the complimentary powers of positive peer-pressure and failure induced
  26. Most cities can reduce the effect of GHG emissions by improving urban tree canopy This popular strategy involves the reclamation and greenification of urban spaces via the planting of native tree species. The benefits of such projects vastly exceed the costs and have the added benefit of being extremely simple to implement, manage, and measure.
  27. Each of the cities in question has emphasized the importance of creating a vibrant green economic sector. Both Boston and Vancouver have placed special emphasis on leveraging their significant research and tech resources for green development and economic stimulus, while Dublin, Berkeley, and Durban all have pointed to the significance of green
  28. The policy with the greatest impact to residential energy efficiency is the use of the package of home upgrades available on the market (primarily insulation and upgrading of older appliances), the widescale adoption of which is inhibited only by lack of funding.
  29. Environmental focuses on education create a groundswell of support for environmental projects, volunteerism, and
  30. As with nations devolving power to cities, so to with cities developing power to community groups, NGOs, charities, and other non-governmental organizations concerned with alleviating climate change is an effective strategy.
  31. Many cities have preferred encouraging behavioral change via the creation and promotion of environmentally conscious norms to the deployment and policing of regulation and policy. They prefer an approach that focuses on behavioral modification and norm adjustment rather than a reliance on governmental coercion.. They’re all carrot, little stick. Ultimately that would seem the most important strategy. Inspire people, business, and communities to pursue emissions reductions as a social good and emissions outputs will drop.



[2] AFP, Ethiopia to cut carbon emissions by two-thirds by 2030, PHYS.ORG (2015),

[3] Bus Rapid Transit System” Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation


[5] Office of Sustainability City of Austin, Final Austin Community Climate Plan, 2, (2015).

[6] Id. at 24.

[7] Berkeley: The Berkeley Climate Action Plan,

[8] PIK, Climate-Neutral Berlin 2050 Results of a Feasibility Study, BE BERLIN (2014),

[9] Compact of Mayors “Compact Cities” (3 June, 2017),  Bogota < >

[10] Greenovate Boston, 2014 Climate Action Plan Update.

[11] City of Boulder Colorado, (last visited March 26, 2017).

[12] City of Boulder Colorado, (last visited March 26, 2017).

[13] City of Boulder Colorado, (last visited March 26, 2017).

[14] “-Capitale: Action Plan in a Nutshell”, accessible at

[15] Compact of Mayors: “Compact Cities” (3 Jun, 2017) Buenos Aires < >

[16]2015 – Cities Emissions Reduction Targets” CDP (2016) <;

[17] Chicago Climate Action Plan (2008).

[18] CPH 2025: a Green, Smart and Carbon Neutral City (September 2012).

[19]   “Dublin City Sustainable Energy Action Plan 2010-2020” accessible at

[20] protection/Publications/Documents/Sustainability%20Best%20Practice%20Climate%20Change.pdf

[21] The City of Edmonton Energy Transition Strategy – 2016 Annual Report (2016)

[22] Kae Murakami “City of Hiroshima” Energy and Global Warming Prevention Department Environment Bureau

[23]   Mayor of London Delivering London’s Energy Future: The Mayor’s Climate Change Mitigation and EnergyStrategy (October 2011)

[24] Los Angeles Climate Action Report: Updated 1990 Baseline and 2013 Emissions Inventory Summary” Plan Environment Economy Equity,

[25] Zero Net Emissions by 2020 – Update 2014 , (2014),

[26] Minneapolis Climate Action Plan: a roadmap to reducing citywide greenhouse gas emissions (2013).

[27] Office of Mayor Megan Barry, “Livable Nashville: Committee Draft Recommendations” (2017), available at

[28] Emily Lloyd, The New York City Department of Environmental Protection Climate Change Program 11 (Report 1 2008).

[29] New York City Mayor’s Office of Sustainability New York Cities Roadmap 80×50 (2015)

[30] “2015 – Cities Emissions Reduction Targets”, above n 14, and “Host and Participant City Profiles”, above


[32] Hahn, Jonathan. Oslo Moves Forward with Climate Budget for Achieving Carbon Neutrality in 2020,, 14 Nov 2016. (Last visited 31 March 2017

[33] Drexel , Options for Achieving Deep Reductions in Carbon Emissions in Philadelphia by 2050 (2014), file:///C:/Users/tyler/AppData/Local/Temp/Reducing%20GHG%20in%20Philadelphia.pdf.

[34] Miriam Parson & John Jameson, Pittsburgh Climate Action Plan 2.0  (Aurora Sharrard et al. eds., 2.0 ed. 2012).

[35] Climate Action Plan – Local Strategies to address climate change 2015, City of Portland (2015),

[37] Suzana Kahn and Isabel Brandão “The contribution of low-carbon cities to Brazil’s greenhouse gas emissions reduction goals Briefing on urban energy use and greenhouse gas emissions” (November 2015) Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ)


[39] San Francisco department of the Environment, (last visited March 26, 2017).

[40] San Francisco Department of the Environment, (last visited March 26, 2017).

[41] Seattle Office of Sustainability & Environment, Seattle Climate Action Guide, 6, (2015).


[43] International Carbon Action Partnership China-Shenzhen Pilot System (May 3, 2017) at 1.

[44] Climate Action Tracker “Singapore” (November 2, 2016) < >

[45] Stockholm Action Plan for Climate and Energy 2010-2020.

[46] City of Sydney, Carbon Reduction: Energy, 3 Nov 2016,

[47] City of Sydney, National Carbon Offset Standard: Carbon Neutral Program Public Disclosure Summary, 4,, (2016).

[48] Id.

[49] City of Sydney, Renewable Energy, 12 August 2016,

[50] Compact of Mayors “Quito” Compact of Mayors “Quito” < >


[52] “Wellington” Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy (2015)

[53] “Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction Targets” Wellington City Council

[54] City of Yokohama Action Plan for Global Warming Countermeasures: Summary Version (March 2014) at 3; Yokohama: Smart City Project <>.


By Donald A. Brown,

For a hard copy of the report, send request to

The Moral Outrageousness of Trump’s Decision on the Paris Agreement







When Pope Francis in May of 2015 issued his Laudata Si encyclical which called climate change a moral issue, it got global attention. Yet despite extensive international media coverage of worldwide condemnation of President Trump’s decision to remove the United States from the Paris agreement, there has been relatively little coverage of why the Trump decision should be understood not only as a dangerous break with the international community but as a profoundly immoral choice.

Climate change has certain features that more than any other global environmental problem call for responding to it as a moral problem. First, it is a problem caused mostly by high-emitting developed countries that are putting relatively low emitting developing countries most at risk. Second, the potential harms to the most vulnerable nations and people are not mere inconveniences but include catastrophic threats to life and the ecological systems on which life depends. Third, those people and nations most at risk can do little to protect themselves by petitioning their governments to shield them; their best hope is that high-emitting nations will respond to their obligations to not harm others. Fourth CO2 emissions become well mixed in the atmosphere so that COatmosphere concentrations are roughly the same around the world regardless of the source of the emissions. Therefore unlike other air pollution problems which most threaten only those nations and communities located within the pollution plume, greenhouse gas emissions from any one country are threatening people and other countries around the world.  This means that US greenhouse gas emissions are causing and threatening enormous harm all over the world.

Under the 2015 Paris accord, 195 nations agreed to cooperate to limit warming to as close as possible to 1.5°C and no more than 2.0°C.  Even nations that have historically opposed strong international action on climate change, including most of the OPEC countries, agreed to this warming limit goal because there is a broad scientific consensus that warming above these amounts will not only cause harsh climate impacts to millions around the word, but could lead to abrupt climate change which could create great danger for much of the human race. The international community’s condemnation of the Trump decision is attributable to the understanding that achieving the Paris agreement’s warming limit goals will require the cooperation of all nations and particularly high emitting nations including the United States to adopt greenhouse gas reduction targets more ambitious than nations have committed to thus far. For this reason, most nations view the Trump decision as outrageously dangerous.

Trump justified his decision by his claim that removing the United States from the Paris agreement was consistent with his goal of adopting policies that put America first. According to Trump staying in the Paris Agreement would cost America as much as 2.7 million lost jobs by 2025 including 440,000 fewer manufacturing jobs. This claim was based on a dubious study by National Economic Research Associates which was funded by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the American Council for Capitol Formation.  This study has been widely criticized for several reasons including that it neither counted the number of jobs which would be created in the renewable energy industry in a transformed energy sector nor the economic benefits of preventing climate change caused harms.

Yet it is the Trump assertion that the United States can base its energy policy primarily on putting US economic interests first while ignoring US obligations to not harm others that most clearly provokes moral outrage around the world. The moral principle that people may not harm others on the basis of self-interest is recognized by the vast majority of the world’s religions and in international law under the “no harm principle”.  The “no- harm’ rule is a principle of customary international law whereby a nation is duty-bound to prevent, reduce, and control the risk of environmental harm to other nations caused by activities within the nation  For these reasons, the Trump decision on the Paris Agreement is a moral travesty.


Donald A. Brown

Scholar In Residence and Professor

Widener University Commonwealth Law School